115. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Minister of the British Embassy (Lord Hood) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree), Department of State, Washington, July 3, 19581
SUBJECT
- Anglo-French Approach to President Chamoun
Mr. Rountree told Lord Hood that we were concerned regarding two aspects of the demarche made by the UK, French and US Ambassadors to President Chamoun early this week.2 First our Ambassador had been associated by his presence with the Anglo-French statements which went further than we thought useful at this stage. Second, despite the discussion and agreement with the British upon the line to be followed, we find ourselves at cross purposes. Mr. Rountree explained we had thought that an Anglo-American position had been worked out and were surprised that Foreign Secretary Lloyd’s conversations in Paris had resulted in new instructions to the British Ambassador with which we did not, and still do not, agree.
Lord Hood agreed that this was an unfortunate incident. He explained that the Foreign Secretary was in Paris and that the Embassy telegram had come too late to affect the instructions to the UK Ambassador in Beirut. He enumerated the French points which the British had found persuasive in planning their approach to Chamoun. Mr. Rountree then commented that we had wanted only to let Chamoun know discreetly that we had taken him seriously when he had told us he did not seek reelection, and that we were interested in learning who he thought should be his successor. We did not favor asking Chamoun to make a public announcement at this time that he would stand down in September. Due to this slip-up, Mr. Rountree feared that Chamoun has been greatly demoralized.
Lord Hood said that Lloyd was equally as unhappy over developments in Lebanon. In the first place, he was disturbed over the lack of concrete evidence of UAR interference in Lebanon. In this connection, he hoped that we both would persuade Chamoun to publish all the evidence available as to UAR involvement in the revolution. He added that it is now clear the UN observers are not genuinely sympathetic to Chamoun and for that matter, neither is Hammarskjold. The latter, [Page 199] according to Mr. Rountree, seems to think that the revolution is primarily due to internal dissension which Chamoun is using as an excuse to bring in outside forces to help him maintain power.
Lord Hood said that Selwyn Lloyd is also worried because he does not believe that the UN observers are sufficient in numbers and that they do not take their job seriously enough. Lloyd proposes that the UK and US instruct their UN representatives to talk to Hammarskjold and “goad” him into greater activity. Perhaps they could point out that Lebanon constitutes a test case to the UN which has a mandate there and that UN failure could cause great damage to the organization. We might ask Hammarskjold whether he has suggestions as to increasing the number of observers or the scope of their activities. Mr. Rountree agreed in general to this approach and said it was clear that the Secretary General would not wish to send a UN police force or a substantially larger observer group without referring back to the UN for authority. Lord Hood said that the Foreign Secretary was speaking only of observers. Lord Hood said that if we will advise our UN Delegation along these lines the British will send appropriate instructions to Sir Pierson Dixon. Mr. Rountree assented.
Lord Hood mentioned a report from a UN observer in Lebanon who said that the insurgents have from 5 to 12 thousand men under arms of whom some 300 to 1, 000 are Syrians. The observer expressed astonishment that the government forces have not taken a village in the Bakaa region to illustrate the fact that the Syrians are in Lebanon in significant numbers.
Lord Hood asked what the American views are as to a successor to Chamoun. Mr. Rountree said that we would have to see how he reacted to the Anglo-French approach and the query of Ambassador McClintock before replying and added that he would let Lord Hood know our views after he had talked these matters over in the Department.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/7–358. Top Secret. Drafted by Dale.↩
- See Document 112.↩