333. Telegram From Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia0

499. Cairo’s 18521 and Embtel 413.2 Realizing and regretting that Faisal continues to hold certain unpleasant memories affecting his attitude toward U.S., we nevertheless wish continue patient efforts to strengthen such goodwill as he does hold for us. In this connection, [1 line of source text not declassified] you should take appropriate opportunities stress to Faisal and those around him USG’s confidence in him and our admiration for constructive program he is pursuing. You may wish to note that such differing viewpoints as may occasionally arise are differences between friends and we always ready to talk them out.

If Faisal should raise subject of Tariki’s oil policies with you (but only if he does so), we have no objection your speaking to him along lines outlined third para urtel but with following modifications: While we have no illusions re Tariki’s responsibility for shortsighted oil policies SAG is pursuing, we believe you should avoid any direct attacks on Tariki personally. [1 line of source text not declassified] Further you should exercise caution in use of figures re alleged losses stressing these are estimates given to us, since USG not technically competent make meaningful assessment this sort. Also encourage as appropriate direct talks between Faisal and Aramco to resolve outstanding problems.

In view considerable Saudi economic potential if its house is set fully in order and criticism here of SAG’s discriminatory practices against Americans on grounds religion, grant aid project for SA extremely difficult justify and we do not think present time is propitious actively explore matter.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86A./12–2459. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Dhahran and pouched to Cairo. Drafted by Eilts and approved by Jones.
  2. In telegram 1852, December 16, Ambassador Hare reported on a conversation with Faisal in Cairo in which the Saudi replayed his grievances against the United States—lack of support for Palestine, exploitation by oil companies, and Washington’s inability to understand the Arab mentality. When Faisal characterized Washington as “Arab enemy number one,” Hare felt compelled to say that he hoped such an assessment was based on past misunderstandings. Faisal agreed that he had been referring to the past and only to certain people in Washington. (Ibid., 786.00/12–1659)
  3. In telegram 413, December 24, Heath commented on Faisal’s “rancorous resentments” as expressed to Hare. Heath noted that Faisal learned from experience. Iraq had alerted him to the dangers of communism and he was gradually realizing that Saudi Arabia’s xenophobic and anti-Aramco oil policy as developed by Tariki was costing Saudi Arabia large sums of lost revenue. Heath proposed to inform Faisal, if he brought up the subject in their next discussion, that Tariki had cost Saudi Arabia “several hundred million dollars in revenues,” several years in developing new Saudi oil production, and generally had an adverse effect on new foreign investment in Saudi Arabia. (Ibid.,611.86A/12–2459)