Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus

230. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State⁰

London, June 16, 1958, 2 p.m.

7260. Reference Department telegram 8955.¹ I have just seen Prime Minister and Selwyn Lloyd together, and discussed Cyprus with them pursuant reference telegram. I said President and Secretary believed strongly a public announcement of British Cyprus proposals at this time would aggravate already tense situation in [and?] reduce NATO’s maneuverability during its present discussion of Cyprus problem. I indicated we hoped that very fact that NAC now has this problem before it will provide basis for deferral of announcement in Parliament now scheduled for June 17. I urged need for utmost restraint in view current volatile nature of relations between Greeks and Turks and tense situation on Cyprus. Referring to Prime Minister’s discussion of Cyprus with Secretary on June 10,² I noted Secretary had instructed our Embassies Athens Ankara to say he felt United Kingdom plan would be serious, carefully thought out effort and should be carefully considered.³ Our Ambassadors Ankara and Athens have worked hard to make this position clear. In addition, as they knew, Karamanlis and Menderes have been informed our expression great concern on the current situation and dangers it poses for world security.⁴

We have urged them to use their influence to improve atmosphere and that they give most serious consideration to proposals on Cyprus being developed in NAC when they are received. I further noted that in his discussion with Macmillan, Secretary had said that while we would ask Greeks, Turks and NATO to give United Kingdom proposals careful consideration, we could only do this privately, and that Secretary had indicated we could not accord British plan public support. I emphasized that public discussion of proposal at present time would in our view have most unfortunate effects. I noted that the United States is not at present either approving or objecting to the specific British proposal. United States does not feel able to go down the line in NAC for this one plan to the exclusion of other ideas. Therefore, in discussion of plan at NAC today best position we can take is to support in any resolution which may be proposed language such as “deserving of careful consideration and discussion.” I concluded that we firmly oppose the development in NAC a situation in which one member of NATO or even two might be publicly branded as uncooperative or worse by other NATO members, and consequently we oppose any majority type resolution which could not be unanimous and might be used to isolate publicly one or more members. I gave them copy of statement our representative is authorized to make in NAC today.⁵

Macmillan said our representations re deferment announcement in Parliament will be given serious consideration. He expressed view that situation re Cyprus is clarifying. The Greeks insist on Enosis, Turks on partition, and in circumstances United Kingdom desires maintain its position taking step forward toward self-government and eliciting Greek and Turkish Government support toward partnership in governance of Island. He felt it impossible for him not to make some statement in Parliament tomorrow, indicating that if he refused to do so in current circumstances, he would anticipate his government being immediately thrown out. However, he felt there might be some misunderstanding as to British position. In fact, British proposal is not a new plan, but is a broad indication of British desire to enlist the cooperation of the peoples of the Island in self-government by establishing Greek and Turkish councils with considerable authority in matters of major importance to those communities. Lloyd interjected that in effect British proposals are not a plan but a policy, and he added that in any event British have never said that their proposals constitute only plan they prepared consider. Lloyd feared that postponement announcement would aggravate situation rather than the contrary. Macmillan noted that while Greek and Turkish Governments have reacted violently, and domestic political situations are critical, Makarios position is less clear and he has not yet come out in opposition. Prime Minister referred to fact he has communicated privately with both Karamanlis and Menderes, offering to discuss problem personally either together or separately, and that offer not yet rejected.

Regarding NAC, Macmillan noted United Kingdom not seeking NATO resolution endorsing United Kingdom proposals which they both agreed would be likely isolate one or more NATO partners.

They believe Spaak’s views are consistent this objective, and that most appropriate result NAC consideration today would be agreement that consensus NAC is to effect problem should be considered by all parties concerned seriously and with restraint. Lloyd said proposed United States statement exactly along lines they hoped for, and greatly appreciated. Macmillan concurred.

Following my reiteration point that United Kingdom announcement in Parliament tomorrow would seem likely restrict maneuverability of NAC and might prejudice further NAC consideration, Macmillan said possible he might be able refer to fact NAC seized of problem. In any event, he would avoid parliamentary discussion, cutting off questions with reference to fact debate scheduled for Monday June 23, and consequently, there will be opportunity for NAC situation to develop in meantime.

My feeling is, in light of conversation, that British position increasingly flexible and that while they will probably have to go ahead with parliamentary statement tomorrow, statement will announce proposals in general terms and indicate that they are subject to negotiation. Seems likely also that parliamentary presentation will play down rather than [emphasize] fact that proposals constitute change of policy regarding Cyprus, with principal emphasis on line that in view attitudes various interested governments, United Kingdom has no choice but to continue exercise sovereignty over Cyprus and endeavor achieve maximum cooperation of population in self-government. Finally, to emphasize, both were of the opinion that to postpone statement would be to increase present local violence rather than the opposite.⁶

Whitney

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–1658. Secret; Niact. Received at 3:37 p.m. Repeated to Paris, Athens, and Ankara.
1. See footnote 3, Document 228.
2. See Document 209.
3. Document 210.
4. See Documents 226 and 218.
5. Presumably a reference to the statement transmitted in Topol 4623, June 13, in which the United States indicated its backing for British efforts to settle the Cyprus question and urged that British proposals be used as the basis for further discussions. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–1358)
6. At 10 p.m. on June 16, C.R. Wiggin, First Secretary of the British Embassy in Washington, telephoned Jones to inform him that the British Government would delay its statement on Cyprus for 48 hours. A memorandum of the conversation is ibid., NEA/GTI Files: Lot 61 D 220, Cyprus before August 15.