Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII

256. Memorandum of Discussion at the 386th Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

Washington, November 13, 1958.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

In Iran the chief of the Shah’s intelligence service had provided the Shah with a report warning him against Soviet-inspired subversive plots. Mr. Dulles thought we needed to watch with particular care developments along the frontier areas, especially those where there were significant Kurdish elements. These latter offer the best possibility to the Soviets for stirring up trouble. In general Soviet-Iranian relations had currently reached their lowest ebb in three years. In conclusion Mr. Dulles mentioned briefly several small steps taken by the Shah to implement the internal reform program. While these were steps in the right direction, they were thus far insufficient in Mr. Dulles’s view to syphon off discontent.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

2. U.S. Policy Toward Iran (NSC 5703/1; NSC Action No. 1998;¹SNIE 34–58;²NSC 5821;³ Memo for All Holders of NSC 5821, dated November 5, 1958⁴)

Mr. Gordon Gray briefed the Council at greater length than usual, stressing particularly those areas in which the newly proposed policy on Iran (NSC 5821) differed from our present policy on Iran (NSC 5703/1).⁵

At the conclusion of Mr. Gray’s briefing, he called on Secretary Herter to comment on the new proposed policy. Secretary Herter said that he found the new paper very interesting, the more so because Iran was the one nation in the world with a long border with the Soviet Union with which we have no defensive alliance. We were not even full partners in the Baghdad Pact. Iran obviously held a highly strategic position, and in our dealings with Iran we have been dealing with an individual (the Shah) of very uncertain quality. Evidently, the Shah had been slow in breaking his ties with the old landed aristocracy but he is now making significant moves in a new and desirable direction. These new moves had been the result of friendly urging by the U.S. rather than as the result of putting the heat on the Shah. The latter was so exceedingly temperamental that the State Department feared that if we really attempted to put the heat on him, he might very well tell us to go to hell and proceed to play ball with the other side. The situation was far from a happy one and, moreover, was now complicated by the recent Kurdish agitation.

As to the problem of the size of Iran’s military establishment, the State Department felt that this called for a professional military judgment and was a subject on which the State Department was not too intelligent except insofar as the military strength of Iran were to be so increased that it would constitute a heavy strain both on the economy of Iran and our own U.S. resources for the assistance of Iran. The Shah evidently counts on the hope that increase in Iranian oil revenues will be sufficient shortly to put an end to all need in Iran for outside assistance.

The President commented that he was aware of this hope and that the Shah himself had said to the President that Iran could dispense with outside assistance in ten years’ time.

Mr. Gray pointed out that as regards inducements and pressures on the Shah to carry out the necessary reforms in Iran, the Planning Board in the present paper was suggesting that we try inducements first and resort to pressures on the Shah only when the State Department deemed this course of action to be appropriate. In short, the Planning Board did not regard the language in the present paper as constituting a restricting directive to the State Department.

Secretary Herter said he was quite willing to accept the language in the paper dealing with this subject, and Mr. Gray then asked General Taylor, as Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to comment on the mission of the Iranian armed forces and the fact that while the old policy paper (NSC 5703/1) had mentioned “outside air and logistic support” to Iran in fighting defensive delaying actions, the present policy (NSC 5821) called merely for “outside support” for this purpose.

General Taylor replied that the language referred to by Mr. Gray in Paragraph 36–a related to Baghdad Pact military planning. It seemed to be the view of the Baghdad Pact planners that some 19 divisions—not only Iranian but some supplied by other Baghdad Pact Powers—were required to discharge the military mission of fighting delaying actions against Soviet forces. Accordingly, it seemed to General Taylor that the change of language from “outside air and logistic support” to “outside support” was a reasonable change and simply reflected the views of the Baghdad Pact planners that Iranian ground forces would be assisted by ground troops from Turkey and Pakistan. With regard to the possibility that the term “outside support” might imply a U.S. commitment to provide ground troops as well as air and logistic support in the event of Soviet-armed aggression against Iran, General Taylor invited the Council’s attention to Paragraph 43 which contained guidance for U.S. action in the event that U.S.S.R. military forces invaded Iran. After reading this paragraph to the Council, General Taylor said the language clearly left open to decision by the President at the time what kind of assistance would be offered, and specifically whether U.S. ground forces were to be included or not.

