Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII

215. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State⁰

Baghdad, February 26, 1960, 9 a.m.

1951. Department pass Defense and pouch Kuwait. Information addresses pass military commands. Paris also for USRO. Dhahran for DLG. Rome for Liaison. There follows Embassy’s appraisal current situation in Iraq.

A. Elements situation:

1. State of political tension continues with apparent weakening Qassim’s prestige and erosion confidence in his leadership among most political groupings including left.

(A) Qassim’s December 2 “State of Nation” speech diffusing blame Kirkuk excesses which he previously attributed Communists and labeling Nationalist students efforts break Communist grip student union in fall elections as part plot against him; continued prominence in his regime outspokenly pro-Soviet officers and officials and his own close association with Colonels Mahdawi, Taher; Leftist control radio TV and most organs press; arrests or exile from Baghdad some active Nationalists have brought discouragement and fear to most “Nationalist” groups.

(B) On other hand, Qassim’s tactics “redress balance” and weaken Communist monolith have become increasingly apparent over past month. Specific acts include covertly sponsoring, supporting, and, finally, licensing as Communist Party small splinter group following legal resumption activity political parties January 6 and subsequent refusal license main body old CPI; intervention in Agrarian Reform to halt efforts introduce collective rather than cooperative concepts followed by dismissal pro-Communist Minister Agrarian Reform and Oil, Ibrahim Kubba; tolerance one hard-hitting anti-Communist newspaper possibly because personal friendliness towards its editor. These plus his moves against them summer 1959 have left Communists and Leftists uneasy. Communist press has increased its criticism regime citing high prices and depression and calling for thorough purge such Ministries as Interior and Foreign Affairs where Leftist influence negligible.

(C) Between extremes Pan-Arab Nationalists and Communists, most groups seem confused by Qassim’s erratic political tactics, discouraged by the lack of concrete evidence progress and disillusioned by his failure give leadership and guidance this faltering state.

(D) Communist power and potential for trouble-making still great. The main Communist Party is well-organized, disciplined and, apparently, financed; it still “controls the streets” in many parts Baghdad, has great influence and varying degrees control Ministries Oil, Municipalities, Guidance, Education, Agrarian Reform and Planning, and in most popular and professional groups. Commander Air Force outspokenly pro-Communist and at least one squadron dominated by pro-Communists; extent which lower ranks army have been penetrated is problematic.

(E) There has been further drop Qassim’s popularity with man in street and within most groups with which Embassy maintains contact.

(F) Reports new plots against Qassim’s life are rife with most in agreement any successful coup must have support significant elements army. Qassim surrounded by increased security at Ministry Defense quarters and in his moves around Baghdad.

2. Economic disorganization and difficulties in reinvigorating development program resulting in increasingly defensive posture on part Qassim regime and more realistic official appraisal economic problems facing Iraq.

(A) Speeches by Qassim and other regime officials increasingly reflect realization socio-economic problems and attempts ease social pressures by promises that cannot be realized in full.

(B) Increased concern over economy now being reflected in efforts create atmosphere conducive developmental progress. These include attempts resolve GOI difficulties with foreign and domestic contractors, decisions which demonstrate reluctance enter into government-to-government deals, over-ruling ex-Minister Kubb’s efforts make USSR sole supplier farm equipment and establish model farm collectives; and easing restrictions which previously inhibited business dealings with west by private sector.

(C) Facts that new development projects are formulated in patchwork manner and regime has lacked managerial competence execute programs when approved have prevented increase in demand for labor and are resulting in increased social pressures on government.

3. Growing disillusionment in public and private sectors economy resulting from limited character benefits derived from east bloc presence in contrast previous great expectations government and people.

(A) Iraqi preference for bargaining element in contracting for development projects becoming manifest. There growing concern over commitments in Soviet aid agreement which many officials fear may not be in accord with Iraq’s best interests or in keeping with attitudes toward government-to-government dealings.

