Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

111. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 30, 1958¹

Washington, June 30, 1958

SUBJECT

• The Lebanese Situation

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. Charles Malik, Foreign Minister of Lebanon
• Mr. Nadim Dimechkié, Ambassador of Lebanon
• The Secretary
• Mr. Stuart Rockwell, NE
• Mr. Joseph J. Sisco, UNP

Reading from notes, Foreign Minister Malik conveyed to the Secretary the substance of a telephone conversation Malik had had with Chamoun this morning. Malik reported that Chamoun said the following.

Illegal infiltrations were going on undiminished; they were taking place at night, and UN observers were not able to confirm infiltrations because they did not operate at night and because they do not reach points on the frontier where the infiltrators go. The observers spend their time in social clubs at night and some of them spend their days at the seaside. The situation in Tripoli is very serious and the insurgents used bazookas and mortars. The amount of fire was so great that it suggests that the insurgents may have considerably more ammunition than the governmental forces. Syrian officers are commanding movements of the insurgents in the Shouf area, and the situation in Beirut is somewhat serious. The army is working hard and doing its best. He did not know what the Secretary General’s optimism was based on. If Hammarskjold’s optimism is based on Nasser’s promise, the Americans know how much Nasser’s and Syria’s promises are worth. Will they keep such promises? Is it conceivable that Nasser has given up the idea of destroying Lebanese independence? Hammarskjold has not been given a promise not to destroy the pro-Western orientation of Lebanon, and even if Nasser has given such a promise, the facts are to the contrary since infiltrations and the radio and press campaign continue undiminished. It is not a question of Hammarskjold or the observers since there are inherent limitations in both. It is the question of the clear pledge of the US. What has brought the present fury of Sovietism and Nasserism to Lebanon? It was Lebanon’s adherence to the Eisenhower Doctrine which has brought about Lebanon’s present difficulties. Two questions evolve from these difficulties. First, will the US come to the assistance of Lebanon within or without the UN? Second, will US aid be directed against aggression, direct or indirect? He had heard conflicting statements by the US. (At this point Malik said he responded to Chamoun that neither President Eisenhower nor Secretary Dulles has made any statements which indicated a change of US policy.) We certainly will and must exhaust every possibility before asking for direct aid. This matter affects Lebanon, her children and her children’s children. Lebanon does not approach this question in a frivolous way or light-heartedly. We will pick the right moment for intervention. A number of countries in the area know the importance of the battle. If Lebanese independence is compromised, other friendly countries in the area will go. Lebanon is holding the dike and this is a battle not for Lebanon alone but it is a battle of the West. If Lebanon goes, the West will go down too. All members of the Cabinet and the Prime Minister agree with the above.

After reporting the foregoing as Chamoun’s words, Malik turned to a special message which he said he had received from Chamoun a few days ago. He reported that Chamoun is not prepared to accept any compromise. There were three reasons: First, that as a matter of principle Nasser should not have any voice in the external or internal affairs of Lebanon; second, that any compromise would be detrimental to Lebanon’s foreign policy, would weaken the legal authority, and help the insurgents; and third, that he is opposed to any negotiations with the opposition group as long as there are Egyptians and Syrians on Lebanese soil. Any stopping of the fighting would help the rebels. Chamoun recognized the limitations of the observers. While Chamoun agreed that the army could do better, it was nevertheless not idle. They have killed two thousand which is equivalent to four hundred thousand killed in the US. It must not be forgotten that 40 percent of the army is Moslem and therefore the army must be handled carefully. Chamoun will fight this battle until he wins or collapses because this is a battle for freedom and for stability and peace in the Middle East. It transcends Lebanese interests.

Malik then said he would now like to make a statement of his own. He thought Lebanon was involved in a struggle concerning whose outcome the US cannot be indifferent. It was not an internal problem alone; it far transcended Lebanon. He said that “Chamoun may be this or that, Chehab may be this or that, Malik may be this or that, various politicians in Lebanon may be this or that, internal problems in Lebanon may be this or that; but allowing that there is something rotten in the kingdom of Denmark, must we allow the kingdom of Denmark to go to pieces?”

Malik then raised two questions: “First, is the total international situation at present such that it cannot be helped that friendship with the West, and in particular with the US, puts governments and individuals in the Middle East at a decided disadvantage? Secondly, is the international situation such that it cannot be helped that Nasser and the communists must score yet another advance in the Middle East?” Malik said individuals were unimportant except insofar as they are called upon to play an important role. Individuals were fully expendable. “If there is any hitch as to individuals as obstacles to the useful course of history, such a situation should be discussed frankly.”

The Secretary said he was starting from the premise that we are agreed that every practical measure should be taken to prevent a victory for Nasser and communism and that we should act in such a way as to make it clear that friendship with the West is an asset and not a liability. The Secretary said the practical question is what we do in present circumstances. The Secretary recalled that we had done quite a bit, including military equipment, strong support of Lebanon in the UN, and our assistance in bringing about the adoption of a resolution in the Security Council.

The Secretary then said that on one important point our information did not agree with that of the Lebanese. Our intelligence sources indicated that there has been a considerable reduction or termination of infiltrations across the border. We have good independent intelligence sources and much concrete evidence regarding operations in Lebanon. The activities of the UN and Hammarskjold have brought about a large cessation of infiltration. The Secretary did not know how long it would last for the rebels may already have received great quantities of assistance. But we could not honestly say today on the basis of our own intelligence that the UN operation had failed.