Mr. Gray replied that the Planning Board merely wanted to be sure of the significance of this change of phraseology and went on to say that he had one other comment to make. It was the consensus of the Planning Board that the so-called Firbal Project, a dummy corporation of Iranian notables acting as an intermediary between French contractors and the Iranian Ministry of War, was not of sufficient importance to justify discussion in the Council. Nevertheless, Mr. Gray said he did feel some concern lest by condoning the Firbal Project, the U.S. was not perhaps in effect condoning the very graft and corruption which it was our policy to try to induce the Shah to eliminate. He therefore hoped that the State Department would take a good look at the Firbal Project so that we could be sure of not being embarrassed later by these arrangements.

Secretary Herter replied that Mr. Allen Dulles was the leading authority on Iranian law, having been the author of that country’s present code of law. Nevertheless, one of the most encouraging features of late was the Shah’s crackdown on corrupt practices within his own family.

The President brought the discussion back to the matter of the deployment of the Iranian Army, and pointed out that when the Shah had visited him last summer, he had talked about the necessity of deploying two good Iranian military units in the Kurdish areas of Iraq [Iran] and he had also talked of the desirability of installing a radio to broadcast in Kurdish to Kurds living in Iran. The Shah had pointed out that the Kurds were constantly bombarded by Soviet propaganda broadcasts and he wanted some kind of counteraction. The President asked if anything had been done by us to respond to the Shah’s request for assistance.

The Director of USIA, Mr. George Allen, said that his agency was currently working with the Government of Iran about setting up a 50-kilowatt broadcasting facility. Of course, continued Mr. Allen, it was equally important what the radio broadcasts of this station would say to the Kurdish population of Iran. The Iranian authorities have not yet decided on what line the new radio would take. Accordingly, USIA was trying to help formulate a broadcasting line to which the Kurds would respond favorably. This was not easy because the Kurds have always disliked the Iranians and probably could never be induced to like them.

Apropos of the various paragraphs of the paper which Mr. Gray had read in the course of his briefing, the President expressed approval of the language. He expressed his earnest agreement with Secretary Herter that as long as we propose to play ball with the Shah, we certainly could not hammer at him in order to get him to undertake the reforms. If we did not propose to treat him skillfully, we had better abandon him altogether and get another man. Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that there was no “other man” in sight at the present moment.

Secretary Anderson suggested that another significant means of influencing the Shah in the right direction was through his many contacts with American businessmen. Unlike most heads of state, the Shah enjoyed very much talking to American businessmen. They were thus in the position of urging reform measures upon him without appearing to be instruments of the U.S. Government carrying out official U.S. policy.

The National Security Council:⁶

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5821, prepared by the NSC Planning Board pursuant to NSC Action No. 1998–b.

b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5821.

Note: The statement of policy in NSC 5821, as adopted, subsequently approved by the President; circulated as NSC 5821/1⁷ for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President.

[Here follow agenda items 3 and 4.]

S. Everett Gleason

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on November 13.
1. See Document 254.
2. Document 249.
3. See footnote 5 below.
4. This memorandum transmitted the financial appendix of NSC 5821 to the NSC. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5821 Memoranda)
5. As Rountree informed Dulles in a memorandum of November 11, NSC 5821 “emphasizes our concern over a possible deterioration of internal stability if the Shah does not move energetically toward certain political, economic, social and administrative reforms. It stresses the need for our representatives in Tehran to assist the Shah in his efforts, wherever appropriate and feasible. The paper reflects the President’s decision of July 19, 1958, to accelerate deliveries of equipment to, and training of, the Iranian armed forces, and to bring authorized units up to full strength. At the same time it emphasizes the need to convince the Shah and others that the attempted creation of forces beyond the country’s ability to absorb and support could only be detrimental to Iran’s own security interests.” (Ibid.)
6. Paragraphs a and b and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 2006, approved by the President on November 15. (Ibid., S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
7. Document 257.