Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

ES–30. Telegram from the Chargé in El Salvador (Downs) to the Department of State¹

San Salvador, November 3, 1960, 7 p.m.

258. Department pass Army for ACSI; CINCARIB; CG USARCARIB; Department of Air Force for AFCIN. Re Department telegram 169.²

At “Kye” Quinonez’s house and in company Colonel Matthews spent one hour this morning with Osorio, and hour with junta member Major Rosales alone, two hours with Rosales and Colonel Escamilla together. Quinonez party to all discussions.

Made presentation as suggested reference telegram and Osorio commenced with review of situation leading to coup which general in nature and lacking in specifics. Lemus hated by everyone, army disunited and decaying, several coup plots in making, executive without power to control situation and action imperative to save country from anarchy.

With one exception, his replies to direct questions were extremely vague and evasive. He denied most emphatically that single Communist appointed to position in government. Some were anti-American but this did not make them Communists. He does not agree that failure to stand up to Communists at this time presents a danger. He does not see a need to curb Communist activities, organizationally or propaganda-wise, and all parties will be given opportunity to participate in free elections. Said he erred in exiling Communists when he was President. Should have kept them here and channeled their activities. No more than 25 real Communists in country at present time and plan now is to “canalizar” their activities; they would be watched and made use of. He implied without saying so directly that if need be proper action could be taken at proper time. Questioned he said he thought he had sufficient influence on junta to initiate control measures at proper time if needed. Specific instances of present open Communist activities such as the inflammatory program of Radio Universal were pointed out to Osorio and his only comment was “this is natural.” When asked explicitly whether or not he anticipated that a 6-man junta could efficiently function or even last with inefficient operation for a period of two years until forthcoming elections, he circumvented the question and gave an explanation of how the military members of the junta had been permitted to select 50 percent of the new government assignments and how the civilian members of the junta had selected the remaining 50 percent. What needed now was unity so that urgently needed social and economic programs can be implemented. Changes had to occur within three months or serious threat to government will emerge from people. Support of extreme left as well as right needed for this and any restrictive action against former would disrupt unity and therefore could not be entertained. He not taking a direct part in affairs of junta but providing his counsel and advice. He reiterated throughout that army united and in control of situation but remarked on several different occasions that situation very delicate. Osorio readily agreed to suggestion we talk with selected army officers and suggested Major Rosales and Colonel Escamilla.

Osorio said government would abide by international agreement[s]. Asked about economic integration treaties said these could go on but some of things agreed to would have to be changed. Could not for example permit free flow of corn into this country. U.S. could produce it too cheaply and too many Salvadorans depended on it for a livelihood. Present situation this regard chaotic. Did not know enough about proposal for new Central American bank to comment. Would have to be studied.

We found Major Rosales straightforward, honest, pro-Western and friendly but a complete babe in the woods. He admitted military on junta consulting with Osorio and that civilian side probably not under Osorio’s direction. Clear he has serious doubts about Doctor Fabio Castillo; he asked whether we could confirm he had extreme leftist leanings. Said decision junta taken by majority vote and no one leader. Admitted that if disagreements occurred and could not be resolved through discussion, they put aside for later. Saw dangers in this arrangement but for moment junta working well together.

Questioning brought out he totally ignorant re developments outside junta. When filled in he clearly taken aback and started taking notes. Said he did not know many of those appointed government positions, clarifying that Salazar Rodezno nominated for Information Chief Casa Presidential by junta member Falla Caceres. Asked whether intention existed apply any curbs Communist activities he parroted Osorio’s remark re strategy permitting open, unfettered operations until Communists identified. When asked who first presented the strategy he hesitated and then answered: “Rene Fortin Magana”. When pressed as to plans for controlling Communist movement Rosales reaffirmed that no plan existed. Said he was very inexperienced in this new assignment and would welcome any suggestions we might have to solve problem without being accused of curbing civil liberties. He stated that military members of junta felt that economic measures improve lot lower classes must be initiated immediately but that civilian members were standing firm in their position that political orientation of government must take precedence. He concluded that military members junta charged with security while civilian members dealing with political situation.

Colonel Escamilla arrived and Rosales gave him straight forward account our talk to that point, including our concern re Communist infiltration and activities. Escamilla inclined at first brush these off saying most effective way handle these was through economic deeds rather than words or control measures. Turning to Quinonez he remarked that he and people he represented should immediately join government in these activities. Quinonez asked whether Escamilla aware type propaganda now being put out by Communists. I called for tape recording (Embassy telegram 248) and for first time Quinonez himself, Escamilla and Rosales heard what Communists saying. Reaction electric with much shaking of heads. All agreed this pure Communism rather than nationalism and that action some sort seemed called for, but they continued expound difficulties taking any direct action under existing circumstances. I suggested good place to start was with Salazar Rodezno. Rosales and Escamilla departed saying they would look into matter.

Quinonez who in interim between Osario’s departure and Rosales arrival had made effort defend some of Osorio’s remarks made no further attempt to do so upon conclusion three interviews. Impact all that is happening seemed to dawn upon him for first time. Asked directly whether in face all he had heard he would, if in my position, recommend recognition this government, he replied he could not in all honesty give an answer. He was not enough of a politician or diplomat to be able to assess all pros and cons of extending or not extending recognition. One thing for certain, situation extremely critical and all help and advice U.S. could give was urgently needed.

[text not declassified] If this could be done without recognition, recognition now not overriding. On my way to Embassy intercepted by emissary from Roberto Parker, He told me Parker had asked him come to see me to transmit following message: Parker had visit yesterday from Major Castro Moran, from Escuela de Guerra. Major Moran told Parker that the military was very unhappy over the current situation. He said that he was speaking for the majority and that they were thinking of doing something about it. Parker asked Moran why he had come to him. He replied that he had come because Parker could put him in touch with American Embassy. Parker replied he did not want to become involved, but that he did have a very good friend in the military, a Major Rodriguez Simo, in the Escuela Militar and that if this man would come and see him he would talk with him. Simo came to see Parker last night. He told him much the same thing that Moran had, adding that their group now had the support of every army unit with the exception of the national guard. Simo said, additionally that Colonel Yanes and Captain Rosales in the current junta were also unhappy and had expressed private regrets over the way the coup was handled and how it was turning out. The emissary said that Parker had also told him to pass on to me that when he had seen me two nights ago he had thought that the U.S. should not recognize. He said he had since talked to many responsible people plus these in the army and that all now agreed emphatically that U.S. should not recognize this junta. Parker said in addition he now sure good many people were not happy with Osorio. He was told by his military visitors that Osorio did not carry out some of the commitments that he had made with the military prior to the coup. He said he is convinced from his recent talks that when next coup comes, and which he now believes it will Osorio will not be included therein. Separate telegram with our analysis follows. Briefly put, we strongly of view that recognition should be deferred indefinitely.

This may be considered joint Embassy/ARMA telegram.

Downs

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 716.00/11–360. Secret; Niact. This telegram was sent in two sections.
2. See Document ES–29.