The Secretary then turned to the practical question of what to do. He said we both agreed that sending Western troops is disastrous. While military intervention by the US might be the lesser of two evils, it would touch off anti-Westernism and rally a bigger percentage of the Lebanese people against the Lebanese Government. Moreover, it might jeopardize other friendly governments such as Iraq and Jordan. The governments of the West would not be united because some are strongly opposed to intervention. Moreover, most UN members would oppose such intervention in view of Hammarskjold’s belief that UNoperations are having a desirable effect. The Secretary emphasized that on the basis of our information we could not dispute Secretary General Hammarskjold’s view in this regard.

The Secretary continued that we therefore come back to the proposition that the Lebanese matter should be resolved without the use of troops from the outside, particularly forces from the big powers. We are not deterred by nor do we fear the USSR. Our military experts feel that we are stronger vis-à-vis the USSR today than we may be in the future since the Soviets for the purposes of economy have skipped the long-range bomber stage and have gone directly into missiles development.

The Secretary said there is concern about the innumerable difficulties and issues which intervention would precipitate. The Secretary recalled how the US opposed the intervention of the UK and France and Israel in 1956. While the Lebanese situation is no parallel, the man in the street sees no real difference and intervention would undoubtedly be misrepresented in the Middle East. It is easy to get into Lebanon but it is hard to get out without promoting strong anti-Western feeling and anti-Americanism. A government sustained by bayonets is not a good situation. While intervention may be a lesser of two great evils, the Secretary thought we must use all our resources and imagination to avoid it. The Secretary also made it clear that he considered the greater evil to be that the appeal of a small country go unheeded and Lebanon thereby lose its independence.

The Secretary then referred to Malik’s comments regarding individuals and their expendability. The Secretary said that Ambassador McClintock had been instructed to raise with Chamoun the question of Chamoun’s purposes and plans. The Secretary asked: If Chamoun decides not to run, as he had indicated to us previously, who is going to take over? What is the political future in Lebanon? The Secretary said it ought to be possible to find an individual oriented to the West. Surely, if there were only one or two individuals oriented to the West, the situation was very bad. The Secretary said we need to think together on how to prepare the situation if Chamoun is not running. Economic support would be important to Lebanon and helpful to the individual who is to succeed Chamoun. The election could be only about four weeks hence and therefore careful plans have to be made. The US was not trying to play politics in Lebanon or prescribe what should be done in the situation, but this was a problem which had to be explored. At this point the Secretary elaborated on the French attitude indicating their insistence on participation if the US and the UK intervene. The Secretary said this would bring all of the problems of North Africa to the Lebanese situation and make it more difficult.

The Secretary said that the use of naked force represented in a sense a failure of statesmanship. On the other hand, there has to be a willingness to use force in the last resort, otherwise diplomacy will not be able to do its job. If hostile forces believe that you are afraid to use force, they will pressure you into making concessions. It was necessary to be willing to fight.

The Secretary said he did not exclude the possibility that the evidence of cessation of outside assistance may lead to diminishing efforts on the part of the rebels. Perhaps the rebels have already been so considerably supplied that diminished efforts on their part will not follow. Nevertheless, it was important that preparations be made for handling the political situation in Lebanon. If Chamoun were to run again there would be considerable disadvantage since it would look as if the US policy was directed to supporting one individual. It would be a great sign of weakness if there were only one person who could carry forward the pro-Western orientation of Lebanon. Plans should be made to select someone in whom Chamoun has confidence; this man should not represent a compromise with Nasser. The Secretary said he opposed a deal with Nasser, and he did not favor the election of someone who could be expected to adopt a policy of Nasser pan-Arabism. The Secretary said it was essential that someone be selected who is acceptable to Chamoun and Malik and who reflects the Lebanese spirit of independence.

Malik agreed on the necessity of going ahead and making plans for a political change. He said that Chamoun has been so harassed that he has not had time to think about these matters. Moreover, in the mechanism of the transfer of power it should be possible to arrange the transfer in such a manner that it will not reduce the power to be transferred. It would be particularly important that the authority and political power of the Government not be diminished in relationship to the rebels.

The Secretary said that we were concerned with this latter point. He said that we could be of help to a prospective successor, particularly with respect to certain measures of economic support. A period of weakness might therefore be avoided. The Secretary once again emphasized that plans must be carefully prepared. Malik said that if this issue can be cleared up, a move could be made to the next stage. He said that what the Secretary seemed to be saying was a condition precedent to the next stage. The Secretary said that the question of Chamoun’s political successor had become a more pressing issue since the elections were only four weeks away. Mr. Rockwell added that this would be particularly the case if there should be a lessening of pressure from the insurgents against the Government.

The Secretary said that Hammarskjold was convinced that a good start had been made in accomplishing his mission. He may be right or he may be wrong. Nevertheless, as long as Hammarskjold is convinced of this fact, it would be extremely difficult to get further UN action. The Secretary said there would not seem to be any advantage in pressing now for further UN action. Moreover, he did not believe it would be possible to get seven votes in the Security Council as long as Hammarskjold is satisfied that the UN effort has not failed.

The conversation closed with Malik referring to his own personal plans. Malik felt that there was no longer any necessity for him to stay on since he did not expect any Security Council action in the near future. Nevertheless, he said he might be useful if Chamoun indicated to him his thoughts regarding the political issue, and he could then be of some service here in discussing the issue with the Secretary. The Secretary concluded by emphasizing once again the importance of making plans so that a prospective successor could be assured of appropriate assistance, resources, and support.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/6–3058. Top Secret. Drafted by Sisco on July 1. The conversation was summarized in telegram 5097 to Beirut, June 30. (Ibid.)