Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

54. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State¹

Beirut, May 30, 1958—11 p.m.

4361. Verbatim text. Ambassadorial SITREP.

(1) Throughout morning Ambassadors were generally surrounded by self-appointed emissaries advocating Chehab Cabinet as a solution of present state of civil war in Lebanon. These included various messages through intermediaries from opposition leaders; increasingly shrill protestations from third force (e.g., Pharaon, et al) and Maronite Archbishop of Tripoli, a former staunch advocate of Chamoun’s reelection, who now feels Chehab Cabinet is only means of ending conflict. Bishop told me this morning he had told both Chamoun and Patriarch yesterday question of Chamoun’s renewal was completely dead and in this received Chamoun’s concurrence.

(2) French Ambassador yesterday evening saw Patriarch and said three Ambassadors had received assurances from Chamoun on question of re-election. Patriarch concurred Chamoun should last out his term and indicated willingness use his influence with opposition to get them to agree to a cease-fire and lifting of general strike if a Chehab Cabinet could be formed.

(3) Roche then saw Chehab last night at Junieh. General was noncommittal as to his own candidature. He revealed his continuing profound suspicion of Chamoun and need for bona fides latter would not try to succeed himself and came up with counterproposal it would be far better to set up a “neutral” government in which all sectors of Lebanese opinion might have confidence. However, names he mentioned were so neutral as to be neuter. Chehab also had intricate formula for convocation by Patriarch of a Moslem-Christian groupment to triple-rivet guarantees against Chamoun’s re-election; a letter signed in blank by President for dissolution of government to be used “in case of necessity”; and an approach via US Embassy Cairo to Nasser. French Ambassador indicated strong doubt that he and his colleagues could envisage such a complicated arrangement as meeting urgent necessities of moment.

(4) Three Ambassadors met before lunch and agreed it was of essence to find out whether or not Chehab would accept Prime Ministership. It was agreed I should see General as soon as possible. Immediately before departure for Junieh for my appointment at 3:30 this afternoon [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Malik had learned from Turkish Ambassador he had found Chehab in complete funk this morning and General had estimated he could not militarily continue longer than two days. At Cabinet meeting according to Malik (later confirmed [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] by Chamoun) government discussed whether or not Chehab should be asked to resign. I later checked both with General and President and was told by Chehab he had made no such estimate to Turkish Ambassador. Chehab said he had confined his observation to saying that within next four to six days he would see more clearly how military situation in Tripoli could develop. My own estimate is that Turkish Ambassador misconstrued whatever Chehab told him. What is certain is Chamoun’s assertion to me this afternoon that Malik got into flap and advised Cabinet Chehab was running out on them and that they had better seek another Commander-in-Chief. Chamoun said he is summoning both Chehab and Turkish Ambassador this afternoon to form his own conclusions on this particular episode. (Prime Minister later told [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] General would be summoned before Cabinet.) This would be of minor importance were it not possible that it may trigger off decision by Chamoun to remove Chehab as Commander-in-Chief. Whether Army would remain steadfast following departure of its General is a major question mark.

(5) Chehab confirmed report brought me by ARMA this morning that govt has asked General to prepare military plans for opening a major thoroughfare through Beirut Moslem quarter of Basta. Middle-ton tells me this is a suggestion originating with Mikkawi who impressed Chamoun and Solh with his urging that a group of tanks and fifty men could open Basta completely. Chehab said Sami Bey had taken one and a half hours of his time discussing this subject but he, Chaheb, would not attempt to open Basta because carnage involved would not be worth results obtained. This question is cited not for its intrinsic importance but because again it may be used by govt as pretext for removal of Chehab.

(6) I told Chehab this afternoon three Ambassadors had received evidence of a general desire that he take Prime Ministership provided this would bring end to civil strife. However, as had French Ambassador last night, I found General still of a divided mind. He said main fear was that if he took Prime Ministership he would be sabotaged by “that bloc” around President. By this he apparently meant principally Phalange Party since this was only name he mentioned. However, it was clear General is still rankled by sabotage work on him last week in the Fawzi–Qawugji affair. General said he still felt solution of a “neutral” govt would be best and that he had not made up his mind on acceptance of Prime Ministership.

(7) I returned directly from Junieh to see Chamoun and told him of efforts Ambassadors had made at his suggestion in endeavoring to find a political solution. I said there were now so many intermediaries running to and fro that we had to deal with principals directly. However, all three Ambassadors felt time was rapidly running short for them to be of much further utility if on one hand General did not wish to take office and if on other President had not clearly resolved to offer it to him. Chamoun said his readiness to appoint Chehab as Prime Minister would be conditioned by his certainty Chehab govt would bring a prompt end to hostilities. Otherwise he would stand steadfast with Sami Solh.

(8) Foregoing was drafted before Ambassadors received text of Patriarch’s press conference this morning (Embtel 4357).² At our evening meeting I found French Ambassador livid with what he calls a super-double cross from Patriarch. All three Ambassadors are also not happy over milk-toast communiqué issued by Malik after his departure in which he “roars like a dove” at UAR. All three of us share view that following Patriarch’s demand for Chamoun’s resignation and his refusal to accept Chehab formula, plus continuing indecisiveness of General, plus Chamoun’s resolution not to accept Chehab unless this can bring a definitive solution, there is little more we can do. We plan to take a short long week-end.

(9) Test will come in my own opinion on issue of whether Chamoun dares to dismiss Chehab and, if so, if General who said once more to me this afternoon, “I have the rifles,” might then be tempted to take power. Fortunately, in Lebanon, everyone (except, of course, the three Ambassadors) is decisively indecisive.

McClintock

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/5–3058. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to USUN, London, and Paris.
2. In telegram 4357 from Beirut, May 30, the Embassy reported on a statement that morning by Maronite Patriarch Boulos Boutros Meouchi. Meouchi told a group of foreign correspondents that President Chamoun “should take a vacation abroad” in order to bring an end to the present crisis. (Ibid.)