Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

116. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 7, 1958, 1:30 p.m.¹

Washington, July 7, 1958, 1:30 p.m.

The Secretary of State

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge

Mr. Hammarskjold

Mr. Hammarskjold showed me the notes² of his conversations with Nasser, Chamoun, and some subsequent correspondence with Fawsi, indicating Nasser’s agreement to stop movements across the border into Lebanon and also indicating Hammarskjold’s suggestion that observation be carried out from the Syrian side.

While I was reading these papers, I handed to the Secretary General the “List of Reports received by the US Government bearing on UAR Intervention in Lebanon, May–June 1958”.³ I said that in addition to this report we had from sources in Cairo good reason to believe that, following the Secretary General’s visit to Cairo, Nasser had in fact sought to stop the movement of men and materiel from Syria into Lebanon, although he had apparently desired that the fighting within Lebanon continue. In connection with the paper which I had given to Mr. Hammarskjold, I remarked that I suspected that our own intelligence was far more complete and dependable than that of the Lebanon Government itself. I said that I had been dismayed at the Baghdad Pact meeting in Ankara at the time of the Syrian crisis and Egyptian take-over under guise of the UAR that the intelligence available to the governments of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan was either lacking or extremely undependable, and that the most dependable information had been obtained from Washington rather than from these neighboring states.

I expressed my appreciation to the Secretary General for what he was doing and said I felt that his intervention with Nasser had been useful, although of course, as the Secretary General agreed, it did not overcome the past intervention, the consequences of which were still apparent. (The notes of the Secretary General’s talk with Nasser indicated that the Secretary General had very strongly asserted as an undeniable fact UAR intervention by men and matériel and by provocative and inflammatory radio.)

I said that the United States recognized that armed intervention from the West would be a very undesirable outcome. It would undoubtedly give rise to an intensified wave of anti-Western feeling on which Nasser could capitalize. It would weaken the position of independent governments in the Arab area and also would create in Lebanon an unfortunate situation because a government which could only survive on the basis of foreign bayonets was not likely to survive very long after the bayonets were withdrawn. However, we had to take into account the fact that if Lebanon, which had been the most independent and pro-Western of the Arab States, appealed for help and was refused, the impact of that also would be great, not only in the neighboring Arab area but also in peripheral states such as Libya, Sudan, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. I said that the latter three States were strongly insistent upon a United States military intervention and that if Nasser and his Soviet backers were to gain a victory in Lebanon while we stood aside and looked in the other direction, the countries neighboring on the Soviet Union and on Egypt would be so shaken that the effect could be very bad. Indeed, it was quite possible that to obviate this Turkey and Iraq would precipitate fighting by their own action on the theory that it would compel the United States to come in.

Obviously, both to intervene and not to intervene under these circumstances would be very bad. Therefore the objective must be to find a third solution which would involve preserving the independence of Lebanon, while at the same time avoiding any victory for Nasser through a political compromise of Chamoun with the rebel elements. The Secretary General said he fully recognized that there should be no such compromise and that as his notes confirmed he had made clear to Nasser that there could be no such compromise.

The Secretary General then began to outline an idea he had for bringing Lebanon semi-permanently and especially under UN protection by the establishment on an indefinite basis of a small group of UN observers at Beirut who would be there to note and to report on any intrusion from without on the independence and integrity of Lebanon, whether these intrusions were in the form of physical intrusions or radio provocation.

We then adjourned from the luncheon room to the Secretary’s office, Ambassador Lodge left and Mr. Rountree joined us. Mr. Rountree will presumably dictate any further memorandum which he deems necessary.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Dulles. The source text indicates that the conversation took place over lunch. Hammarskjöld was visiting Washington in connection with the release on July 3 of the first report of the U.N. Observation Group in Lebanon. The report established the problems for effective observation created by a difficult terrain, and by the fact that access to the border by U.N. observers was only established for the 18 miles of the border controlled by government forces. (UN doc. S/4040; printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 952–958) In commenting on the report, Hammarskjöld discounted allegations of massive infiltration of men and arms into Lebanon from Syria. (The New York Times, July 4, 1958)
2. Not found.
3. Apparent reference to a document prepared in INR on June 20 entitled “Evidences of UAR Intervention in Lebanon.” A copy of this 16-page document was sent to INR Director Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., on June 20 under cover of a memorandum from Richard H. Sanger of INR/IRA/DRN. (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/6–2058; included in the microfiche supplement)
4. Infra.