Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus

273. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State⁰

Athens, October 2, 1958, 7 p.m.

896. 1. Continuing our efforts to influence GOG to agree to conference on basis Spaak paper,¹ have just concluded another conversation with Averoff in which I utilized Roberts statement quoted in Deptel 1070.² I have made this point often before but emphasized it was now statement by UK Representative. In addition, and following telephone consultation last night and this morning with Burgess, I again urged Averoff to continue NATO discussions in view of progress that had been made there. I underlined once again importance of paragraph ten of Spaak paper and said if there is any misunderstanding another effort should be made in discussion tomorrow to clarify it. To me, paper should be considered as a whole and it was stipulated Spaak’s modification could be discussed in conference.

2. Foreign Minister replied hot debate was still proceeding within GOG re Spaak paper and therefore he would not have “important communication” for me today. Karamanlis was fighting real battle to preserve Greece’s Western orientation but was faced with threats by several Ministers to resign if he accepted conference on proposed basis. This internal debate was being waged on issue of role of Turk representative and influence would have on Governor. Furthermore there was contradiction between paragraphs eight and ten of Spaak paper. In reply I repeated argumentation in paragraph one of Embtel 869,³ omitting however any reference to GOT acceptance of proposal. Averoff then said this was all very well but real point was that in NAC role of US was that of spectator and our weight had not been thrown to support what I said. Recent high level indications of our attitude had been general rather than specific and if we thought conference should consider modifications suggested by Spaak why did we not insist this be made clear, and give GOG some answer on where we stood on Spaak modifications. I replied we were working for compromise that would make progress along these lines possible but as he well knew could not dictate the answers.

3. Averoff then said he was in position to make suggestion that might help. US had urged GOG to accept modified Macmillan plan and there might be one way of Greece accepting it if it could be combined with proposal he had made in June. Now that Makarios statement on independence was issued,⁴ if agreement could be reached to hold plebiscite in 7 to 10 years for independence excluding both enosis and partition, GOG might be brought to accept modified Macmillan plan. He asked me to submit this urgently.

4. I realize how difficult this negotiation is for Department in view of variety of pressures on US and am trying to steer course here which does not commit US to position which will merely raise problems elsewhere. But it would be enormously helpful to me if I could receive more precise instructions re our attitude on (A) powers of government representatives, (B) Spaak modifications of UK plan, and (C) points raised by Averoff in paragraph two of Embtel 869.⁵ I believe we have now reached point in this negotiating where our neutrality is so compromised, or held to be so compromised, that we must risk more specific replies whether palatable or unpalatable to Greeks or Turks.

Riddleberger

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10–258. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, Istanbul, London, Ankara, Nicosia, and USUN.
1. See Document 271.
2. Telegram 1070 to Athens, October 1, reported that at the September 30 NAC meeting, Roberts stated that under British proposals Greek and Turkish representatives on Cyprus would not be members of the executive authority of the island and would have no role in its administration. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10–158)
3. In telegram 869 from Athens, September 30, Riddleberger reported in paragraph 1 that in a meeting with Averoff that morning he stressed the limited role that a Turkish representative would have in Cyprus. (Ibid., 747C.00/9–3058)
4. On September 29, Makarios submitted a proposal to the British Embassy in Athens calling for a period of 7 years of Cypriot self-government under British rule followed by full independence. The British Government rejected the plan.
5. In paragraph 2 of telegram 869 from Athens, Riddleberger reported that Averoff charged the United States with switching from support of the more acceptable Spaak plan to backing the Macmillan proposals which Greece could not accept. Averoff indicated that he felt that the United States was responsible for the introduction in Spaak’s proposal of the idea of Turkish representation on Cyprus.