33. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba 1
484. From Rubottom. Re Embtel 5252 and Telecon with Ambassador.3 Agreed Batista be informed along lines your three recommendations included reftel. You may also wish consider asking him whether in view necessity reimpose constitutional restrictions he believes Government capable protecting American lives and property.
Your attention invited to Emergency and Evacuation Plan for Cuba dated February 15, 1956.4 Am sure you aware Embassy responsibilities this connection and leave your discretion timing any action required.
[Page 56]Your tel raises serious doubts in Dept. whether Batista regime can survive. While true that US does not desire intervene Cuban internal affairs, believe US special relationship to Cuba requires that we seek by every means possible use our constructive influence with Government and Opposition to help find peaceful solution to problem.
From here appears that Batista regime has utterly failed to convince Cuban people and certainly US public of its intention carry out free elections. Example is statement of March 105 expressing confidence in election Government candidate which in eyes public tended to negate promise hold free elections.
Would it be possible for Batista, notwithstanding real risks involved for himself, to decide and somehow convincingly convey through Church or other impartial group that elections will in fact be free and that all candidates will have equal chance win at polls? Recognize that problem is how achieve this but if Batista can be convinced that this decision is vital not only to his continuance in office but to his and Cuba’s good name and as means avoiding possible chaos, believe he knows his own people well enough to evolve an electoral plan. If this feasible, postponing elections might be advantageous and could conceivably provide time for tempers to cool.
Realize above may be impossible of execution but Department would appreciate soonest your estimate Batista regime’s ability survive present crisis and for how long. Also need your best estimate whether military junta, mixed military-civilian group, or individual might emerge as head of Government in event Batista abdicates or otherwise removed from scene. Especially important is role Castro would play in any changed political situation. Has he achieved sufficient personal prestige, if not respect, to be dominant factor in Cuban political scene if Batista removed?