294. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State0
REF
- Emb Desp 698, May 3, 19601
SUBJECT
- Possible Leaders in a Coup d’État Government in Iran
Summary
In spite of much talk to the contrary, the Embassy sees no real threat to the continuation of the Shah’s regime on the immediate horizon. However, considering Iran’s far-reaching problems, it would be unrealistic to ignore the possibility of a coup in Iran. For the background understanding it gives to Iran’s present situation, the possible leaders and policies of a coup government are discussed here. A possible coup would most likely take place in Tehran, would probably be led by the military, would result in a government combining military and civilian figures, would remove the Shah from the scene, and would probably be faced with a communist attempt to participate in the new government.
[Page 689]The first possible source of the leaders of a coup government is the group of senior, conservative officers who now hold key positions in the Shah’s regime. This group is the least likely of the ones discussed herein to initiate a coup, although it would make an attempt if it became clearly obvious that the Shah’s position were seriously deteriorating. Men in this category would carry out a coup for the purpose of saving the status quo; major changes in policy from those of the present regime should not be expected. Nor should such a government be expected to last for long. Second stage revolts would probably soon eliminate it.
A more likely source of the initiators of a coup would be found among those army officers from the rank of major general down to captain. Many of these men are dissatisfied with the present army command and hold positions which would be of key importance in case of an emergency. A coup by this group might well be bloody, and out of the general confusion following it would emerge its leaders. These men would be most interested in cleaning out the army command, in eliminating corruption throughout the government. They would need the aid of civilians and would most likely grant these civilians a leading role in the non-military part of a new government which would emphasize social reforms. This government would probably reduce US activities in Iran.
Civilian Mosadeqists lack initiative and power and could be expected only to participate in a government initially established by others. A government in which they participated would be far more neutralist than the present one and would be much less reliant on US friendship. The government would also emphasize development projects, social reforms, and the elimination of corruption. It would benefit from the lessons learned by Mosadeq’s failures.
Rightist and other non-Mosadeqist civilians include a wide range of possible leaders in a coup government. These men should not be expected to make major changes in present Iranian policies, but could give Iran an experienced and possibly forceful government. Like the Mosadeqists, these men would need a military alliance to accomplish a coup.
The most likely coup government would be a combination of two or more of these groups but exactly who would emerge as the dominant force in any government is impossible to predict.
US policy aims in Iran could be achieved best through a government dominated either by senior, conservative officers or by rightist civilians. In each of those cases, the US should attempt to encourage the reformist tendencies of the leaders, for otherwise the chances of survival of such a government would not be good. With a government dominated by either Mosadeqists or junior army officers, the US would find the achieving of its aims in Iran much more difficult, but not necessarily [Page 690] impossible. In any case, the essential qualities of US policy should of necessity be flexibility and forebearance.
[Here follows 20 pages of biographical details on the potential leaders of each possible coup group.]
Minister-Counselor