Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

56. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State¹

Beirut, June 2, 1958—7 p.m.

4404. There is at present a precarious lull in Lebanon. Military situation seems to have reached tacit cease fire with army preventing partisans on either side from engaging in communal strife. However G–2 reports indicated steady buildup of anti-government irregulars, although no central organized command has been identified. Although conditions in Tripoli are tense life in Beirut is returning to normal with exception that Moslem Basta district is still closed and very much in hands of partisan bands, estimated at 2, 100 against Chamoun, probably balanced by a similar number defending the President.

On POL front a similar stalemate continues. Following declaration of Prime Minister Solh (Embtel 4272)² giving assurances his government will not amend constitution to pave way for Chamoun’s reelection, main domestic bone of contention has been removed. Clamor of extreme opposition leaders for Chamoun immediate resignation now has less appeal; and Maronite Patriarch’s extraordinary press conference (Embtel 4357)³ has boomeranged against Chamoun remaining in office until end of constitutional term but with his government pledged to no renewal for a second term.

With Lebanon case under consideration by Arab League and held pending in Security Council of UN it seems useful to review causes of conflict which are numerous and not as simple as various partisans would have us believe. In particular, with Malik now in New York, USUN and Department will receive his very partial account of how

Lebanon difficulties began. In all objectivity it cannot be said this is a black and white issue of UAR aggression against Lebanon. Although evidence of UAR infiltration and subversion is conclusive, in my judgment root cause of Lebanon’s present difficulties was of domestic origin. It was Chamoun’s determination to stand for a second six year term in office which provided pretext for this near rebellion, although Nasser and his henchmen were quick to take advantage of issue thus presented.

Department and USUN (as well as Embassies London Ankara Baghdad and Amman) may wish to keep in mind following points:

(1) With or without question of Chamoun’s desire to succeed himself a trend had set in in Lebanon toward a more neutral stance in foreign affairs prior to recent crises. However, present state of quasi civil war has not been fought on a foreign policy issue and it would be a great over-simplification to ascribe Lebanon’s present division only in terms of “pro or con Eisenhower Doctrine.”

Attitudes toward Chamoun’s foreign policy may have contributed to basic likes or dislikes for Chamoun as a leader but were not in my opinion controlling factors. This judgment describes domestic opinion; it does not bear on Nasser’s enmity for Chamoun and his supporters which probably is based on foreign policy issues.

(2) Although not of noble motivation one of main springs of present insurrection was simple desire of the “have-nots” to become “haves.” Basic personal hatred for Chamoun of such opposition leaders as Saeb Salaam, Abdullah Yafi and Junblat sprang not alone from ideological differences on foreign policy but more intimately from fact that in 1957 elections Chamoun brought about their defeat for Parliament. In fact alleged issue of Eisenhower Doctrine was in some measure merely coincidental with timing of last Parliamentary elections where rankle of personal political defeat coincided with Chamoun’s espousal of Eisenhower Doctrine.

(3) There has been undoubted subversion and infiltration from UAR particularly Syria, but this has been going on over past two years. There have been a number of political enemies of Chamoun living in voluntary exile in Syria; and it is fairly clear Serraj and Company have been only too willing to supply Lebanon partisans with clandestine arms, funds and other support. Evidence of actual involvement of Syrian agents and particularly of military cadres is much more difficult to substantiate. Certainly Lebanon Army has not thus far secured any impressive number of prisoners whose presence on Lebanon soil in flagrante delicto would have provided major proof for GOL allegations against UAR. At maximum it would seem UAR was ready and willing to assist opposition against Chamoun once they had called general strike and had unleashed a not very well coordinated action of armed insurrection, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] suggested UAR deliberately brought about Metni assassination which triggered off general strike and led to armed conflict. Most palpable evidence of UAR intervention against GOL lies in incontrovertible proof of press and radio incitement to civil war both from Damascus and Cairo. It would be interesting if UN might some day be able to establish a norm of international conduct (if not international law) violation of which would indicate wrongful interference by one state against another through use of radio and press.

(4) Another cause of Lebanon difficulty is ancient division of country between Moslems and Christians. By tradition and practice Christians have had edge over Moslems both in assignment of political plums (President always being a Maronite Catholic) but also because Christians have had a much higher standard of living and have tended to monopolize more lucrative offices and professions. Although in pious theory Christians are a slender majority (51 percent) we suspect that in fact more prolific Moslems are today more numerous than Christians. Fact Christians have not dared take a census since 1936 corroborated this conclusion. There is in any event a built-in Moslem inferiority complex and feeling of ranking inequity which has been exacerbated by recent dreams of Arab glory awakened by Nasser.

(5) There is as yet no clear cut manifestation of desire by Lebanon Moslems to join UAR. Although in moments of exaltation probably all the Sunni Moslems could be worked up to demand such a union. They are but 25 percent of population. We very much doubt if Shiites would wish to submerge their confessional identity in larger Sunni community: and have similar reservations re Druzes. Christian population almost unanimously would strongly resist incorporation in UAR. Thus recent fighting in Lebanon has not been caused by question of incorporation of Lebanon into UAR.

In consequence, because this is a highly fragmented problem which defies simple black and white diagnosis, I believe we should adopt an attitude of caution in our UN presention unless for other motives, we desire to use Lebanon issue as a means for carrying out a conscious policy of enmity toward Nasser and UAR with a view to splitting off Syria and trying a “neo-Suez” against Nasser. As seen from here British, Turks, Iraqis, and Jordanians would like nothing better than to seize upon present difficulties in Lebanon as an excuse for fighting Nasser. To do so they will have to stretch the case to an extreme in order to fit the procrustean bed of their policy if the issue is to be fought on facts as they are in Lebanon. All that can be said is that for largely domestic political causes this little county has come to a crisis in which issues of foreign policy were subordinated to issues of personalities even though those personalities symbolized foreign policy; and that interference from UAR was contributory but not controlling to the main dispute.

What we may hope to see internally in Lebanon is continuation of Chamoun and Solh government sufficiently strengthened to resist inevitable demand of opposition for recourse to new elections. In this I am encouraged by fact that General Chehab has twice volunteered opinion to me it would be disastrous to hold such elections following deep division resulting from present insurrection. Elections would most certainly return a Parliament far less friendly to the west and would serve internally to divide Lebanon with possibility of ultimate Moslem dominance. This would certainly turn Lebanon pro, and eventually might force her in, UAR.

On wider stage of foreign policy most recent development of Eisenhower Doctrine by the Secretary and President as indicating US readiness to assist in preservation of independence and integrity of nations of Middle East as vital to our own national interest and world peace will have contributed much, I think, to general stabilization and security in this area. This determination manifested by US will enhance our prestige and influence and may long postpone, if not avert, a future attempt by UAR against the integrity of Lebanon.

McClintock

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/6–258. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Ankara, Amman, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Tel Aviv, and USUN.
2. See footnote 2, Document 51.
3. See footnote 2, Document 54.