Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus

275. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece⁰

Washington, October 3, 1958, 7:34 p.m.

1101. 1. We greatly appreciate your persistent efforts to penetrate Greeks’ wounded pride and induce GOG to accept Cyprus conference on basis Spaak paper. Postponement NAC meeting until October 6 and account your talk with Averoff as reported in Embtel 896¹ had encouraged us to hope there remained some chance of getting Greeks to sit down at table for serious negotiations based on British plan.

2. However, Averoff’s apparent insistence on agreement on plebiscite as precondition to conference as reported Embtel 907,² if actually GOG position as distinguished from Averoff bargaining tactic, could kill any hope of conference at this time. Agreement on independence plebiscite at this time is so clearly out of question that we question whether Averoff suggestion motivated more by determination thwart conference than by desire seek mutually acceptable solution.

3. Averoff’s suggestion that British plan be prelude to plebiscite for independence excluding both enosis and partition seems to parallel suggestion recently made informally by one Greek representative that Makarios plan, modified to provide that change in independence status could be achieved only by agreement of interested parties, be superimposed on British plan.

4. You should try to dissuade Averoff from postulating plebiscite as precondition to conference. You should tell him flatly that we cannot support his proposal as conference precondition. He could of course raise proposal for plebiscite at conference based on Spaak paper but we frankly doubt that there is any possibility of achieving agreement on plebiscite at this time. In speaking with Averoff you may wish add following thoughts:

(a) We do not believe it practical at this time to consider final solution, which is what Averoff suggestion amounts to, in view present intensive effort within NATO to find basis for conference to discuss interim solution.

(b) This effort, which we believe offers real chance for agreement, based on assumption that aroused emotions make final solution impossible to achieve now. Both British plan and alternate Spaak proposals based on this assumption.

(c) Time for discussion final solution must wait until passions cool or interim period concluded. At that time we would expect some form of guaranteed independence would certainly be among various proposals considered.

5. We believe you should attempt to see Karamanlis urgently in order ascertain whether insistence on plebiscite as precondition is final GOG position. You are authorized in your discretion to tell Karamanlis and King that we think setting of such precondition would in effect sabotage conference which we believe could lead to mutually acceptable interim arrangement for Cyprus.

6. Deptel 1093³ indicates as specifically as we believe we can at this time our attitude toward powers of government representatives and Spaak’s modifications. (Deptel 1093 is being repeated to addressees this message.)

7. We agree that Averoff’s remarks reported para 2 Embtel 869⁴ should not go unanswered. We leave to your discretion time and method of refutation which we suggest include following points to set record straight:

(a) US did not urge GOG in early August to accept Spaak’s set of principles for interim solution, nor did we ourselves take position on substance these principles. We urged Greeks to discuss Spaak principles as we are now urging GOG to discuss latest Spaak paper.

(b) US did not influence Spaak to modify his most recent set of principles. Spaak has developed each of his papers without any consultation with US, though of course our views had been made known in NAC as authorized Topol 1025.⁵ We believe Spaak made modifications in attempt develop basis for discussion which might be more readily acceptable to all interested parties. tWe have not lobbied in NAC for changes in Spaak proposals.

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10–358. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Blood. Repeated to Paris for USRO, London, Ankara, Nicosia, and USUN.
1. Document 273.
2. See footnote 3, Document 274.
3. Document 274.
4. See footnote 5, Document 273.
5. Document 267.