Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

35. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State⁰

Bonn, October 26, 1959, 7 p.m.

812. Paris for Embassy, CINCEUR, Thurston and Finn. I am seriously concerned that at this time we are still without agreed tripartite position deal with another flag incident Berlin.¹

Fully concur with General Hamlett’s October 22 statement our position (Berlin’s 406 to Department).² In my view, it would be politically disastrous to have repetition indecisive October 6 developments. Moreover, given stated Western position and commitment following first incident (Commandants’ talking paper to Zakharov, Berlin’s 367 to Department),³ it seems to me we would suffer irreparable loss prestige and find most difficult maintain our present position Berlin, vis-à-vis both Berliners and Soviets, if we stood aside while GDR goons rehoisted their flags with impunity, or we pretended we were really dealing with situation by selecting arbitrarily to be brought down some number flags fewer than those hoisted. This happened last time. Some flags were lowered, but Communists just as quickly rehoisted them. Problem is essentially one of principle—demonstrating Soviets our determination meet provocative challenge our position in Berlin.

Given present international political climate and Berlin’s assessment of West Berlin capabilities (Berlin’s 415 to Department),⁴ there would seem be no better time than present for us take strong measures prevent Communist flouting our authority. As I see it, there probably has been no time in recent past, nor can we count on many occasions in future, when we will be able deal as effectively as we now can with challenge this kind in Berlin, without incurring serious risks either to ourselves or cause of peace. If there is any validity alleged peace aims USSR, unlikely Soviets would now take risks war or even drawing world attention need Western forces in Berlin.

[1 paragraph (7-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

In this connection, consider it absolutely essential Berlin be given tripartitely agreed instructions soonest to reply questions raised by Berlin police—scope of operation; authorized weapons and allied garrison support (Berlin’s 415 to Department). Afraid if we wait until details French allegedly seeking provide, we will find ourselves without operational plan at most critical moment.

Bruce

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10–2659. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Berlin, Moscow, Paris, and POLADUSAREUR Heidelberg.
1. Bruce discussed the flag incident with British officials on October 25 and recorded in his diary that the British favored a “much softer line” than did the United States. (Ibid., Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327)
2. Document 33.
3. Telegram 367 from Berlin, October 9, transmitted the text of a 4-paragraph talking paper which the British Commandant would use in his meeting with the Soviet Commandant on October 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10–959)
4. Telegram 415 from Berlin, October 25, reported that Lipschitz had submitted a 111-page estimate of the situation in West Berlin containing a description of the 107 S-Bahn installations, an estimate of police forces required for various types of incidents, and methods to effect blocking the S-Bahn system to prevent reinforcements from arriving from the Soviet part of the city. (Ibid., 762.0221/10–2559)