Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

34. Letter From Foreign Minister Brentano to Secretary of State Herter⁰

Bonn, October 23, 1959.

Dear Chris: When a few days ago Ambassador Bruce called on me, he recalled on your behalf the conversation we had in Bonn on 27 August 1959.¹

I did not forget about that conversation. I reported on it at the time to the Federal Chancellor, and I also discussed it with my closest collaborators. May I try now to inform you of the result of my considerations, and in doing so, I ask you to consider this letter as a confidential and personal contribution to the discussion which is intended to help prepare the forthcoming conferences.

It is perfectly clear to me that the attitude of the Soviet Union during the Geneva Conference as well as in all the talks since then and in all the statements made since then offers no grounds for assuming that the Soviet Union might be ready to change its viewpoint in the German and Berlin questions. In his latest letter, too, to Chancellor Adenauer, Premier Khrushchev reiterated the well-known theses.² He demands the conclusion of a peace treaty with two German States which should then be left free to conduct negotiations about a rapprochement or a union; he writes that such a peace treaty would also be a prerequisite for a change in the abnormal situation of the city of Berlin which according to him should be given the status of a free city.

I am sure we are agreed that a final solution to the Berlin problem can only be found when the division of Germany is terminated. We also agree—and you emphasized that viewpoint with great earnest in our conversation of 27 August—that the situation in Berlin is dangerous. Berlin’s isolated position in the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany offers the Soviet Union the opportunity to exert a constantly growing pressure and perhaps also by deliberate individual actions to undermine the status of Berlin step by step. The threat concerning the conclusion of a separate peace treaty between Moscow and Pankow probably finds its explanation only in the intention of the Soviet Union to evade by means of such a treaty its commitments resulting from the Four-Power agreements regarding Berlin. The status in public and international law of the so-called German Democratic Republic would not be changed by such a separate treaty, nor is it within the intentions of Soviet policy to change that status for the purpose of giving an increased freedom of action to that pseudo-State. It is rather quite obvious that the Pankow authorities are thus to be given the task of impairing and ultimately blocking access to Berlin while pointing to their alleged rights of sovereignty.

I could easily imagine that in this context the Pankow authorities would be instructed at first to respect the rights of the Western allies in Berlin as well as the free access and supply requirements of the Western forces in Berlin. This would mean that in the first phase at least the acts of interference would be limited to the communications between the Federal Republic and Berlin. You are sufficiently familiar with conditions in Berlin to know that this would paralyze the economy of West Berlin. The very existence of the two and a quarter million West Berliners depends upon the unrestricted maintenance of their communications with the Federal Republic. The consequences of a blockade of Berlin would be immeasurable. Berlin’s economy would collapse in a very short time, and economic and political chaos would ensue.

I need not remind you of the numerous attempts we jointly made in Geneva to secure for Berlin the status quo at least in its essential substance. I may only recall that as late as 28 July the three Western Foreign Ministers made a joint proposal³ of which we were all convinced that it went to the limit of what is practicable—if not perhaps beyond. This proposal, too, was rejected and answered by a counter-proposal⁴ which, as your delegation rightly stated, was compatible with the Western ideas on this subject only in one point, namely, the question of the nuclear armament of the forces stationed in Berlin, while according to your delegation it seemed unacceptable in twenty-three other points.

Today I wonder whether it was at all wise to make that proposal. Foreign Minister Gromyko had certainly learned by then that a meeting between the Soviet Premier and the United States President was imminent. There can be little doubt that under these circumstances he was neither prepared nor authorized to agree to a reasonable compromise.

The West has certainly lost ground by the proposals it made in Geneva. The Soviet Union maintained its rigorous standpoint from the first to the last day. It is in keeping with Soviet negotiation tactics to pocket concessions offered without ever honouring them by counter-concessions. In future negotiations concerning Berlin, therefore, the point of departure of the West will be weaker than it was before the beginning of the Geneva Conference. In later negotiations, too, the Soviet Union will, as she did in Geneva, carefully analyze all the earlier Western proposals, single out the various proposals and offers and set them over against her own unchanged demands. Thus the negotiating margin will be necessarily narrowed down to the detriment of the West.

I wanted to make these short preliminary remarks before answering your question as to whether the Federal Government was in a position to develop ideas and make proposals of its own. After careful consideration and examination I believe I can give no positive answer.

