Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

133. Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁰

Washington, undated.

OUR SUMMIT PURPOSES

Introduction

1. Need to Define Our Purposes.

We have a fairly good idea of what the Soviets hope to obtain from the May meeting. We should be equally clear as to our own aims—over and above the negative one of frustrating Soviet purposes. It is now time to mature our own Summit philosophy.

2. Danger of Leaks.

As we do so, we should redouble efforts to prevent leaks. Leaks prejudice diplomacy’s changes and hence increase the risk of conflict.

3. Raising Our Sights.

We must overcome any tendency to look on the Summit as something of a chore, whose maximum result would be to leave us no worse off than we were before.

This is too modest an aim and would be too negative a result for such an important international meeting.

We should look upon the coming talks with the Soviets as a chance to achieve, or at least to champion, four affirmative purposes.

Our First Purpose:

A Small Beginning Toward Practical Controlled Disarmament

4. Specific Steps.

We should press for Summit progress toward controlling the arms race. We should propose limited measures, which would reduce the risk of war by miscalculation. Our proposals for prior notification of launching of space vehicles and for safeguards against surprise attack are examples of such limited measures. These measures would not radically alter the military situation, but they could help to avert an unwanted conflict, while we seek more extensive disarmament.

5. General Disarmament.

The importance of any Summit discussion of general disarmament, on the other hand, will probably be its effect on world opinion. With this in mind, we should emphasize that progress toward general disarmament will have to go hand in hand with progress toward open societies. While recognizing that this is for the Soviet Union to decide, we should stress that support of closed societies hinders the achievement of disarmament.

Our Second Purpose:

Deterring Communist Action Against Berlin and
Paving the Way for an Eventual Acceptable Solution

6. The End in View.

Our second major purpose at the Summit should be to seek an arrangement—explicit or tacit—to preserve the existing situation in Berlin for a period of time. During this period we could try to progress toward a more formal and definitive solution regarding Berlin.

7. The Means.

To this end, we might seek either a temporary agreement or very general Summit directive to a subordinate group, which would negotiate and report back to Heads of Government. In this latter case, reciprocal declarations to avoid provocative actions, e.g., interference with unhindered communication to Berlin, might also be exchanged at the Summit, in an effort to reduce tensions over Berlin during the period of negotiation that would then lie ahead, without our trying to work out a formal agreement, with all the attendant semantic and legal difficulties.

8. Deterrent.

Success in this effort to “de-fuse” Berlin would only be possible if we made clear the grave view that we would take of any Communist action which threatened our access and purported to destroy our rights. We should emphasize, at least privately to Khrushchev, that any such action would seriously prejudice prospects for détente and for early disarmament. The Soviets seem to set some store on pushing for détente and on reducing their military burdens. They might prefer to have relaxation of tensions with progress on arms control than to have their own way over Berlin—if we made clear at a Summit that they could not have both.

Our Third Purpose:

An Increase in the Confidence and Cohesion of the Western Alliance

9. Our Goal.

The Communists traditionally use any international encounter to air their confidence in the ultimate triumph of their system. If they run true to form at the Summit we should go them one better. We have good reason to do so.

10. Military Strength.

Our position is strong in the military field. Our strategic deterrent is highly effective, and will remain so. The USSR, in spite of its missile boasts and accomplishments, is quite conscious of the restraint that this strength imposes on its aggressive designs.

11. Non-Military Strength.

Freedom’s priority claim to the future in non-military competition was never so clear as during President Eisenhower’s recent journeys through Asia and Latin America.¹ The peoples of these areas just do not want totalitarianism; they know that their independence will die if the Free World does not thrive. Our countries can rightly enter the Summit with confidence that our three spokesmen of the free world represent the tide of history.

12. Our Posture.

We should use the Summit to manifest that confidence—to Khrushchev, to our own peoples, and to the world as a whole.

If the Soviets initiate a propaganda exchange at the Summit, we should stress our view that the future belongs to governments and ideologies firmly based on the principle of self-determination.

We should make clear that we welcome the intensified peaceful competition with Communism which lies ahead.

We should call on free peoples everywhere to mount the increased effort that this competition will require.

If we can use the Summit thus to mobilize the moral and physical energies of the free world for the coming serious economic and ideological struggle, this alone will have made the Summit worthwhile.

Our Fourth Purpose:

Clarification of Our Posture Toward the
Communist Bloc in a Period of Apparent “Thaw”

13. Need for Clarity.

We need to make clear at the Summit that the Western Powers are in deadly earnest, despite the moral difference between their system and that of the Soviets, in their desire to find ways of controlling the risk of nuclear war. We also need to make clear that this moral difference is not being narrowed in any way by the Summit dialogue.

14. Our Behavior.

Our behavior should thus reflect the fact that we have come to the Summit in a businesslike attempt to reduce the risk of war—not to confuse our peoples by meaningless gestures. We want to make progress—on disarmament and on Berlin—which would make the forthcoming period of struggle a somewhat safer time for mankind. We want to maintain a friendly and courteous mien in seeking such progress; we do not want to gloss over the absence of progress or the difference between freedom and totalitarianism.

Conclusion

15. Affirmative Purposes.

There are thus four affirmative purposes that we should set for ourselves at the Summit:

(1) Forward movement toward controlling the risks of the arms race;

(2) “De-fusing” Berlin;

(3) Enhancing free world confidence and cohesion;

(4) Clarifying our countries posture toward the Bloc in a period of apparent “thaw”.

16. Affirmative Stance.

We should make clear, starting right now and through the Summit, that we do have these affirmative purposes and that we welcome the Summit as an opportunity to prosecute them. We should not give the impression that the Summit is something that the Soviets invented or that we have been dragged into against our will. We should be ready to take the initiative, in proposing that another Summit be held, to receive the Berlin negotiating group’s report if such a group is set up—or earlier if a threat to the peace or an opportunity for significant progress arises.

17. Outcome.

If we can gear our actions at the Summit to these affirmative purposes, we will—while effectively seeking to reduce the risk of war—enhance worldwide respect for the Western alliance: its firmness, its clarity of purpose and its claim to the future. This kind of moral victory should help us to strengthen peace and get on with free men’s efforts to remain free, whether or not we succeed in reaching agreement with the USSR.

18. Execution.

Our final preparations for the meeting should reflect these purposes and our representatives should concert on pre-Summit public information, as well as on Summit style and substance, with this in mind.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/4–2260. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. On April 21, Smith sent a copy of this paper to Herter for transmission to the President. On the following day, Herter transmitted copies of the paper to Couve de Murville, Lloyd, Brentano, and General De Gaulle under cover of a brief note explaining that it was the paper he had mentioned at the meeting on April 14 (see Document 126) and that it had been read by the President.
1. The first trip took place December 4–22, and the second February 23–March 3, 1960.