Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

126. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC/26

Washington, April 14, 1960, 11 a.m.

FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING

Washington, D.C., April 12–14, 1960

SUBJECT

• East-West Relations—Western Position at Summit

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Foreign Secretary Lloyd, United Kingdom
• Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, France
• Secretary-General Spaak, NATO
• (Full list of delegations on last page)¹

The three Foreign Ministers under the Secretary’s Chairmanship and with the participation of NATO Secretary-General Spaak discussed the East-West relations agenda item, proceeding from the questions the Working Group had posed for decision (FMW ERF 4/107) on the basis of its interim report (FMW ERF 4/101–109).²

In introducing this topic the Secretary voiced our concern that summit discussions on the East-West relations topic might be interpreted as having repercussions upon other states. We would have to make it clear to all that in discussion of this topic we had no intention of resolving problems directly affecting the foreign or internal policies of other nations not represented at the summit. The Secretary then turned to the individual sections of the report and questions thereupon.

Soviet Proposals and Suggested Responses³

The Secretary proposed and the Ministers agreed that the Working Group paper was acceptable and that the Group should be instructed to keep alert for evidence of additional proposals the Soviets might advance in this field.

General Aspects of East-West Relations⁴

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville said that the Working Group paper and draft declaration of principles was a good starting point. Secretary-General Spaak said that the North Atlantic Council considered this question of great importance and that the majority of the Council felt that it should be useful for the Western representatives at the summit to oppose their own conception of peaceful co-existence to Khrushchev’s. To attempt to draw up a four-power document that would be subject to equivocal interpretation would be unwise. Some members favored the idea of seeking agreement on a set of rules of good international conduct. In any case, the Council thought that the summit negotiators should be allowed full freedom to determine how, when, or in what form this subject should be treated. Foreign Secretary Lloyd expressed his satisfaction with both the Working Group and the NATO draft declarations and suggested the Group be instructed to draw up an improved draft. Although it was premature to decide on just how the Western heads would make use of such a document, it would be useful to have some clear statement which was mutually acceptable.

The Secretary concurred with Mr. Lloyd’s remarks. He inquired of Mr. Spaak whether he correctly understood the sentiment of the NAC as to the futility of attempting to reach any joint declaration of principles with the Soviets. M. Spaak confirmed that the opinion of the majority of the Council was that it would be extremely dangerous to propose a joint declaration. A statement of Western principles, however, would be valuable in order to demonstrate the inadequacy of the Soviet peaceful co-existence concept. Mr. Lloyd observed that if the Russians agreed to our draft it would thereby become a joint declaration. The Secretary questioned the likelihood of their agreeing to our position, to which Mr. Lloyd replied that the Soviets would be bound to want to work on the draft with a view to having a common declaration. We should be aware of this likelihood at the start.

M. Couve de Murville, expressing agreement, pointed out that the statement would of necessity become a conference document and thus be subject to discussion and attempted amendment by the Soviets. As to M. Spaak’s previous remark, M. de Murville said that the ideas in the Western declaration would be in practice used wherever the Heads of Government thought fit, for example, in their explanations to Khrushchev of the falsities and limitations of peaceful co-existence. There was, however, no intention to propose a joint statement designed to gain Soviet concurrence.

The Secretary suggested that the Working Group be instructed to refine the Western declaration for further discussion at the Istanbul meeting with a view to having it ready for use as appropriate by the Western heads but not as a formal conference document. The Ministers agreed with this recommendation. Before leaving this subject Mr. Herter asked Mr. Lloyd whether there was a new UK draft on a code of international conduct. Mr. Lloyd answered in the negative.

Restrictions on Arms Deliveries⁵

M. Couve de Murville put forth the French belief that the idea of limiting arms deliveries came up automatically under the noninterference heading since it constituted one of the most characteristic and dangerous forms of interference in the affairs of third countries. He said the problem was increasingly becoming a general one, referring to the Middle East, Guinea, and more recently Latin America. He acknowledged that the detailed Working Group study had brought out very great difficulties, particularly that of distinguishing justified from unjustified arms shipments (e.g. to Africa) and of rejecting Soviet attempts to make any such agreement apply to Turkey and Iran (e.g. the proposals made when Khrushchev and Bulganin visited England in 1955).⁶ Moreover a great many countries which did not themselves produce certain arms, like Switzerland, would be placed in a difficult position if unable to purchase arms abroad. Notwithstanding the difficulties he still thought it would be useful to bring up the subject at the summit.

The Secretary stated that we saw more dangers than advantages in raising this subject, since we were in no position to make specific proposals in this field. Moreover, we could not seek to restrain other countries from delivering weapons, for example, Belgium to the Congo. He inquired of M. Spaak as to NAC feeling on this point. M. Spaak said that there had been no NAC discussion of this subject since the report had not been transmitted to the Council, but speaking personally, he saw great difficulties in any attempt to devise limitations on weapons deliveries that would apply to certain states and not to others. Mr. Lloyd observed that public opinion would expect this subject to come up and we must be prepared to deal with it. He mentioned the tripartite undertaking of 1950 to exercise restraint vis-à-vis arms deliveries to the Middle East.⁷ He added that if it was known the subject would come up it was not a bad idea to bring it up yourself.

