Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

44. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State ¹

Cairo , May 20, 1958—7 p.m.

3029. In over 2-hour talk with Nasser this afternoon I conveyed contents of Department telegrams 3117² re Lebanon and 3134³ re basic relationship, opening with latter.

Nasser listened to discussion re our basic intent with close attention and expressed appreciation but mention of Lebanon raised storm clouds since he had apparently just been given ticker report of statements attributed to Deputy Under Secretary Murphy and Director Allen Dulles (whom he seemed have confused with Director George Allen) in closed hearings of Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Nasser coupled these statements with others emanating from London and Paris as part of deliberate build-up in preparation for some unknown conspiratorial action. He also strenuously objected to portions of statements (unavailable to Embassy) which by implication or otherwise gave the impression that UAR was working with Moscow. Nasser said that in circumstances he would have no recourse but to react to these charges. I tried calm him down and he seemed respond somewhat but difficult know whether effect will last.

Nasser then launched into tendentious discussion of Lebanese situation per se. Unpredictable problems were always arising in ME and he said UAR unavoidably becomes involved. He had heard of Lebanese situation by radio in Moscow and had called Marshal Amer to warn against becoming involved until his return, at which time he felt that publicity was one-sided and unfair and had ordered that opposition side of story should be told, including statements of opposition leaders; while at same time denying alleged UAR involvement. How was it possible to maintain that opposition was wrong when it included all former Prime Ministers except Solh, two of three Speakers of Parliament, former President Khoury, the Maronite Patriarch, and leaders such as Jumblatt and Frangie? Was there one of these opposition leaders who was not pro-Western? How could they all be wrong and just Chamoun and Malik right? Chamoun seemed intent on following course which would eventually lead to war between Moslems and Christians than which nothing could be worse. Why did we insist on backing Chamoun in these circumstances while putting him (Nasser) in position of being tied up with Russians? Greatest mistake of USG in Middle East was that it failed understand that basic fact of life in area is that people are tired of being exploited. Why did we continue support leaders who were out of sympathy with people? Nasser admitted that he sometimes acted in rather high-handed manner, such as when he ruled that some people could stand for election and others

could not. This was obviously not democratic but people approved because they were convinced he was acting in their interest; that was reason they supported him.

As far as alleged UAR involvement in Lebanon was concerned, he denied such the case and would be interested in any evidence that could be produced to contrary. It was of course possible that there might have been some crossing of border by persons, especially Druses, and some arms smuggling but UAR had nothing to do with it. There is always tendency assume Egypt has greater capability than it has. Did I know how much its total budget for intelligence was? Only 1 million pounds. What could you do with that?

Except for a few interruptions to endeavor keep record somewhere near straight, I allowed this somewhat incoherent tempest run its course and then observed that, regardless of incidental details, I had impression that both of us interested in seeing Lebanese situation settled quietly and prevented from developing more seriously. Was that correct? Yes, said Nasser, but there is now stalemate and difficult see what could be done. I said repeating difficulties would get us nowhere. How about thinking instead in terms of settlement?

Much to my surprise, Nasser’s whole attitude changed at this point. He said had heard of plan to replace Solh [with?] Chehab as Prime Minister which seemed reasonable to him and he did not know why it had been refused. In fact he did not understand exactly what opposition really wanted but in his opinion settlement might be worked out somewhat along following lines:

(1) An amnesty for opposition. This is of first importance because greatest preoccupation of opposition leaders in that they will be court-martialed and, as long as there is prospect that Chamoun will take his revenge, they obviously will not talk of settlement.

(2) General Shehab to become Prime Minister since he is respected and enjoys confidence of both Christians and Moslems.

(3) Chamoun to disclaim intention to seek change constitution but to serve out term. Nasser said understood opposition insisting on his resigning now but this would obviously present complications and he saw no reason for insisting on this provided there was fully guaranteed amnesty.

(4) Possibly have new elections.

Nasser said that he sincerely wished be helpful and would be glad to attempt use his influence with opposition leaders in effort obtain their assent to any formula on which we might agree. He also suggested Ambassador McClintock might be able get in discreet touch with Saeb Salaam. Nasser said he would be glad see me at any time in event I had any ideas. He added unfortunate several days had already been lost while attention devoted entirely to refutation of charges of UAR complicity.

Although I am still somewhat mystified by this sudden change of Nasser from the tendentious and querulous to thoughtful and reasonable (a change which was also reflected in his entire manner), I feel that we may have struck lead which can be profitably pursued. If so, it would surely be preferable do so rather than have case go to Security Council where it could hardly fail to degenerate into a propaganda battle between Lebanon backed by West and UAR backed by USSR. Perhaps this is Nasser’s worry since recurrent theme of conversation was his aversion to being linked with Soviets in connection Lebanon.

Suggest Embassy Beirut may wish comment.

Hare

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/5–2058. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to Beirut, Damascus, and London.
2. Document 36. In the absence of Nasser and General Amer, Hare had conveyed the message outlined in telegram 3117 to Hussein Aziz, Permanent Under Secretary of the Foreign Office, on May 16. Given the importance of the message, Aziz indicated that he would arrange for Hare to meet with Nasser when he returned to Cairo. (Telegram 2985 from Cairo, May 16; Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/5–1658)
3. In telegram 3134 to Cairo, May 17, Ambassador Hare was instructed to respond to Nasser’s concern over U.S. intent toward the UAR. Hare was to tell Nasser that the United States was not interfering in the internal affairs of the UAR, nor seeking to remove Nasser or his government. Hare also was to emphasize that an important factor in the U.S. approach to the UAR was the UAR attitute toward the security and national integrity of other states in the area, “particularly those maintaining close relations with US.” The full text of this telegram is printed in vol. XIII, pp. 450–451.