Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

115. Paper Circulated in the Department of State⁰

FMW REF–2/110

Washington, April 9, 1960.

REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON GERMANY INCLUDING BERLIN

Summary

1. The Four Power Working Group on Germany including Berlin has met in intensive session in Washington from April 4 to April 9, 1960. Prior to this period certain preparatory work was done during February and March by representatives of the British, French and German Embassies meeting with representatives of the Department of State.

2. In organizing its report, the Working Group has considered that the Four Power Meeting of Foreign Ministers scheduled to take place in Washington April 13–14, 1960 would wish to review the conclusions reached so far and to issue such directives for further work as their discussion might show to be necessary. The Working Group has also had in mind the need for consultation with NATO and recommends that this report be forwarded to the North Atlantic Council in order to assist in NATO discussion of the forthcoming Summit Conference which it understands is to take place primarily during the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Ministerial level in Istanbul early in May.

3. As a logical starting point, the Working Group has prepared an estimate of probable Soviet negotiating intentions on Germany and Berlin at the East-West Summit Meeting. This is attached as Annex I.

4. There is attached as Annex II a discussion of the question of Germany containing certain recommendations to the Ministers.

5. Annex III contains a discussion of the Berlin question, together with the conclusions of the Working Group following upon its analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of various possible approaches to an agreement on Berlin.

6. In view of the key role which the tactics of the West will play at the Summit, the discussion of this subject which follows provides a convenient synthesis of, as well as logically deriving from, the more detailed discussions and conclusions reached by the Working Group.

TACTICS ON GERMANY INCLUDING BERLIN AT THE SUMMIT

1. The Working Group assumes that, from the Western point of view, discussion of subjects at the Summit should preferably be in the following sequence: (a) general opening statements; (b) disarmament; (c) Germany including Berlin; and (d) East-West relations. The general mood of the Summit will to some extent be influenced by the amount of agreement already reached or in prospect in the disarmament field. If the situation in this field is favorable, it would give the Western Powers a certain leverage to use in persuading the Soviets not to press too hard on the Berlin issue. However, the precise tactical interrelationship of the various subjects at the Summit can only be determined later in the light of the actual situation.

2. The aim of the Western Powers at the Summit Conference should be to eliminate the threat which the Soviet Union is exerting on Berlin without sacrificing the basis of their general policy in Germany (reunification in freedom and European cooperation). To reach that goal the Western Powers have three essential methods at their disposal:

a. To induce the Soviets to lift the threat to Berlin by means of agreements in other fields;

b. To maintain the present situation as it is by providing for continuing discussions;

c. To reach a modus vivendi on Berlin which, without altering the essentials would be mutually acceptable;

3. The tactical approach of the West might accordingly proceed as follows:

a. On the assumption that the Soviets start out by insisting on the necessity of a peace treaty with the two Germanies, the Western rowers would resubmit their Western Peace Plan.¹ (See Annex II)

b. When the Soviets reject the Western Peace Plan, as may be anticipated, the Western Powers would advance their proposal for a plebiscite to be held in West and East Germany and in all Berlin. (See Annex II)

c. When the discussion turns to Berlin proper, the Soviets will presumably reiterate the desirability of their “free city” proposal. The Western Powers would normally wish to start by restating their standard position that the only lasting and real solution to the Berlin problem must come within the framework of German reunification.

d. At this point it might be tactically advantageous for the West to put forward an all-Berlin proposal (see Annex III), even if such a proposal is considered non-negotiable.

e. If the Soviets reject the proposal mentioned in 3. d., the Western Powers should not proceed to further discussions without making it clear that under prevailing circumstances the present situation in Berlin is tolerable and that from their point of view no change is necessary.