(B) Coupled with instances Iraqi insistence on competitive tenders in projects financed under Soviet agreement is gradually improving climate for western business operations.

4. Iraq’s relations with UAR, Jordan, and Iran have worsened and it is possible that these states may override differences and covertly agreed lend support opposition elements without and within Iraq in effort oust Qassim. Qassim’s recent campaigns for independent Syria, Palestine Republic, and against Shah and government make difficult any rapprochement with UAR, Jordan, and Iran. Relations with rest Arab world correct but not close. Of area states, relations with Turkey have remained best and Turks have exercised some helpful influence in controversy between Iraq and Iran over Shatt Al-Arab.

5. Relations with west seem improved despite continued hostility Iraqi press and radio. Subjectively, most officers of mission feel there has been drop in suspicion western intentions in general and present US policies in particular. Contacts with certain types Iraqi officials easier and more frequent now and some feelers for closer cooperation in military and economic fields have been noted.

6. On political level, relations with Communist bloc continue close with bloc continuing considerable effort make presence felt.

7. Government radio and TV still follow pro-Soviet bloc line as does most of press. Qassim has, however, removed a few most blatantly pro-bloc officials from Ministry Guidance operating level. We still hopeful result will be noticeable.

8. Qassim’s devious tactics and attempts maneuver political forces seem have produced distrust of him among most of these. He still appears maintain upper hand and apparently, wields effective control over army command although persistent reports indicate this will be lost unless he continues show firm attitude toward Communists. Although clearly messianic in outlook, it becoming evident Qassim no Communist but “Qassimist” with his own interests and those of Iraqi nationalism foremost.

B. Conclusions and recommendations:

1. An attempt against Qassim’s life is possible at any time. If successful and military junta (possibly headed by Sovereignty Council President Rubai and Military Governor General Abdi) takes over, transition would be rapid and any disorders controlled. If Communists move install pro-Communist regime, civil war and widespread disorders likely. Intervention from Jordan or UAR would probably be opposed by most of army and masses of population unless invited by an anti-Communist regime which had already achieved some degree of control.

2. While Qassim’s policies have been so erratic that seems unlikely he could rally widespread popular support behind him in near future, continuation trend limit Communist influence would minimize opposition and bring more stability regime. He would still, however, have to solve Iraq’s dilemma of having economic resources but not capability marshalling them to enable rate economic development essential survival his regime.

3. We continue believe in basic soundness current United States policies toward Iraq and believe these beginning pay off in terms improved United States-Iraqi relations. Embassy recommends United States continue efforts restrain attempts by external forces intervene in Iraqi affairs and remain ready consider sympathetically any GOI request assistance.

4. Embassy believes situation has progressed to point where efforts make “American presence” felt appropriate. These would include gradually increased contacts by Americans with official, cultural, and business circles, continuation present accelerated trade promotion program, encouragement American contractors compete for projects in Iraq, propose offer resume training Iraqi military officers in United States military schools, and resumption informational activities in discreet manner following completion current cultural agreement negotiations.

5. In event successful non-Communist coup, United States should stand ready grant prompt recognition and discourage outside intervention. While present situation does not warrant active contingency planning with regional allies, we should maintain inventory resources which we could use attempt counter pro-Communist take-over in event coup.

6. While my staff and I do not believe assistance program similar pre-revolution USOM program in Iraq would be acceptable or appropriate in future, consideration should be given immediate measures that could be taken assist new anti-Communist regime or meet requests for advice or assistance from Qassim’s Government. Discreet advice on how move ahead on stalled development program or on basic developmental planning could be major factor determining orientation GOI in future.

7. We remain convinced Iraq faces continuing political instability and prolonged economic difficulty.

Service Attachés [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] concur.

Jernegan

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.00/2–2660. Secret. Transmitted in three sections and repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Dhahran, Ankara, Jidda, Khartoum, London, Moscow, Paris, Rabat, Rome, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Tunis, and Basra.