36. Letter From President de Gaulle to President Eisenhower0
Dear Mr. President: It seems to me, since our conversations in Paris and Rambouillet, despite the few differences which may have arisen later in the matter of dates, that you and I quite agree on the essential points.
A summit conference between you, Mr. Khrushchev, Mr. Macmillan, and me may inaugurate some practical arrangements between East and West on the main issues: general disarmament, Germany, assistance to underdeveloped countries, non-interference by any State in the internal affairs of another, etc. Such an outcome would indicate an initial easing of tension among the four participants and would perhaps serve to moderate the evil intentions of certain others, for example Communist China. If such were the case, there is reason to think that the world climate, which thus far has been one of cold war, would change appreciably; then, with psychological factors affecting policy, later developments favorable to peace would probably follow.
However, holding a summit conference that would be limited to banal declarations of a general nature without positive results would have a disappointing effect. Uneasiness would be all the greater if the conference were to bring out the basic antagonism between Soviet Russia and the West. Lastly, the spectacle which in such case would be presented of disagreement between the Western Powers, particularly with regard to the German question, or, worse yet, their more or less resigned and disorderly retreat, would be a severe blow to our Atlantic Alliance.
The summit conference should therefore not be an improvisation. It should be prepared. This can be done, first, by improving the [international]1 climate, particularly through contacts like those you yourself made so successfully at Camp David. Moreover, it was with the same intention that I recently invited Mr. Khrushchev. However, above all, the chances of success of the meeting of the Areopagus will be contingent on a preliminary effort by the Western Powers to present a united front on definite, firm positions.
As for the time at our disposal, I note that you have induced Mr. Khrushchev to declare publicly that he was not setting a definite time limit on his goals with respect to the Berlin matter. And how indeed [Page 97] without assuming the responsibility for a world war—could he impose his demands when we are aligned solidly against him? Moreover, the Chairman of the Council of the Soviet Union has hastened to accept my invitation to come to France, and it appears unlikely that he will want to create a crisis before that. In short, it is clear now that Mr. Khrushchev desires the Conference very much, and that we have time to prepare for it properly.
That is why I agree readily to your suggestion for a preliminary meeting in Paris between you, Mr. Macmillan, and me, to be devoted chiefly to work, with Mr. Adenauer joining us when we discuss Germany. In view of the contemplated visits in the near future in London and Paris, the meeting in Senegal of the Executive Council of the community, the meeting of the [North] Atlantic Council, the discussion of our budget before Parliament, etc., I should be at your disposal and at Mr. Macmillan’s and, for the study of the German question, at the disposal of Mr. Adenauer, from December 19. We could, at that time, outline a Western agreement. After which our governments would work out the entire position we would uphold at a Summit Conference.
Thereafter, the attitude of the Russians in United Nations debates, and in matters concerning Asia and Africa, the talks my government and I shall have with Mr. Khrushchev—which will probably be in March—and doubtless other occasions will enable us to see more clearly the general direction the Soviet Union will take. On the basis established by the preliminary work of our governments and their exchanges of views, we would then be in a position about April to invite Mr. Khrushchev, jointly, to come to a Summit Conference. Before opening the conference, we would have another meeting of the Western Powers to establish definitively our common position. Thus, we would have prepared as carefully as possible for this very important meeting and kept the initiative at all times.2
Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my loyal friendship.
- Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret. The source text is a Department of State translation. A copy of the French language text is ibid.↩
- All brackets are in the source text.↩
- On October 28, President Eisenhower wrote to De Gaulle accepting the December date for a Western summit and informing him that he would have Herter inaugurate talks with the British, French, and West Germans in Washington in preparation for the meeting. (Letter transmitted in telegram 1787 to Paris, October 28; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/10–2859)↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