Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

33. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State⁰

Berlin, October 23, 1959, 2 p.m.

406. Paris for Embassy and CINCEUR Thurston and Finn. This is part one of three-part message. Ref: ourtel 346 to Bonn, 392 to Dept.¹ Commandants accompanied by deputies and POLADs met for four hours Oct 22 to attempt to resolve issues left undecided by POLADs Oct 17. Mayors Brandt and Amrehn attended first part of session and Commandants heard Brandt give not too strong presentation his views on various questions relating to handling GDR flags if flown West Berlin November 6–7 (see part two).²

In addition basic disagreed issues Commandants discussed other matters on which substantial agreement was reached (see part three).³

Gen Hamlett forcefully outlined our position as follows:

1. Flying of GDR flags on S-Bahn property in West Berlin is far more than disturbance of law and order—it is direct challenge to allied sovereignty in West Berlin.

2. Allied position and prestige viS-à-vis Communists would be seriously impaired by failure to live up to Commandant’s own commitment to prevent GDR incursion West Berlin territory.

3. We should effect removal of all flags. Any GDR flag, irrespective of S-Bahn “zone” in which it flies, represents challenge to our sovereignty.

4. Police should be committed in sufficient force to insure success of operation.

5. During police action allied troops on alert should be visibly present in various parts of city (not, however, at actual scene of police actions as Lipschitz suggested).

6. If police find themselves unable to handle job, allied troops should come to their assistance. Allies cannot afford entrust sole defense of allied sovereignty to West Berlin police [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

7. Every effort should be made to avoid bloodshed. For example, tear gas and fire hoses would be employed, and firearms used only if our side absolutely pushed to limit.

Gen Hamlett urged Commandants agree make tripartite recommendation to governments embodying these points.

British and French Commandants agreed more than law and order involved and that some action called for. They were unwilling specify extent of that action until more information available on a) intentions and capabilities GDR, b) capabilities West Berlin police, with and without allied forces’ assistance, and c) effectiveness West Berlin police plan. French in particular were insistent these points and we gained strong impression they seriously worried lest other side commit really large numbers of hoodlums who might prove too much for combined police and allied military to handle.

Question of making advance commitment re use of allied forces discussed at length but no agreed tripartite position reached. British were particularly reluctant to go along with any recommendation re use of allied troops. In fact British reluctance to take position on use of troops and removing all flags seemed based on abhorrence of situation that might result in spilling of blood. British pointed out disastrous consequences allied prestige worldwide if bloody incidents arose over “mere matter of flags”, whether involving West Berlin police or allied forces.

British not convinced by U.S. arguments that a) effective action in any conceivable contingency could not be guaranteed unless authorization obtained for use of allied troops if such became necessary and b) best means preventing bloodshed was to prepare for strong decisive measures which in themselves might dissuade other side from embarking on aggressive action. British also unconvinced by U.S. argument that despite our distaste for bloodshed, even this unfortunate possibility preferable to position we would be in if we failed to take flags down.

In short despite agreement some kind of action required, tripartite position Oct 22 basically not advanced beyond that reached Oct 17. French, whose acting Commandant said he personally agreed necessity committing allied troops if necessary, apparently favor limited number of flag-removal targets because they fear we do not have capability of tackling more. British evidently want flag removal operation with only safe targets because they want avoid violence. One British suggestion, for example, is that if police encounter resistance they should withdraw, and then several days later police should cut S-Bahn—which act would serve to reestablish fact of allied sovereignty over S-Bahn terrain.

With respect to Commie intentions and capabilities, capabilities are of course considerable but key to problem is intentions. Our analysis of intentions being reported by separate telegram⁴ those qualified to judge on American side here consider that West Berlin Police, numbering 13,000, have capability remove all flags from all three zones unless other side is prepared undertake major operation entailing grave risks which we seriously doubt Soviets would countenance. (During week Oct 11, 117 flags were involved, of which total of six were in zone three.)

Revised Lipschitz police plan now being studied on priority basis by allied public safety and military officers. First glance indicates good many deficiencies but we have confidence they can be corrected.

We have considered here advantages and disadvantages unilateral action in event impossible get British and French agree to decisive action but conclude importance maintaining allied unity outweigh all other considerations.

Decisions now appear to be up to governments. Due to necessity clear cut instructions to all three Commandants, recommend Dept’s approach to British and French be made soon as possible.

Assume on basis para. 3 Deptel 199,⁵ that U.S. Government agrees our position re use of troops.

In view of responsibilities outlined Executive Order 10608, May 5, 1955,⁶USCOB requires instructions through military channels re employment U.S. Forces. He therefore requesting instructions.

Lightner

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10–2359. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 3:25 p.m. Sent also to Bonn and repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and POLADUSAREUR.
1. Telegram 392 from Berlin, October 19, reported that no agreement had been reached at a tripartite Political Advisers meeting on October 17 on either an analysis of the flag-raising incident or on what steps should be taken by the police in future incidents of this type. (Ibid., 762.0221/10–1959)
2. Telegram 407 from Berlin, October 23 at 3 p.m., reported that Brandt favored another approach to the Soviet Commandant before the November 7 celebrations and that any flags should be removed at once by West Berlin police and this action supported by the Western Commandants. (Ibid., 762.0221/10–2359)
3. Telegram 408 from Berlin, October 23 at 3 p.m. (Ibid.)
4. Telegram 413 from Berlin, October 23 at 7 p.m., reported that the East Germans had clearly been “under wraps” since Khrushchev’s visit to the United States, but still had many opportunities for provocations and incidents in West Berlin. (Ibid.)
5. Document 28.
6. For text of Executive Order 10608, “United States Authority and Functions in Germany,” see Department of State Bulletin, May 16, 1955, pp. 792–793.