Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Cuba, Volume VI

35. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, March 14, 1958—7 p.m.

541. Department telegram 484.² Batista told Ambassador³ he confident can survive present crisis. Embassy inclined share his view. Current crisis built up by talk and agitation for general strike and by small acts of terrorism and violence. Sources among revolutionary groups are telling Embassy, as in past crises, their plans and action groups not ready, coordination difficult, and no date set for strike. Also as in past they accompany such statements with particularly vehement criticism US for “keeping Batista in office against wishes of Cuban people”. Embassy believes strike accompanied by violence may still be attempted. Intimidation rather than personal conviction will be basic factor influencing many participants. Government’s chances of success in handling situation will thereby be increased.

Batista has no intention abdicate. On contrary he informed Ambassador he now preparing take all-out measures against Castro. If Batista were assassinated, military junta would probably take control government. This junta could possibly merge into combined military-civilian group. As yet Castro has given no indication any disposition cooperate with other groups. Any new government would be faced with serious problem of controlling Fidel Castro.

Embassy considers present support of Castro by revolutionary groups basically more for him as figurehead than as personal leader. Reservations concerning him and reluctance follow him blindly noticeable even in 26 July movement. He apparently regarded with antipathy by armed forces. Embassy therefore considers Castro important but probably not dominant factor political scene if Batista removed. The 26 July movement would lose in cohesiveness and momentum with Batista gone.

Embassy believes Cuban picture will be characterized by fluctuating tension as long as Batista in office. Provided armed forces remain loyal, leadership organized labor remains pro-Batista, and he escapes assassination, Batista will probably remain in control until end his term February 1959.

Situation changes daily and above appraisal subject modification in light of events.

Smith

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–1458. Secret; Priority.
2. Document 33.
3. An apparent reference to the conversation of March 13 described supra.