ES–27. Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to the Secretary of State1

SUBJECT

  • Coup d’etat in El Salvador

In the early hours of October 26 a bloodless coup d’etat occurred in El Salvador which resulted in the sending of strongly pro-U.S. president Jose Maria Lemus and his principal aide and heir apparent, Major Adolfo Rubio Melhado into forced exile in San Jose, Costa Rica, and the assumption of power by the following six-man combined military civilian Junta.

Military Members:

Col. César Yanes Urías—Deputy Chief of General Staff under Lemus regime. Recently assigned to special staff responsible for maintaining order in San Salvador during state of siege. Has been in the U.S.; described by former U.S. Military Attaché to El Salvador (Col. Ferguson) as reticent, non-commital, retiring in personality; not particularly a leader.

Lt. Col. Miguel Angel Castillo— Director of the Treasury Police under Lemus regime; former Director General of Telecommunications under President Osorio; described by former USMA as friend of President Osorio, a leader, and very friendly to U.S. (The Auxiliary Bishop of Guatemala, who spent many years in El Salvador, describes both Yanes and Castillo as “high-calibre anti-Communist officers of the Osorio stripe.”)

Major Ruben Alonso Rosales—former Deputy Chief of key El Zapote Fortress, commanding the capital city of San Salvador; described by former USMA as being very friendly to a former member of U.S. Army mission; close to General Parada, late Minister of Defense, known as friendly to U.S.

Civilian Members:

Dr. Fabio Castillo—Medical Doctor and Vice Dean of the School of Medicine at the National University; respected and popular with University students; has studied in the U.S. and Europe; a known liberal or leftist, who has been called “Communist”, a charge which has not been substantiated.

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Rene Fortin Magana—Lawyer, aged 30. As a University student was an active leftist, anti-U.S., an associate of Communists, and an alleged “Communist.” A Salvadoran source here, however, whose judgment I value, described him as young, honorable, violent, rich, and not left. In view of my personal knowledge of the University of El Salvador, I am inclined to the latter view.

Ricardo Falla Caceres—Lawyer, aged 32. An active leftist at the University in recent years who has been consistently alleged to be a “Communist,” but is described as liberal by other sources considered reliable.

The individuals comprising the Junta and the new cabinet appear to represent a cross-section of Salvadoran political views. This is undoubtedly deliberate, in an endeavor to attract widespread support for the new Government. They are largely younger men who are relatively unknown politically. A tentative appraisal indicates that the new Government is nearer the “middle of the road” than to either extreme, with a definite tendency towards the left on the part of the civilian members. Ambassador Kalijarvi views a substantial proportion of the civilian members as being to the extreme left. The Department’s sources indicate many of them to be moderates, although preponderantly to the left.

The new Government’s first actions have been to release political prisoners, lift the state of siege, cancel the law restricting the right of assembly, and to announce that it would hold free elections as scheduled in 1962 and would govern by means of decrees during the transitory period of government. Also, it has declared its firm intention to comply strictly with the political Constitution of 1950, to respect existing treaties and international conventions, to fulfill its obligations and commitments, and to respect human rights. These latter assurances have been given by the new Minister of Foreign Affairs in a note dated October 27 to our Embassy in San Salvador.2

Among the principal factors leading to the overthrow of the Lemus Government have been (a) his failure to carry out social reforms announced following his inauguration in 1956; (b) his failure to accept the advice of and delegate responsibility to the better-qualified members of his cabinet; (c) his vacillation in controlling the increasing activities of pro-Castro and pro-Communist agitators, first by failure to act and later through strong-arm suppression; and (d) his alienation of the military by his apparent intention to make his aide, Major Rubio Melhado, his successor to the Presidency.

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The coup d’etat followed over two months of demonstrations by anti-Government and student and labor groups, initiated on August 16 by a protest against the existing regime and the OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers at San Jose. President Lemus was finally goaded, principally by the Salvadoran press, into using repressive measures against the demonstrators, including the arrest and exile of agitators, the enacting of a law restricting the right of assembly, excessive force by members of the security units, and the establishment of a state of siege, which soon alienated most of Lemus’ own supporters and created martyrs for continued anti-Government agitation. Temporary truces were effected by a civilian group composed of representatives of the Church, prominent businessmen, and representatives of the leading families, which intervened in an effort to mediate the differences between the Lemus Government and the demonstrators. These efforts, and less violent measures by the Security Forces, produced over a month of relative calm immediately preceding the unexpected coup d’etat, which appears to have been carried out as a preventative measure to insure that pro-Castro and pro-Communist elements would be unable to capitalize on the constantly deteriorating stability of the Lemus regime.

The files of U.S. intelligence agencies contain reports indicating that the three civilian members of the Junta and a number of the members of the new cabinet have been accused of being “Communists,” pro-Communist, and/or associates of Communists. Such accusations have been levelled at one time or another against almost all “liberals” or “leftists” in El Salvador who have advocated change in their still largely semi-feudal social order, opponents of the regime in power, and/or students politically active in the affairs of the traditionally leftist-oriented, anti-status quo, and anti-Government University. The term “Communist” is frequently used synonymously with “leftist” in El Salvador. As a result some of the best friends of the U.S., and some of the most effective anti-Communist leaders in El Salvador (including former President Osorio and several of his trusted associates), have been bitterly denounced as “Communists”. Therefore, ARA believes it would be a grave error to consider, without further substantiating evidence, that the new Government or its members are suspect for this reason, in the absence of their identification with purely Communist objectives.

From information now being received from a variety of sources it appears that able Ex-President Oscar Osorio is emerging as the dominant personality behind the Coup. However, the political orientation and likely policies of the new government, while controversial, indicate a definite swing to the left in El Salvador. On the other hand, ARA

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  1. Source: Department of State, S/S NSC (Miscellaneous) Files, Lot 66 D 95, “NSC–5902 Memoranda.” Secret. Drafted by Gwynn and Higdon, and initialed for Mann by Gwynn.↩
  2. The text of the Note was translated in telegram 222 from San Salvador, October 27, 1960. (716.00/10–2760)↩