I am convinced that we agree on the fundamental demand that the freedom of Berlin must under all circumstances be maintained. In saying this I am not thinking only of the two and a quarter million people in Berlin. The incorporation by violence or successful blackmail of Berlin into the communist sphere of power would be a human tragedy defying description. In saying this I am also thinking of the credibility of our joint policy as reflected in cooperation within NATO. All the countries in Europe, whether large or small, would have to fear that they might sooner or later suffer a like fate. I well remember a conversation I had in December last with our Danish colleague, Foreign Minister Krag, in Paris when we discussed the Soviet ultimatum of 27 November 1958.⁵ He told me very earnestly that he clearly realized the immense danger that this note had brought to the fore. But, he added, if ever the two million Berliners were abandoned, the question would be put in a small country like Denmark as to when the moment would come of abandoning three million Danes. May I also remind you that our British colleague, Selwyn Lloyd, dealt with such considerations in the meeting of the Council of Ministers, the tenor of his statement being as follows: If we give up Berlin, the question will soon be asked, “Who will be the next?” I know that no one in the Atlantic Community even plays with the idea of abandoning Berlin, least of all the United States. I need not tell you with what interest and also with what gratitude we have read the statements made until very recently by the President of the United States and by yourself. Only a few weeks ago some outstanding exponents of United States public life were our guests here in Bonn,⁶ who had a long and I believe fruitful conference with their German partners. In these conversations, too, there was not a single American who would not have stood unequivocally and unreservedly for maintaining and securing the freedom of Berlin.

I see no possibility of making to you any German proposal that would have to fulfil two conditions:-

For one thing it would have to go beyond the proposals made in Geneva, for even the far-reaching concessions offered in Geneva were rejected as insufficient by the Soviet Union. And on the other hand, such a proposal would have to secure the maintenance of Berlin’s freedom, that means that the essential substance of the present status of Berlin should not be changed.

This, then, is the dilemma facing us:-

The present status of Berlin is unsatisfactory; we all know that. But in view of the attitude of the Soviet Union we must realize clearly that any change of Berlin’s status will necessarily be a change for the worse. This holds good even for the proposals we made in Geneva, and it would apply all the more to any new proposals going even further in meeting Soviet demands.

I have, of course, also considered the question of whether the existing status could possibly be replaced by a completely new agreement with quite different contents. Our respective collaborators and we, too, discussed this possibility, as you may remember, before and during the Geneva Conference. I am thinking of our considerations whether Berlin might be placed under a guarantee of the United Nations. I believe, however, we all were agreed that a United Nations guarantee could at best be given additionally but could not replace the guarantee of the three Western allies which is expressed by the physical presence of allied forces in Berlin. All of us surely realize that a United Nations guarantee, even if given, would never be sufficient. Any violation by the Soviet Union of obligations undertaken would at best start the clumsy United Nations procedure. But before even a resolution could be adopted accomplished facts would have been created. And we know that the United Nations are incapable of action and will continue to be so as long as the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries oppose any suggestion to equip the United Nations with an executive branch however weak it may be.

Permit me in this context to indulge in a few considerations concerning the German question. I realize that the Soviet Union is not prepared at present even to discuss an acceptable solution to the German question. It is very bitter for me to state that for this reason we can at present in no way expect to advance the problem of reunification even by one step. The All-German Committee, so frequently referred to, is certainly no instrument for reaching that objective.

I sometimes have the impression that the formula of “reunification” may have caused a certain confusion; if so, we Germans are to a certain degree responsible for this. The real issue is not the reunification of two separated parts of Germany. Rather does the solution of the German question, i.e. the restoration of Germany as one State, presuppose that the people in the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany should be given back their right of self-determination. The so-called German Democratic Republic is not a State created and maintained in accordance with the desire of one part of the German people. What has happened and is happening to this hour in that part of Germany is nothing but the partial accomplishment of the imperialist aims of the Soviet Union which, incidentally, has never denied, nor does she deny today, that she is interested in keeping what she possesses without abandoning her aim of expanding her possessions westward. It is one of the most stupendous political lies of our time that the Soviet Union presents herself to the world as a protagonist against colonialism and as speaking for the allegedly oppressed peoples in their struggle for self-determination while having simultaneously reduced to the lowest level of colonials many millions of people in central and eastern Europe who used to live in freedom. Thus, the Soviet-occupied zone is in fact an area to whose inhabitants the right of self-determination is denied by those who in the United Nations loudly and insistently advocate the right of self-determination for the Negroes in Cameroons. The Soviet system of terror would collapse within 24 hours if the Government at Pankow were not backed by the Red Army.

