Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

ES–31. Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, November 5, 1960

SUBJECT

• Recent Developments in El Salvador.

REF

• NSC paper dated October 30 entitled “Coup d’etat in El Salvador.”²

In the past week it has become clear that currently the most prominent if not the dominant figure in the revolutionary movement which overthrew the Lemus Government is ex-President Oscar Osorio who, while a complex individual, has a long record of cooperation with the U.S. and of opposition to Communist domination of El Salvador’s political life. In this coup he appears to have had the financial support of some of the leading “14 families.” There is, however, a question as to whether he is in full control of the situation with indications that the influence of the extreme left may be growing rapidly and unchecked. Also, there are reports of dissension in the military and plans for a counter-coup by dissident officers. The question of the recognition of the new Salvadorian regime is being given urgent consideration in the light of these reports as this paper is being prepared.

The most significant new indications of expanding Castro-Communist influence include:

a) The appointment of more leftists to second and third echelon positions in the Government, particularly in the Attorney General’s office, the Ministries of Education and Labor, the Supreme court (two to three seats in nine seat body), and in the Junta public relations office. Among these are some extremists or Communists.

b) The commencement of a daily half-hour radio program carrying the straight Communist line, reportedly with the blessing of the new Junta public relations office, and the cancellation of a USIS daily prepared international newscast on the Government-controlled station (since reinstated).

c) The rapid resumption of activities by Communist-dominated groups, including the reappearance of manifestos making demands on the Government apparently designed to foment unrest and keep it moving toward the left; the resumption of public student meetings; efforts to intimidate University students and faculty members opposing the Communist student leadership in the recent disturbances; and the arrest on a vague assault charge of an ex-deputy who had pushed hard for anti-Communist legislation before the fall of Lemus.

d) The reported return from exile of Cuban “Prensa Latina” staffers, rumored plans for the re-opening of the Cuban Embassy in El Salvador and rumors regarding plans for the creation of a civilian militia.

The new Government appears to lack agreement on any real doctrine and it certainly contains anti-U.S. elements, with the inherent risk that these, though in a minority at present, could possibly take over. Col. Osorio admits that the situation is delicate. He appears to be influencing the three military members of the six-man Junta, but possibly has less influence on the civilian members. While he has implied to our Charge that proper action would be taken when the time came, he apparently does not intend to curb Communist activities, organizationally or propaganda-wise, at present. He feels this kind of a coalition is necessary and desirable at this time.

On the question of recognition, Ambassador Kalijarvi, presently here on consultation, and the Embassy recommend deferring recognition indefinitely. They consider that the complexion and trend of the present Government is leftward towards a Castro-Communist takeover; that the reported plans for a counter-coup may make it short-lived; that recognition would cast a cloak of respectability about the new Government in the eyes of other countries and peoples and encourage attempts to effect similar overthrows elsewhere in Central America; and that immediate recognition would thus encourage and strengthen forces hostile to the United States without any realistic prospect of our being able to control the situation or to effect a change in the course of the new government.

There is, of course, always a possibility that Communist-Castro elements will succeed in getting an upper hand in El Salvador. The question is, however, whether it is in the U.S. interest to work with the new Government and endeavor, through the moderate elements of the regime, and particularly Osorio, to achieve an orientation toward the West, or whether, by failure to recognize or delay in recognition, we should alienate the Government, weaken Osorio and help to create a situation of uncertainty propitious for Communist and Castro influence. On balance, recognizing there are risks in whatever we do, I believe we can more effectively pursue U.S. objectives by working with the present Government. This conclusion is based largely on the hope that Osorio will remain influential, and the history of our relations with Osorio.

1. Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files, Lot 66 D 95, “NSC–5902-Memoranda.” Secret. Drafted by Gwynn and Higdon.
2. Reference presumably is to the paper from Mann to Herter, October 31, 1960, See Document ES–27.