337. National Intelligence Estimate0
NIE 36.6–60
THE OUTLOOK FOR SAUDI ARABIA
The Problem
To estimate probable developments within Saudi Arabia and in its foreign relations during the next year or two.
The Estimate
1. Saudi Arabia has had a relatively tranquil time during the past year and a half . The 1958 Iraqi revolt and its aftermath, including fears of increased Communist influence, have diverted the interest of Arab Nationalists in general, and of Nasser in particular, away from the traditionalist and conservative states. In addition, King Saud’s brother, Crown Prince Feisal, who has been the principal architect of Saudi policy since March 1958, has taken care to prevent his country’s involvement in regional disputes.
Internal Stability
2. As a result, Feisal has been able to devote much of his time and effort to internal matters. He has succeeded in stabilizing the Saudi currency, has established the first real national budget, and has effected some improvement in the administrative machinery of the government. However, the country’s archaic social and political structure remains virtually unchanged and Feisal has shown little inclination to modify it.
3. It appears to be generally recognized, even by King Saud, that Feisal’s achievements have helped to preserve the dynasty and that the Crown Prince is not out to depose his brother. Nonetheless, Saud is irked by Feisal’s increased stature [2 lines of 2-column source text not declassified]. During the past year, the King appears to have had some success in consolidating his influence among religious leaders and the central and eastern tribes. He has sought to gain the support of various small but influential urban elements by repeated hints of his desire to create a council of advisers on which they would be represented. He has also sought popularity by outbidding Feisal in protestations of interest in economic development schemes.
[Page 760]4. Sooner or later Feisal’s chronic illness and known willingness to resign if subjected to undue interference will provide the King with an opportunity to try to reassert himself. This could provoke a crisis [4 lines of source text not declassified]. If Feisal simply withdrew, however, it would be difficult [less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified] to find another leader to support, [2 lines of 2-column source text not declassified]. Even so, there would almost certainly be an increase in tensions between various groups. This, [1½ lines of 2-column source text not declassified] would probably result in a sharp reduction in political and economic stability.
5. A serious challenge to the status quo originating outside the ruling group does not appear likely during the period. There is much dissatisfaction among literate urban and labor elements, including younger officers of the army, air force, and civil service. No clear evidence exists, however, that among these malcontents there has developed any organized movement against the regime. Nor are we aware of any reformist group plotting against the regime from outside the country. The more obvious and articulate pro-Nasser nationalists are few in number and have limited influence beyond their own small circles. In any event, all these people are finding at least a degree of satisfaction in Feisal’s acceptance of some of their own views. Finally, Nasser, to whom the reformists look for leadership, is not likely to encourage any political upheaval in Saudi Arabia at least as long as he remains preoccupied with Iraq, with communism in the area, and with internal problems of the UAR, or as long as Saudi regime does not actively seek to undermine his position in the area.
[1 paragraph (10 lines of 2-column source text) not declassified]
Foreign Relations
7. It is unlikely that the next year or so will see much change in the broad outlines of Saudi foreign policy, particularly if Feisal remains at the helm. The regime will probably continue a limited participation in world and regional affairs based on a qualified neutralism, and on common Arab objectives as propounded by the Arab League. It will probably continue to refrain from interference in the internal affairs of other League members—[2½ lines of 2-column source text not declassified]. Opposition to Israel will remain unabated.
8. Even if Saudi-British diplomatic relations are resumed, the relationship between the two countries will continue to be clouded by conflicts of interest between Saudi Arabia and British-protected states on its borders. As a means of expressing support for Arab League policies, the Saudis will probably continue to defer resuming diplomatic relations with France. Both the King and Feisal probably regard the US presence in the area as a safeguard for the position of the dynasty. Hence, despite [Page 761] aspirations toward neutralism, the regime will probably seek to preserve reasonably good relations with the US and continue to permit US access to Dhahran Airfield. Events in Iraq have heightened Saudi apprehensions of communism and the regime is unlikely to enter into relations with any Bloc country dining the period.
Oil
9. Saudi oil is likely in the future to pose problems both within Saudi Arabia and in that country’s relationship with the US. There is a widespread belief that the policies of Aramco (Arabian American Oil Company) and the US are closely associated, and the Saudi Government’s relationship with Aramco, once among the most harmonious in the Middle East, has deteriorated badly in recent years. Abdullah Tariki, Saudi Arabia’s energetic Director of Petroleum, insists that Aramco must become an integrated company, so that Saudi Arabia will share in revenues from refining, transporting, and marketing, as well as from the production of crude oil. Feisal has given Tariki considerable support. Aramco and its parent companies are unwilling even to consider integration, and have assumed a stiffer attitude toward the Saudis in recent months. This has probably resulted in part at least from the discovery of large new sources of oil in Libya and elsewhere, much of which will be available to Aramco’s parent companies.
10. Considering the virtually nonnegotiable nature of the main issue, Saudi-Aramco relations are unlikely to improve. However, Saudi Arabia is almost completely dependent on oil revenue to finance governmental expenditures, and neither Feisal nor any other member of the royal family is likely to [less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified] bring about a shutdown. The American companies, despite the availability of oil elsewhere, are unlikely to write off their heavy investment in Saudi Arabia as long as profitable operations remain possible. Thus, the present situation, while unsatisfactory to both sides, will probably continue for some time. At the same time, nationalist feeling will continue to be irritated by substantial foreign control over Saudi Arabia’s basic source of wealth.
- Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, Saudi Arabia Documents. Secret. A note on the cover sheet indicates that this estimate, submitted by the CIA, was prepared by CIA, INR, and the intelligence organizations of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff. All members of the USIB concurred with the estimate on April 19 except the AEC and FBI representatives who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.↩