Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

113. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 2, 1958¹

Washington, July 2, 1958

SUBJECT

• The Lebanese Situation

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. Charles Malik, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lebanon
• Mr. Nadim Dimechkie, Ambassador of Lebanon
• The Secretary
• Mr. Rockwell, NE
• Mr. Sisco, UNP
• The Under Secretary

Foreign Minister Malik said he was inspired by the statement made by the Secretary to him in their last conversation that intervention spelled bankruptcy of diplomacy. Malik said he agreed with this statement and for the record he wished to say that he never contemplated the possibility of armed intervention lightly, but certainly as a last resort and not without explicit support of Arab friends and, if possible, with their active participation. He, therefore, had considered what measures could be taken short of a last resort. He said that the measures he was suggesting have not been fully tried and if fully tried had an excellent chance of resolving the Lebanese crisis without having to proceed to the last resort and without either giving Nasserism or communism a victory or causing further retreat of the West in the Middle East.

Foreign Minister Malik said that his suggested measures were based on four fundamental assumptions: (a) that it is the United States policy that Lebanon’s independence be maintained; (b) that it is United States policy that Nasserism and communism should not be allowed to score a victory; (c) that assumptions (a) and (b) above should be conceived as independent, if possible, of persons or regimes in Lebanon; (d) that the rebellion in Lebanon to overthrow the Government would continue with active and decisive assistance coming to it from the UAR.

Dr. Malik left with the Department an informal note containing the following 18 suggestions:

1. Strong and repeated declarations of support of Lebanon by leaders of the West.

2. Intensive diplomatic activity in support of Lebanon throughout the world.

3. Direct strong representations to Nasser against interference in Lebanon’s internal affairs.

4. Much more vigorous campaign in the press, on the radio, television and through other media in support of the independence and integrity of Lebanon.

5. Liberal economic and financial assistance to Lebanon from the West.

6. More military assistance immediately sent according as the Army of Lebanon asks for it.

7. Arming of paramilitary groups (partisans) in Lebanon to support the regular Army.

8. Military and other technical advisers from the West, similar to the case of Greece.

9. Promote a less strict interpretation of the Security Council resolution by sending more observers and, if necessary, troops to aid them as the Secretary General had at first planned.

10. Bring the matter again to the Security Council with very strong speeches in support of Lebanon and with a strong resolution that will almost certainly be vetoed.

11. Transfer matter to the General Assembly and have strong speeches made there with a resolution seeking diplomatic and economic sanctions only.

12. Much more attention paid to the press of Lebanon.

13. As many governments of the Middle East as possible to come out boldly and publicly in support of Lebanon.

14. Have a firm understanding, and if necessary a showdown, with Chehab.

15. Try to win as many people of the Opposition in Lebanon as possible by political and all sorts of other means.

16. Prudent Iraqi and Turkish troop movements to give Nasser cause for worry.

17. Promote closer relations between Lebanon and the Arab Union.

18. Exploit internal situation in Syria.

The Secretary agreed with Malik’s approach and recalled his view that when governments turned over problems to fighting men diplomacy had failed. The Secretary said that if we are resourceful, we can find a solution short of intervention. The Secretary agreed generally that we and the Lebanese could do more short of intervention. He emphasized that the Lebanese had not made as effective a public case as desirable. He felt if the Lebanese dramatized the case more, it might create a greater deterrent. He expressed his feeling that civil war would dry up if outside assistance could be deterred. Without accepting any of the suggestions contained in the informal note left by Malik, the Secretary said we would give them careful study. He emphasized that the Lebanese should get more support from the Arabs and mentioned Tunisia specifically as a possibility. If a chorus could be developed in support of the Lebanese case, it would be helpful in the circumstances.

Dr. Malik said the above were only suggestions. He stressed point 15 above as of particular importance. The Secretary noted omission of the question of a political program for Lebanon. Dr. Malik said this could be added to the list as No. 19 with the phrasing something along these lines: “Greater constructive clarity as to the political future of Lebanon.”

The Secretary noted McClintock’s discussion with Chamoun regarding the political issue in Lebanon did not quite follow the line we had intended since it appeared to Chamoun as an attempt to try to get Chamoun to step down rather than a question of who is to step in. The Secretary again noted there were some good ideas in the above list and stressed the importance of being concrete on some of these things. Malik responded that the question of political settlement is a delicate issue and the limits of concessions should be drawn in advance. Malik said there was a field for greater precision between the United States and Lebanon on this question in particular even though it is internal. He felt it important to be precise as to the limits of concessions. The Secretary said there should not be concessions in the sense that someone is selected who is not an adherent of Chamoun’s policy. He was against a political deal with Nasser. Malik responded that we cannot think of political changes unless there is a healthy atmosphere brought about by a victory over the rebels. With a victory over the rebels, the mood of everybody in Lebanon would change and the Lebanese would see that it was silly to go on with the fighting. He stressed that the rebellion must not be given a feeling of success. In response to Governor Herter’s query as to how Malik visualizes the progression of events assuming victory over the rebels, Malik said this depended on events. If the rebels were given a serious blow, Parliament could meet; if a stalemate continues, it would be difficult for such a meeting to take place.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/7–258. Top Secret. Drafted on July 7 by Sisco. A summary of this conversation was sent to Beirut in telegram 31, July 2. (Ibid.)