The Secretary questioned the likelihood of its being raised in any serious manner, since Khrushchev, when speaking of this subject on previous occasions, had always interposed conditions that were clearly unacceptable from the viewpoint of our alliances and our relations with other nations. M. Couve de Murville said that public opinion would be surprised if this topic were not raised. The Secretary rejoined that we feared that the whole balance of public opinion might be turned against us if this question were raised without having any prospect of agreement. Mr. Lloyd said that no decision needed to be made today, but that we should have a clear-cut idea of our position. The Secretary said we certainly must have a clear-cut idea if we intended to raise the subject ourselves, but that we saw no useful outcome from doing so from the public opinion viewpoint. Mr. Lloyd said that a formula on self restraint in arms deliveries was the only safe thing we could live with. M. Couve de Murville added that the main thing was to take a sound and reasonable position that could be explained to public opinion. Restraint worked in two ways and he saw no danger in the West bringing up this very natural question between countries that have major responsibilities affecting the maintenance of peace. The Secretary, reiterating his concern that raising this subject would lead to real dangers, called on Mr. Bohlen to speak.

Mr. Bohlen pointed out that it had not been possible to devise a position that would meet the criteria mentioned by M. Couve de Murville. Also, the U.S. had many more collective security and bilateral arrangements than the Soviet Union, and the Soviets would turn this proposal against us in order to limit our freedom of action at little cost to themselves. Their 1957 proposal for a Middle East arms embargo⁸ broke down over their insistence on including Turkey and Iran. As regards public opinion, a proposal that would be designed clearly to restrict the Soviet area of activities while leaving ours unaffected would not be persuasive. Finally, African countries in need of arms would naturally look to obtaining them from their former metropole.

M. Couve de Murville observed that this discussion raised the question of the very nature of the Summit Conference. There would be no time at the summit to go into great detail on any subject; in any case he envisioned no commitment which would violate the engagements of the U.S. to the defense of the free world countries; and finally it was altogether normal that the question of arms deliveries should arise when the Cold War was discussed. Indeed, the summit would not be complete if there were no mention of arms deliveries, in view of the major impact these have on international relations. M. Spaak pointed out the danger of other countries (e.g. Czechoslovakia) entering to provide substitute sources of weapons whenever Western powers refrained. He also commented that Turkey would protest if NATO were not included in any arrangements made of this kind. The Secretary said he doubted the usefulness of returning this question to the Working Group since it had been thoroughly canvassed, and suggested it be reserved for determination by the Heads of Government. Mr. Lloyd queried whether there was disagreement on the formula, presented in paragraph 11 of the Working Group paper.⁹ Although the Working Group had been unable to reach agreement on the desirability of raising this subject, he urged that if the Western heads were forced to do so, the best possible formula would be needed. The Secretary said he saw no harm in this approach. Mr. Lloyd said the language could be made clearer to cover Mr. Spaak’s point.

The Secretary noted that the role of purveying arms throughout the world was not an agreeable one, but that we had been forced into it by the security situation of the free world. He agreed with Mr. Bohlen that raising the question would open up a field in which the Soviets would have a great advantage. He referred to our support of regional arms limitations agreements under the OAS and stated that the U.S. would be prepared to cooperate with African States if they agreed among themselves to avoid uncontrolled arms competition.

Mr. Lloyd suggested that the Working Group be instructed, first to review the formulation over the undertaking of self restraint in arms deliveries and, second, to develop the idea of the Four Powers declaring their readiness to cooperate with any regional arms control schemes that might be worked out. The Secretary agreed. Mr. Lloyd proposed that the Ministers suspend judgment on this question and reserve it for consideration by the Western Heads, but reiterated his view that we should be prepared with the best defensive position if the question is raised. The Secretary agreed, stating that in this case the subject should be met head on.

Non-interference¹⁰

The Secretary reviewed the limited success of past efforts to define non-interference given the Soviet Government’s refusal to be bound by actions of the Communist Party. M. Spaak, noting again that the Council had not seen the working paper on this subject because of insufficient agreement in the Working Group, said that NAC opinion was divided and not all countries had spoken. Among those who favored seeking some no-interference agreement were Italy and Greece, while Denmark and Norway entirely disagreed and considered dangerous and illusory any statement on this subject to which the Soviet Government would be a party. M. Couve de Murville observed that only third countries were envisioned under this subject and that it was natural for each country to think in terms of its own Communist Party problem. He admitted that he did not particularly recommend the approach set forth in paragraph 6a. of the working paper and was prepared to leave it aside.¹¹ Mr. Lloyd said he thought it should be included in the statement of principles. M. Couvede Murville said that it was already in both drafts.

