Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

112. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State¹

Beirut, July 1, 1958—4 p.m.

14. Three Ambassadors met with President Chamoun this morning to make tripartite demarche authorized Deptel 5080² with modifications worked out in Paris between British and French Foreign Ministers reflected Paris telegrams 6278 and 6279.³

1. Interview opened with an account by Chamoun of present military situation. He was pleased at yesterday’s action in the Chouf in which Jumblat’s Druzes had suffered losses and had been repelled from vicinity of Chemlan. Army and Air Force with gendarmérie were continuing offensive operations against Jumblat today. Chamoundwelt at length on strategic importance of the Chouf where he said all Lebanon’s decisive battles for past 400 years had been fought. He pointed out control of Chouf permitted domination of access to Beirut, to the Bekaa from the coast and coastal communications with Sadon. Beirut was quiet although Basta might erupt at any time. Fighting in Tripoli had been very severe with estimated casualties on rebel side between two and three hundred in each of the two preceding nights. Insurgent military command in Tripoli was now in Syrian hands, said Chamoun, there having been violent differences between Rashid Karame and the Baathist leader Rafi which had been compromised by giving military direction to a Syrian officer. However, Army was reacting energetically in Tripoli and its defensive lines seemed well held. (This point is corroborated by ARMA.) Intelligence indicated rebels were bringing in 120 millimeter mortars at Minia north of Tripoli for attack tonight against army lines. Situation around Baalbek and the Bekaa generally was quiet. In response to our question President said he thought military balance was leaning lightly in favor of government.

2. Ambassadors then pointed out that despite this light balance in government’s favor, it looked like a long drawn-out insurrection unless there could be some sort of political solution. By previous arrangement French Ambassador made his representation first. It included reference to advisability of a statement by Chamoun to his own people of intent not seek re-election; and of need for consideration of forming a government with as wide a possible base of national union to facilitate an eventual compromise. Chamoun listened to this representation with obvious distaste.

3. I followed, limiting my intervention to terms of paragraph 2, Deptel 5080 which I presented orally. This was the only element of tripartite representation made in English as French was language of our conversation.

4. Middleton then associated himself with French démarche indicating with my complete agreement that all three Ambassadors had a friendly concern as to how political future of Lebanon would shape up, pointing out need to look beyond fixed dates such as July 24 and September 23.

5. Chamoun made his reply in mounting choler. He said “if I am in the situation you find me in today, it is precisely because I have been a friend of the west. If I had wished an easy life or to be reelected for a second term by a unanimous vote, all I had to do was follow a policy of positive neutrality. Instead of that in 1956 I refused to break relations with you—England and France—and this was the start of my troubles. It is because of my pro-western policy that you find me fighting today.”

He said he had noticed many signs which seemed to indicate our three governments were having second thoughts on guarantees given for Lebanon’s integrity and independence. He did not at all relish political advice he was now being given. With flushed face and rising inflection he said all he wished to know was where he stood in respect to guarantees given by three western powers. He would await a response from our respective governments.

6. I said so far as US was concerned I could give him a straight answer now. I said our readiness to intervene to assist Lebanon to maintain its integrity and independence has not changed but remained as defined to him in my interviews of May 14, May 24, June 16 (when I left a letter) and my oral presentation of a message from the Secretary of State on June 20 (Deptel 4890).⁴ Matter we had come to discuss was not reaffirmation of guarantees but in all sincerity and friendship to inquire his views on political succession in Lebanon since he himself had told us all he had no intention of seeking a second term. Since Parliament had been convoked for July 24th to elect a new President, it seemed reasonable that Lebanon’s friends should ascertain from Lebanon’s President what he thought about these new elections.

7. Chamoun had meanwhile been fighting to get a grip on his temper and began to calm down. He did somewhat resentfully mutter that he could not be charged with thinking up a presidential slate while at same time fighting for his life. Eventually however, and in a much calmer mood he ticked off the fairly unresplendent list of candidates both in and out of Parliament, concluding, “as you see it is no easy task to find a man who can govern Lebanon and carry out my policies.” However he said he would give problem further reflection although he did not rise to my remark that possibly we could meet again to discuss candidate. When he asked us if we had any names in mind, we said we had come to him to find his views, not to advance our own.

8. Several times during conversation which lasted an hour and a half Chamoun said he could if he wished be re-elected again since he had a “crushing majority” of Christian population behind him. He said “if I wished to, by choosing my own time and in my own way, I could be president of this country again.” Although throughout interview he accepted proposition that issue of non-renewal had been decided, he was clearly furious at suggestion he make a public statement to Lebanese people to this effect. I had overall impression that Chamoun could easily persuade himself, given a slight upturn in his military fortunes, that he is the indispensable man who must remain in office to carry out his policies and vindicate his position.

9. President said several times during conversation he had no belief efforts of Hammarskjold would be successful in preventing infiltration against Lebanon. He denied local press reports Malik had been instructed to request another session of Security Council.

10. Interview closed on a note of strained cordiality. Chamoun said we should mark well fact that Lebanon commanded position of Jordan and Iraq. If forces of Nasser should triumph here, he predicted masses of population in AU would give their governments short shrift.

11. As we left Chamoun inquired if our three governments still intended to give him aid in form of weapons and matériel. We said yes. Chamoun reaffirmed once more that he would not ask for our military intervention “unless the knife is at my throat.” When I pointed to a combination clock–barometer–compass on his desk and expressed hope the weather would be better he laughed and said “ I still have not lost my compass.”⁵

McClintock

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/7–158. Top Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.
2. Document 110.
3. Telegrams 6278 and 6279 from Paris, June 30, summarized discussions in Paris that day between the British and French Foreign Ministers on a variety of subjects. On the question of the course to take with regard to Lebanon, they agreed that Chamoun should be urged to make a public declaration that he did not intend to try to succeed himself, but they did not think it was wise to ask Chamoun to identify the successor he would prefer for fear that it might prove difficult not to support Chamoun’s selection. (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/6–3058)
4. Document 97.

5. This telegram was discussed at the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting on July 2. Rountree indicated dissatisfaction that the result of British-French coordination had been an approach to Chamoun based upon a position which the United Kingdom favored but the United States did not. He said that McClintock had gone along with the British and French Ambassadors in making this approach, and the result was that Chamoun had reacted violently and the situation had become even more delicate. He felt that it would be necessary to call Lord Hood in to express U.S. displeasure. (Department of State, Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)

   Dulles saw Hood later in the day and raised the issue. Dulles said that rather than urging President Chamoun to make a categoric statement immediately as to his intention not to run again for office, it seemed to him more important to have Chamoun concentrate first on getting a suitable successor. Hood agreed, but said that the French felt that this might eventually lead to the necessity of supporting whomever Chamoun chose. (Ibid., Central Files, 783A.00/7–258)