For this reason there exists no possibility of discussing “reunification” with the representatives of that system. Indeed, their task and their mission only consist in maintaining the present system in the Soviet zone of Germany and in making the Federal Republic ripe for the assault of communism. I am informed that only a few days ago, when the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Austria were in Moscow,⁷ Mr. Khrushchev stated with cynical frankness that while reunification was a matter for the two German States to settle, it could only be accomplished by the Ulbricht Government superseding the Adenauer Government in the Federal Republic.

You will perhaps say, when reading these lines, that my position is rigid. You will perhaps remind me that international conferences are imminent on whose outcome war or peace, life or death may possibly depend. I am aware of this situation and also of the immense responsibility resting on us all. And I know that the United States Government has a particular responsibility, for it represents the strongest Power of the free world and cannot forget its primary responsibility to its own people while meeting its political and moral commitments to other parts of the world. I would answer that you are surely right but that the maintenance or the loss of freedom is at stake for us. Please do not think that I overrate the part of Germany in the present world-wide political conflict. But we should not forget that the future of the German people is closely linked to that of its neighbours and allies. We can uphold the freedom of the 52 million inhabitants of the Federal Republic only if the Atlantic alliance system can be preserved. Should mistaken political decisions abandon Germany to bolshevism, the rest of the European continent would within a short period share the fate of Germany. The gigantic accretion of power which such a development would accord to the Soviet Union, would create a new situation for the whole world. It passes the power of imagination to assess the effects of the enlargement of the Soviet potential by more than 200 million people in Europe and the productive capacity of this highly developed continent.

May I revert once more to the problems which will face us during the forthcoming conferences:-

It seems as if the Soviet Union herself is interested in a relaxation of tension or at least in a relaxation phase. The chief reason for this may be Moscow’s realization that the Seven Year Plan can only be carried through if other burdens are cast off. This may provide a real chance for disarmament talks. And therefore I personally think that this question should be the first and perhaps even the only one to be placed on the agenda of the first summit conference. In such disarmament negotiations it will be shown whether the Soviet Union is really prepared to cooperate in common measures in this field. I do not want to conceal from you my impression that the disarmament proposal submitted to the United Nations by Premier Khrushchev does not seem to be an honest one.⁸ It does not look like an act of good faith to speak of disarmament but at the same time to indicate that controls should only become effective once disarmament has been carried out. But, of course, the attempt must be made. And in this connexion it would also be possible to ascertain whether the Soviet Union is sincere. It could be proposed to her to defer the Berlin problem, since the Soviet Union herself denies that her Note of 27 November 1958 was in the nature of an ultimatum. It might be proposed to her to confirm the existing status Berlin, perhaps for a period to be agreed, as we suggested at the time in Geneva. Such a proposal could be made on the grounds that the solution of political problems, i.e., the Berlin question and, later, the German question, would be more easily possible after initial arrangements and measures had been agreed in the disarmament field. If the Soviet Union rejects such a proposal, it will follow that no serious readiness for negotiations exists. We shall then perhaps have to face a serious crisis, but we shall not be able to avoid it by not wanting to see it.

This letter has turned out longer than I wanted it to be, but I hope you will nevertheless give it careful attention. I want to repeat that it contains my personal opinion and is meant for you personally. I should much appreciate hearing from you what you think of it. It goes without saying that I am willing at any time to come to Washington so that we can talk this matter over privately and frankly.

With sincere regards in friendship,

Yours as always,

Von Brentano⁹

0. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret; Eyes Only; Personal and Private. The source text is a translation. Delivered by the German Embassy at noon on November 6.
1. Bruce saw Brentano on October 14, and in a brief telegram reporting on the meeting stated that the German Foreign Minister would soon be writing Herter a personal letter on Berlin. (Telegram 745 from Bonn, October 15; ibid., Central Files, 762.00/10–1559) For a record of the meeting on August 27, see Document 7.
2. For text of this October 15 letter, see Moskau Bonn, pp. 595–600.
3. See vol VIII, Document 488.
4. See ibid., Document 489.
5. See ibid., Document 72.
6. Presumably a reference to the American-German Conference held at the beginning of October in Germany under the auspices of Atlantik Brücke which included Dean Acheson, McCloy, Conant, U.S. Senators and Representatives, and American scholars.
7. Chancellor Raab and Foreign Minister Kreisky visited Moscow October 5–15.
8. For text of Khrushchev’s address on disarmament before the U.N. General Assembly on September 18, see Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. II, pp. 1452–1460.
9. Printed from the translation that indicates that Brentano signed the original German language copy.