Aid to Less Developed Countries¹²

M. Spaak reported that the NAC was not agreed on the advisability of proposing joint assistance to the less developed countries. Several countries expressed forceful views in opposition to this idea with only Norway advocating a positive initiative in this field. The majority thought there was little chance the Soviets would accept this form of co-operation, that there were many dangers involved, but that if there was a desire for increased collaboration it should take place through the UN specialized agencies or possibly in terms of a very limited and precise project.

Mr. Dillon summarized the U.S. position opposing an initiative on this subject at the Summit in view of (A) the continued conflict of Soviet political purposes with our own throughout the world, (B) the possibility of affording new openings for the extension of Soviet influence to areas from which they are now excluded, (C) the implication that Soviet aid programs were being given a stamp of approval on an equal basis with our own and, (D) the ease with which the Soviets could reject this initiative in view of past denunciations over cooperating with imperialist aid programs designed to perpetuate colonial exploitation. He said that the U.S. agreed with the Working Group’s counter proposals in case this subject were raised, noted that Khrushchev also had referred to channeling savings effected by a disarmament agreement to the less developed nations, and referred to the debate on the proposed UN agency SUNFED, to which we had objected for reasons quite apart from those connected with Soviet aid programs.

M. Couve de Murville pointed out that this matter raised the same question as that posed by the proposed arms restriction agreement. At the summit particular cases should be studied and, like arms deliveries to sensitive areas, this question was one of the forms of the Cold War which public opinion would expect to be raised. While recognizing the political, practical and psychological dangers involved, he thought it nevertheless important to demonstrate our ability to effect rational co-operation with the USSR. He acknowledged, however, that the U.S. had a special position since its aid effort was the greatest, just as its Military Assistance Programs were the most extensive in the Alliance. This question could be reserved for the Chiefs of State to decide. In any event, no great consequence either for good or for bad could follow from raising this subject. He added that in recent months Soviet delegations in international conferences (ECOSOC and UNESCO particularly) had been stressing the savings that might be applied to the less developed counties if a disarmament agreement were reached. He suggested consultations so that the Western powers would adopt a similar position in these various bodies to counter the Soviet propaganda move. The Secretary agreed that this was a good suggestion and added that all the major governments had committed themselves to the same principle.

Trade and Economic Questions¹³

M. Couve de Murville said that this was essentially a bilateral question, although some reference to it should be made in the communiqué. The Secretary observed that U.S. policy was limited by congressional legislation in this field and our part in any general declaration on commerce would be limited by legal inhibitions on certain transactions. Mr. Dillon interposed that the extension of credits was to be kept particularly in mind. M. Couve de Murville noted that the French had a trade agreement with the USSR as did the U.K. and all contingencies would need to be covered in any communiqué statement. The Ministers agreed that the Working Group might consider appropriate language for this communiqué.

Cultural Exchanges and Freedom of Information¹⁴

The Ministers agreed that the Working Group should review its draft of a proposed communiqué statement.

NATO Consultation

M. Spaak brought up the question of reports of these meetings being made available to NATO before the Istanbul meeting if possible. The Secretary stated that agreed papers on Berlin and Germany were to be distributed to the NAC early next week. M. Spaak expressed his satisfaction with this arrangement. The Secretary said that we had prepared a think piece on what we hoped to achieve from the Summit, and would distribute it shortly to the French and British for consideration as a basis for reporting to the Istanbul meeting.¹⁵ Mr. Lloyd said that Ormsby-Gore would be going to Paris on April 26 to report on disarmament to the NAC. The Secretary said that Mr. Eaton would be going to Istanbul.

There was discussion on the text of a press statement with Mr. Lloyd and M. de Murville advocating a listing of the subheadings discussed under East-West relations, and the Secretary opposing this on the grounds that press curiosity would immediately be aroused and disagreements might come more quickly into public view. The communiqué was redrafted after mutual consultation.¹⁶

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–WA/4–1460. Confidential. Drafted by Heyward Isham of the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and approved in M on April 20, U on April 21, and S on April 22. The meeting was held at the Department of State.
1. Not printed.
2. Copies of these papers are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559. The report of the Working Group is printed as Document 115.
3. The paper on this topic was FMW REF–4/109.
4. The paper on this topic was FMW REF–4/101.
5. The paper on this topic was FMW REF–4/102.
6. For documentation of Khrushchev and Bulgaria’s visit to the United Kingdom, April 18–27, 1956, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. XXVII, p. 655.
7. For text of this declaration, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, vol. II, p. 2237.
8. For text of this proposal, see ibid., Current Documents, 1957, pp. 761–762.
9. Paragraph 11 of FMW REF–4/102 suggested a draft declaration on the supply of arms to local hot spots.
10. The paper on this topic was FMW REF–4/102.
11. Paragraph 6a of FMW REF–4/102 presented a draft declaration by the Four Powers for mutual consultations when crises developed in various areas of the world.
12. The paper on this topic was FMW REF–4/105.
13. The paper on this topic was FMW REF–4/104.
14. The paper on this topic was FMW REF–4/103.
15. Transmitted to the British, French, and West Germans on April 22; see Document 133.
16. For text of the communiqué, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, p. 401.