Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

55. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, May 31, 1958—2 p.m.

3151. Re Deptel 3223.² In talk with Haikal yesterday following that with Bustani³ reported Embtel 3940,⁴ former said he was one who had urged Bustani come and arranged for his being given visa at airport when visa refused by UAR Ambassador Beirut, who personal enemy of Bustani. Conversation then led to general discussion of Lebanese situation which brought out little of interest except for fact that Nasser’s formula for solution is “peace without victory or defeat” and assertion that UAR has mass of information available re atrocities in eviction of Syrians (some actually being sent over border nude) but was not releasing for fear making bad situation worse and possibly raising question of action against Lebanese here. Conversation did however afford occasion to refer to Nasser’s reported disposition to renew discussion of situation with me and to Haikal’s undertaking to arrange, which seemed fit in well with Department’s instructions in reftel to seek approach Nasser on personal basis. As consequence I saw Nasser for well over hour last night and approached as instructed.

Nasser was definitely in one of his difficult moods and, whatever may have been real cause or causes, it was obvious this due at least in part to what he professed regard as return of USG and American people to position of hostility to him which belied our recent professions of desire for more normal relations. In particular, he mentioned:

(1) Secretary Dulles’ press conference of May 21⁵ in which Nasser felt Secretary had pre-judged case by uncritically accepting Lebanese assertions. Nasser seemed attach particular importance to fact that Secretary’s statement was made on day following our conversation of May 20 (Embtel 3029).⁶ I suggested Nasser read transcript in entirety and felt he would get quite different impression.

(2) Reported statement by Ambassador Lodge to UAR representative Loutzir in New York that USG had taken definite position in support GOL.

(3) Recrudescence of anti-UAR material in American press centered around “now is time to get Nasser” theme. Nasser dwelt on this at considerable length and indicated his conclusion reached by personnel of American press.

(4) Appearance of new item in Beirut newspaper An-Nas of May 29 (text by despatch Number 1174)⁷ correctly reporting essential points he had proposed me in our last conversation of settling Lebanese crisis. Nasser did not however belabor this point.

(5) Fact we had not seen fit respond to suggestions he had made for settlement, which he could only regard as turn-down. He had made proposals in good faith and was disappointed that we had not seen fit respond.

In reply my renewed effort to emphasize desirability of Nasser’s exerting constructive influence, especially with view to convincing opposition of desirability of reciprocating decision not seek change constitution by dropping demand that Chamoun resign, Nasser said he still felt Chamoun should stay on until another president elected but he did not feel justified in urging this point of view on opposition unless there was clear guarantee that Chamoun would not victimize opposition in revenge during few months remaining of his term. What position would he (Nasser) be in if he urged opposition be reconciliatory and then have government institute persecution campaign program against them, especially since situation developing into confessional conflict with Christians, led by Chamoun, out to get Moslems?

He had not, said Nasser, played part in starting present troubles, had not maintained contact with opposition and could not assume responsibility of intervening to bring conflict to end unless he could do so by agreement with USG and on understanding latter would underwrite any guarantee given to safeguard opposition. I said [I] had been talking personally and not in position suggest deal. Situation is that we have been doing everything we can to reduce dangerous potential in Lebanon, and on assumption Nasser similarly disposed, I ventured renew hope he would do what he could. However, he remained obdurate, maintaining that risk of unilateral action was too great; would only intervene in association with US.

Meanwhile, added Nasser, he convinced that he is faced by conspiracy of governing heads of Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon against UAR and has no option but to fight back by exposing plot. That is what radio now doing under his orders. It is matter of defense and UAR will be equally prepared defend itself if present difficulty assumes international proportions. Such development would not be of its seeking but UAR entertains no fears if it should materialize.

Only light note in conversation was when Nasser observed still recovering from fatigue of trip to USSR. Daily routine of formal lunch and dinner, each inevitably lasting three hours including speeches, had really gotten him down.

Hare

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/5–3158. Top Secret. Repeated to Beirut, London, and Paris.
2. Document 51.
3. Emile Boustany, a Deputy in the Lebanese Parliament, with extensive commercial contacts in Egypt. [1 line of text not declassified] (Despatch 544 from Beirut, March 26; Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/3–2658)
4. In telegram 3140 from Cairo, May 30, Hare reported on a conversation with Boustany concerning Boustany’s meeting with Nasser on May 29. Boustany said that Nasser was concerned that developments in Lebanon were not only damaging to Lebanon but also inimical to UAR interests, particularly in light of his hope for improved relations with the United States. Boustany suggested that Nasser discuss the situation with Hare, and Nasser replied that it was difficult for him to take the initiative, but he would respond to a request from Hare for a discussion of Lebanon. (Ibid., 783A.00/5–3058)
5. Reference is to Dulles’ remarks on May 20; see footnote 3, Document 42.
6. Document 44.
7. Not found.