f. It might be possible to secure an agreement—perhaps no more than a tacit one—to preserve the existing situation for a period of time during which an attempt might be made to achieve progress towards a more formal agreement. One way of doing this might be to seek agreement at the Summit to remand the task of further negotiation to a subordinate group (perhaps Deputy Foreign Ministers), which would report back to a future meeting of the Heads of Governments. This might be accompanied by certain reciprocal declarations intended to reduce tensions, for example, to maintain unhindered access to Berlin, to avoid inflammatory propaganda, and to refrain from unilateral action affecting the rights of others. Such a remitting to a subordinate group by the Heads of Governments would presumably require some sort of directive which might be essentially procedural in nature. This would have to be drafted with great care to avoid the implication that Western rights in Berlin would be in any way affected during the period prior to the meeting of Heads of Governments to which the subordinate group would be reporting. The Western Heads of Governments might likewise wish to make a statement at the Summit stressing the essential conditions which they believe should govern any Berlin arrangement. If the Foreign Ministers agree, the Working Group in its next session could attempt to draft such a directive, the possible reciprocal declarations, and the Western statement of essential conditions.

g. In the light of the Soviet attitude as it becomes manifest at the Summit, the Western Powers might explore the possibility of concluding an acceptable modus vivendi. One possible development is (as suggested by Ambassador Smirnov in Bonn)² that the Soviets will attempt to resume the discussion of an interim solution for Berlin at the point where the Geneva discussions broke off, stating that, while the Western proposals of July 28³ were not entirely satisfactory, they are willing to consider whether certain further changes could not be made which might make possible an agreement. In any event, the Western Powers would at this stage have to be prepared to discuss certain substantive proposals along the lines of the July 28 proposals, possibly improved by certain provisions aimed at ameliorating the existing situation in Berlin and safeguarding access thereto. A provision might also be envisaged committing all parties to refrain from any acts inconsistent with the terms of the agreement.

4. If it seems that an impasse has been reached and that the Soviets will proceed to take unilateral action purporting to end their responsibilities in the access field, the Western Powers might wish to consider making a proposal involving a series of interlocking but unilateral declarations on Berlin access, propaganda, etc., aimed at achieving a freezing of existing access procedures with ultimate Soviet responsibility being maintained although implementation might be by the East German authorities (along the lines of London Working Group Solution C of April 1959).⁴ If the Foreign Ministers agree, the Working Group could in its next phase undertake to further refine a proposal along these lines.

5. If the Soviets refuse further discussions, the Western Powers will have to consider how, while still at the Summit, they might best bring to the attention of the Soviets the serious results which unilateral action on their part might have. The Western Powers might likewise consider at this point the desirability of a Berlin plebiscite in the Western sectors of the city in order to provide a starting point for ensuing developments.

6. Some believe that a tactical question which might arise is whether, and if so at what point, the West should express willingness to discuss the principles of a peace treaty with Germany either in a deputy or expert group if it appears at some point during the Summit Conference that a Western offer to discuss peace treaty principles might tip the balance in favor of preventing Soviet unilateral action directed at the Western position in Berlin. There are some important objections to such action by the Western Powers, as indicated in the discussion of advantages and disadvantages in Annex II.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1628. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. The paper consisted of a cover sheet, summary, a paper on the tactics on Germany including Berlin at a summit meeting, Annex I (a 6-page paper entitled “Probable Soviet Negotiating Intentions on Germany and Berlin”), Annex II (a 5-page paper entitled “The Question of Germany” which had a 3-page attachment describing a proposal for a plebiscite in Germany), and Annex III (a 3-page paper entitled “The Berlin Question” which had a 3-page attachment on the reunification of Berlin and a 2-page attachment on a modus vivendi for West Berlin). Only the summary and paper on tactics are printed here.
1. For text of the Western Peace Plan, May 14, 1959, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 624–629.
2. For text of Smirnov’s remarks to the Foreign Press Association at Bonn on March 22, see Dokumente, Band 4, 1960, Erster Halbband, pp. 560–561.
3. See vol. VIII, Document 488.
4. See footnote 8, Document 72.