Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

97. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon¹

Washington, June 19, 1958—8:01 p.m.

4890. For Ambassador from Secretary. Embtel 4895.² Please seek urgent meeting with Chamoun and inform him that I have asked you to pass to him following information and views to which I hope he will give most serious consideration. Presentation should be oral but slowly and carefully made. (Inform your British colleague.)

President Eisenhower’s remarks at Press Conference June 18 should be regarded within context statements we have already made to Chamoun re UN role in this matter, namely that since GOL has itself invoked and received support from UNSC US would find it very awkward to act militarily while it was still uncertain UN action would be inadequate and where responsibility of collapse of UN effort would be generally attributed to US. We have as Chamoun knows come to believe that it is almost a sine qua non that Lebanon have full recourse to orderly processes of UN before finally requesting or receiving friendly military forces. Minimum action would seem to be convocation of SC again in emergency session.

President’s words should in no way be interpreted as meaning that we would require the concurrence or recommendation of UNSYG prior to military assistance to GOL but some further reference to UN is necessary, and undoubtedly SYG’s views would carry weight with other UN members. We continue ready to take exceptional measures on behalf of Lebanon if such measures are absolutely essential and factors set forth in Deptels 4271, 4482, 4790 and 4814³ are present. We retain this determination despite apprehension which possibility of such action has aroused in UN and among friendly countries in western Europe and Latin America.

Chamoun should be reassured of our full confidence in him personally. Tell him that we realize that he is the symbol of Lebanon’s determination to defend its independence and integrity and the extensive support we have provided to the government over which he presides should convince him of our determination to stand by him in his efforts to resolve this crisis. We realize that we cannot and should not offer him specific advice with regard to political moves which he might make within Lebanon. He is the best judge of the action in this field which may be in the best interests of Lebanese independence.

We also believe that Lebanon has the capacity to solve this crisis without use of foreign military forces, and we are prepared to give all appropriate assistance to this end. While perhaps it would be better in some situation to request forces than not to, we do not consider that the introduction of Western forces into Lebanon would either solve the present crisis or enhance Lebanon’s long term position in the area. We believe that intervention would have the opposite effect since intervention in circumstances as they have been developing could well bring about serious confessional strife in Lebanon and set into train indigenous trends toward Lebanon’s ultimate territorial partition or truncation. Lebanon’s integrity would be assured only as long as foreign forces remained on Lebanese soil. Moreover, intervention could and probably would lead to solidification of opposition throughout Moslem world not only to Christians in Lebanon but to the West in general. We have also noted growing indication that allied military intervention would be viewed with repugnance even by many Lebanese Christians.

In these circumstances, there is a grave danger if not certainty that reaction in the Near Eastern area to intervention would represent a victory for Nasser in that there would be aroused strong popular feeling which could well sweep away regimes of pro-Western Arab leaders in other countries. In this event the prospects of diminishing Western position in the Arab world, which is one of Nasser’s prime objectives, would be greatly furthered.

For these reasons we take this occasion to urge Chamoun to do everything in his power to avoid a situation in which a request for intervention might be required. He should know that he will have our full backing in his efforts to safeguard Lebanese independence and integrity by other means.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/6–1958. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Rountree and Dulles and approved by Dulles. Repeated to London and USUN. Dulles discussed the proposed message with Ambassador Caccia and then called the President and explained that the cable was an attempt to clarify misconceptions on Chamoun’s part growing out of the President’s press conference. He added that it was also an effort to make Chamoun appreciate the gravity of sending Western forces into Lebanon. Eisenhower was not clear what it was he had said that could have produced misconceptions, but he approved the cable. He added that he hoped McClintock could get the message across. “Tell him,” Eisenhower said, “to read it slowly to get every word in it.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations; included in the microfiche supplement)
2. Supra.
3. Documents 31, 49, 82, and 87.