117. Memorandum of Conversation0


  • Jordan and Iraq


  • United States
    • The Secretary of State
    • Frederick Reinhardt
  • United Kingdom
    • Lord Hood, British Minister

The Secretary said that it was not clear to him from the British messages we had seen how the British thought the problem of Jordan and Iraq should be played and what were their concepts and plans. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd had indicated he might be able to come to Washington. If there were time, the Secretary thought this would be a good idea and he said that the President was agreeable. Lord Hood replied he believed the messages passed to us did not look very far forward but reflected London’s belief that unless something were done quickly in Jordan and Iraq, it would be too late. To this the Secretary agreed and added that there was a great absence of information. It was clear the landing in Lebanon today had had a good effect but the big question was Iraq. Whoever came over from London should come over if and when he was ready to discuss this problem seriously and perhaps he should bring some technical people with him. We had thought about many contingencies but the Iraq development was a new one. We had sent a brief holding message to King Hussein1 but had no clear idea as yet on the desirability of putting troops into Jordan. We were studying these problems and would try to be ready by Thursday.2 The Secretary said we might probably want to have a working party on this subject, which perhaps should be set up in London, but first the top people should determine what was to be done. The Secretary said that he could probably make all day Thursday available and part of Friday morning for meetings with Mr. Lloyd. Friday afternoon he would be taken up by Mutual Security hearings on the hill.

  1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D199. Secret. Drafted by Reinhardt.
  2. See footnote 1, Document 111.
  3. July 17.