Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

ES–29. Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Embassy in El Salvador¹

Washington, November 2, 1960, 1:31 p.m.

169. Principal lines our reasoning on recognition issue have been:

1. Overthrow of Lemus regime was an accomplished fact.

2. Our principal objective should be to support promptly those elements who are willing and able to prevent a Castro-Communist take-over and to guide evolution towards a constitutional regime oriented toward West.

3. Osorio appeared to be best, if not only person around whom Army and anti-communist elements could unite to bring about such transition. Corollary to this is our belief that division and drift at this time in El Salvador would create a climate propitious for commie take-over.

Embtels 244 and 248² are disturbing because they suggest Osorio may be unwilling to prevent intensive propagation of communist propaganda in El Salvador and that he has no plans to prevent communist and Castroites from promptly organizing as a political force.

If you concur we suggest Downs approach Osorio promptly and inform him that while Department has no desire to intervene in Salvadoran political crisis we believe we have common interest in preventing Communist-Castro take-over. In view of esteem with which he is held in U.S. we would appreciate knowing whether he agrees that a failure to stand up to Communist and Castroites at this critical time will create serious danger of chaos and confusion which will afford maximum opportunity for Communists and their Castro allies to take over. You should also attempt discreetly to ascertain what his detailed views are on this subject. If possible ascertain how he intends meet this aspect of problem. You should also seek to ascertain what Osorio’s estimate is of his ability control Army and if you deem this prudent his plans for unifying Army. Depending on how conversation has gone up to this point and whether you agree with approach suggested in paragraph next following, you may also wish inform Osorio of plan to approach key Army officers.

If in your opinion split among officer corps is serious, we suggest an approach should also be made promptly to key officers in both Osorio and Lemus camps. These officers would be informed that while we have no desire to intervene in political affairs of Salvador and in particular no desire to take sides as between military groups, we believe that unity of armed forces in face of present Communist threat is both urgent and essential. Colonel Alberto Escamilla or Major Ruben Rosales or both may be best persons to approach in Osorio camp. General Molina or General Cordova or both might be best persons to approach in Lemus group. However, our information regarding military is fragmentary and we leave to Embassy’s and Mil Attaches discretion which officers should be approached and most appropriate person in Embassy family to make approach. Cable Niact results these conversations with any additional recommendations Embassy may have. Department suspending recognition until receipt your report.

Ambassador Kalijarvi concurs.

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 716.00/11–160. Secret; Niact. Drafted and signed by Mann.
2. In telegram 244 from San Salvador, November 1, 1960, the Chargé, Downs, reported Colonel Osorio apparently did not intend to attempt to prevent any party from participating in any election or to curb Communist propaganda and organizational activities. (716.00/11–160) In telegram 248 from San Salvador, November 1, 1960, Downs informed the Department of State of a Communist-line, anti-U.S. radio broadcast in San Salvador on October 31, and reported that the government controlled station was dropping the USIS daily prepared international newscast. (716.00/11–160)