125. Memorandum of Discussion at the 441st Meeting of the National Security Council0
[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.] Mr. Dillon said the meetings of the Foreign Ministers in Washington on Germany and on Control of Armaments had been very satisfactory. Agreement on Germany and on Berlin had been reached in approximately an hour. An agreement had been reached on a tactical approach to deter unilateral Soviet action against Berlin by an interim agreement or by an agreement to continue the Berlin discussions in some other forum after the conclusion of the Summit Meeting. As a move to counter the Soviet idea of separate peace treaties with East Germany and West Germany, the West has agreed to propose a plebiscite in East and West Germany on whether the Germans prefer the Western or the Soviet approach to a solution of the German problem. Mr. Dillon said this tactical approach would provide us with an excuse to emphasize self-determination. He added that we had switched our policy line from reunification to self-determination. These two terms meant about the same thing in practice but self-determination was more palatable in various countries such as India. The Vice President asked what question we would ask in connection with the plebiscite. Mr. Dillon said the Germans would be asked whether they preferred the Soviet or Western approach to the question of a peace treaty with Germany. Secretary Gates said there would be difficult problems of East-West agreement on the plebiscite referees. Mr. Dillon did not expect the Soviets to agree to the plebiscite proposal, which was largely a propaganda maneuver. The West Germans were enthusiastic about the plebiscite approach. Mr. Dillon reported that the West Foreign Ministers had also agreed that a proposal to reunify Berlin would be desirable, except that the French have some reservations on the ground that such a step might lead to a third German state. The Germans are opposed to any proposal for an all-German discussion of German questions because they fear the implication of recognition of the GDR.
Turning to Control of Armaments, Mr. Dillon reported that the Western Foreign Ministers had also agreed on what to do in the Disarmament Conference. The West would work out a concrete statement on armaments control to put forward at the Conference.1 The U.S. has prepared [Page 323] a draft statement which emphasizes specific steps such as prohibition of weapons of mass destruction in space, prior notification for the launching of missiles, cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons, establishment of initial force level ceilings, the placing of certain armaments in internationally-controlled storage depots, and measures for protection against surprise attack. The Western Foreign Ministers agreed to refer the preparation of a concrete joint Western proposal on armaments control to their delegations at Geneva. Mr. Dillon believed the West was making some progress in the Geneva negotiations by emphasizing the necessity of taking concrete steps for the control of armaments in contrast to the Soviet insistence on talking only about general principles of disarmament. The world reaction to the Western proposals has been favorable because we appear to be ready to take the initial steps towards disarmament. Mr. Dillon added that all the NATO governments would be given an opportunity to express their views on this and related questions at the Istanbul meeting of the NATO Council on May 2, which would be preceded by another meeting of the Western Foreign Ministers on May 1.
[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs. The Vice President presided at the meeting.↩
- For text of this statement as submitted to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva on April 26, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 700–701.↩