302. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran0
771. Embtel 750.1 Dept concurs your thoughts as expressed penultimate paragraph reftel and you are authorized convey these views as considered opinion USG in your next talk with Prime Minister. In addition, you should express USG concern over possible exploitation visit by Khrushchev for psychological measures designed damage free world morale and more specifically sow doubts in Turkey and Pakistan re terms reference goodwill mission. In this connection you should emphasize desirability careful early briefings Turk and Pakistani Ambassadors and careful wording official announcement of plans for goodwill mission. Along same line you should mention casually that it had been our belief that a delegation headed by an official lower ranking than the PriMin would provide less opportunity for Sov psychological exploitation and would be more easily able to turn aside persistent efforts which Sovs will doubtless make to involve delegation in political discussions.
[Page 705]You are further authorized convey USG views that delegation’s mission would become much more difficult if Sovs allowed to gain impression that Iranian govt prepared to go to considerable lengths to obtain cessation Sov propaganda attacks. Should Sovs, on contrary, receive impression their propaganda attacks have been failure, they would be more, not less, willing respect Iranian integrity. You should express US gratification at PriMin’s realistic attitude and his determination avoid political discussions with Sovs.2
FYI. Dept would prefer no delegation at all to Moscow but realize Shah demands some effort relaxation tensions with USSR and that plan for goodwill delegation, though possibly dangerous, is valid method for GOI to stall Soviets and present self to Iran public as willing explore possibilities easing tension and as not being adamantly hostile to Sovs on US instigation. Commerce Minister would be preferable to FonMin as alternate to head delegation. We must take care not to give Iranians impression we have positive interest in Sov-Iran hostility in itself. For this reason and in order avoid any impression we distrust motives and capacity of PriMin, you should convey our views in low key without indicating great US concern over outcome of mission. Inform British Embassy. End FYI.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.88/10–2960. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Bowling; cleared by Henry J. Spielman, Officer in Charge of Pakistan-Afghanistan Affairs, and in draft with John A. Armitage, Officer in Charge of Multilateral Political Relations, Office of Soviet Union Affairs; and approved by Hart. Pouched to Moscow and London.↩
- In telegram 750 from Tehran, October 29, Charge Rockwell reported that Iranian Prime Minister Sharif-Emami told him that the good will mission to the Soviet Union would be headed by Sharif-Emami himself. Although the Iranian Prime Minister opposed heading the delegation, the Shah insisted that he do so. Sharif-Emami assured Rockwell that he would refuse to discuss political matters and would only listen to discussions about economic affairs. He also asked Rockwell for suggestions on what line to take in Moscow. Rockwell requested the Department’s approval that Sharif-Emami be urged not to make any political concessions, to avoid any commitments that would infringe on Iranian sovereignty, and to be wary of any new arrangements that would increase the Soviet presence in Iran. (Ibid., 661.88/10–2960)↩
- In telegram 764 from Tehran, November 3, Rockwell reported that he had made the suggested points to Sharif-Emami. The Iranian Prime Minister agreed to brief Iran’s allies in detail, feared that he was committed to head the mission although he would prefer not to, reiterated that he would make absolutely no concessions to the Soviets that would infringe on Iranian sovereignty, and promised not to engage in political discussions. (Ibid., 661.88/11–360)↩