Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus

274. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece⁰

Washington, October 2, 1958, 8:43 p.m.

1093. For Ambassador. We are not sure whether at this time further pressure on GOG to accept Cyprus conference would be wise. If you believe it would be helpful you should deliver Karamanlis following message from Acting Secretary.

“Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

At this moment when the Cyprus problem presents the greatest danger to the NATO alliance and paradoxically at the same time is the closest yet to a mutually acceptable interim solution, I want to speak frankly as a friend of Greece.

In the last few weeks, we have been doing what we can, quietly but urgently, to bring the parties to this controversy closer to agreement. The British, whom we have urged to consider sympathetically your needs, are displaying considerable flexibility and a willingness to make concessions in the common interest, as evidenced by the statement made by the British NATO representative at the North Atlantic Council meeting on September 30¹ that the Greek and Turkish representatives would have no role as sovereigns or with respect to the administration of Cyprus.

We recognize that Greece has already made several significant concessions. We know that these concessions raise political difficulties for your Government, and we have appreciated your courage in making them. We are now asking you not to falter at this critical moment but to agree to attend a conference on the basis of Mr. Spaak’s latest paper.²

Such a conference offers the possibility of a mutually satisfactory agreement. The United States would be willing to participate in a conference as an observer or as a member of a two or three member NATO advisory committee. During the conference we would be prepared to support the early establishment of a single assembly, in addition to the two communal assemblies, and to use our influence to achieve a mutually agreeable interpretation of the functions of the government representatives in keeping with the British NATO Ambassador’s statement.

In such a conference Greece can strive for an interim arrangement within the framework of the British plan that will in effect not prejudice Greece’s long term interests with regard to Cyprus and the Cypriot people. As the Belgian Representative at NATO pointed out Wednesday at NAC, NATO observers at a conference would assure Greece fair treatment.

You have an opportunity, Mr. Prime Minister, to influence greatly the course of this dispute. In weighing the effects of your decision, I urge you to remember the underlying importance of Greece’s ties with the NATO alliance and, particularly, Greece’s friendship and cooperation with the United States.³

Sincerely yours, Christian A. Herter”

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10–258. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Blood and cleared by Herter. Repeated to Paris for USRO.
1. The British statement was made on September 29; see Document 269.
2. See Document 271.
3. In telegram 907 from Athens, October 3, Riddleberger reported that he had delivered Herter’s message to Averoff since Karamanlis was unavailable. Averoff indicated that even allowing for the British interpretation of the role of the Turkish representative, further negotiations were needed to find a solution to Cyprus satisfactory to Makarios and other Cypriot leaders and that the Archbishop’s suggestion for a 7-year period of self-rule would provide an excellent interim solution. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10–358)