Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Cuba, Volume VI

238. Editorial Note

In mid-January in response to public and congressional criticism of the execution of former Batista supporters, the Cuban Government invited certain Congressman, including Adam Clayton Powell and Charles O. Porter, to visit Cuba to witness the trials firsthand.

On January 20, Congressman Powell called Rubottom to inform him that the Cuban Government was sending a plane to Miami to transport the Congressmen to Cuba and to ask what the Department’s reaction was to the Congressmen accepting the invitations. Rubottom replied that Powell “would be the best judge of how this would affect him personally, but that the Department of State has been very careful to conduct its activities with regard to the Cuban situation with dignity and understanding of the emotion-charged situation, and that he did not think the presence of American congressmen at the trials was quite in keeping with that attitude.” (Memorandum of telephone conversation by Beers, January 20; Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100/1–2059)

Also on January 20, Congressman Porter called Wieland to indicate that he was planning to accept the invitation to visit Cuba. Porter said that he planned to witness a trial in Havana and to visit other parts of the country, including Oriente province, but he did not intend to go to the rally which Castro had scheduled for January 21 to show support for the government’s trials of the “war criminals.” Porter said that such rallies prove nothing and “the country would be far better advised to allow people to return to work.” Wieland pointed out that there had been a slowdown in the number of executions coincident with the invitations to the Congressmen and the American press to come to Cuba, which Porter said he had noticed. When Wieland asked Porter if he could “risk his present position” by accepting the invitation:

“He replied that he had been surprised by it, but felt that he was more or less bound to accept inasmuch as he had not only criticized the executions but had sent a special personal telegram to President Urrutia urging more objective procedures be observed in the Cuban courts. He said he, therefore, did not feel he could decline the invitation but intended to utilize his visit to continue to urge the Cuban Government to start now to give serious attention to more constructive measures in the Republic in order not to undermine still further the prestige of the revolution.” (Memorandum of telephone conversation by Wieland, January 20; ibid., 033.100–PO/1–2059)

On the morning of January 21, Porter arrived at the Embassy in Havana just as a meeting of Chargé Daniel Braddock and other senior officers was ending. Braddock invited Porter into the meeting, gave him a brief analysis of the situation in Cuba, and asked others present to respond to questions that Porter raised. According to Braddock’s report to the Department of State:

“The Congressman asked my advice as to whether he should attend the mass rally to which he said he had been invited by Castro. I told him that I too had been invited and that I had not yet made up my mind whether to go inasmuch as there was a strong possibility that the rally might be turned into an anti-American demonstration. I said I was trying to obtain some kind of satisfactory assurance that this would not occur and if I were successful I intended to go. Mr. Porter said he felt exactly the same way; that he had come to Cuba for the purpose of showing ‘friendliness’; and that he could not attend a meeting which was going to turn into a demonstration against the United States. He said he was going to try to see both Castro and Urrutia before the meeting.” (Despatch 772 from Havana, January 22; ibid., 033.1100–PO/1–2259)

At 12:05 p.m. on January 21, Snow called Braddock and asked that he urge Congressman Porter to stay away from the rally. Snow said he did not expect Porter to heed this advice, but he “wanted to be on record as having thus advised the Congressman.” Snow also said that Porter, prior to his departure, had told the press he wanted to shake Fidel Castro’s hand and he felt the U.S. Government should show a warmer attitude toward the new Cuban Government. Snow wanted Braddock to make sure that Porter could not say later on that he had obtained the Embassy’s approval to attend the rally. Braddock told Snow that Foreign Minister Agramonte, in response to the Embassy’s inquiry, had sent word that no statement unfriendly to the United States would be made at the meeting and that Fidel Castro and President Urrutia had been informed of this commitment. In light of these assurances, Braddock felt he could go to the reception before the rally, which the entire Diplomatic Corps would attend, and then stay for the rally if the Diplomatic Corps decided to remain. (Memorandum of telephone conversation, January 21; ibid., ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary Files: Lot 61 D 411, Cuba 1959)

Apparently following this conversation, Braddock talked by telephone with Rubottom and told him that he was going to the Presidential Palace at 1:15 p.m. along with the Diplomatic Corps for champagne and from there they would go to the mass rally. President Urrutia would speak at the rally, which Rubottom felt would give the affair more “of the stamp of the Government” than he had first realized. Rubottom then checked with William B. Macomber who said “he did not think we would suffer too much on the Hill” if Braddock went to the rally, especially since he could “use his own judgement about walking out if he had to.” In a telephone conversation with Secretary Dulles that day, Rubottom described these conversations with Braddock and Macomber and the Secretary agreed that Braddock should attend the rally. (Memorandum of telephone conversation by Beers, January 21; ibid., Central Files, 737.00/1–2159)

The rally, held in front of the Presidential Palace and attended by approximately 500,000 people, lasted 5 hours. The main speaker was Fidel Castro, who spoke for nearly 4½ hours. Present were many foreign press correspondents, mostly from the United States and Latin America. Of the various U.S. Congressmen invited, only Powell and Porter were present. According to the Embassy’s summary of Castro’s speech, Castro asked the crowd, in the name of “revolutionary justice,” to vote by a show of hands whether they approved the “shooting of the assassins.” All the hands were raised to the accompaniment of a “vengeful roar.” Castro also criticized the unfair press treatment of the Cuban revolution and said Cuba would demand the return of “war criminals” who had taken refuge in the United States. Castro’s only direct criticism of the United States, according to the Embassy, was the following:

“Great crimes have been committed in the name of peace, and I could address this question to the Congressmen who attack us: What did the United States do? What was done at Hiroshima and Nagasaki? In the name of peace two cities were bombed and more than three hundred thousand human beings killed. We have shot no child, we have shot no woman, we have shot no old people. Nevertheless, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, three hundred thousand members of the civil population died. In the name of what? Well, they said it was done to achieve peace and also to keep many American combatants from being killed. Well then, I say to those Congressmen, apart from the fact that they have no reason to interfere in Cuban problems, that we are shooting the assassins so that they will not kin our children tomorrow. And when all is said and done the total of assassins we shoot will not be more than four hundred, which is about one assassin for every thousand men, women and children assassinated in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.” (Telegram 874 from Havana, January 22; ibid., 737.00/1–2259)

A full report on the rally and the various speeches was sent to the Department in despatch 779 from Havana, January 23. (ibid., 737.00/1–2359)

After the rally, Castro received the members of the Diplomatic Corps at the Hilton Hotel. When he was presented to Castro, Braddock said: “I listened intently to your speech this afternoon but could not make it all out and therefore won’t know until I read it whether you hurt us very much or just a little. In any event, with all our heart, we want cordial, friendly relations with the Cuban Government and to get down to business as soon as possible.” According to Braddock, “Castro replied in sincere manner that he hoped we had received no hurt as he had intended none and that it was necessary in a public rally of that sort to express certain points of view. He said something to the effect that the two countries would of course work together.” Braddock also reported that Miro Cardona had told him that he was glad that Braddock had spoken to Castro as he did. (Telegram 869 from Havana, January 22; ibid., 737.00/1–2259)

Braddock had been unable to reach Congressman Porter by telephone prior to the rally to convey the Department’s strong desire that he not attend, so he sent a note to Porter’s hotel. At the reception following the rally, Porter told Braddock that he had received the note just before leaving for the rally, which had caused him some “soul-searching,” but he had been able to see both Castro and Urrutia before the rally and as a result had decided to attend. (Despatch 772 from Havana, January 22; ibid., 033.1100/1–2259)