ES–22. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of El Salvadoran Affairs (Gwynn)1
SUBJECT
- Political Situation in El Salvador
PARTICIPANTS
- Dr. Alfonso Rochac - Director, Inter-American Development Bank and former Minister of Economy of El Salvador
- ARA - Thomas C. Mann, Assistant Secretary
- E - Mr. Turnage, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs
- OAP - Mr. Gwynn, Officer In Charge, El Salvador
- ARA - Mr. Pryce, Staff Aide
While calling on Mr. Mann today regarding another matter, Dr. Rochac commented at some length on the present Salvadoran [Typeset Page 608] political situation. According to him, the situation appears to have improved substantially. [illegible in the original] a growing realization of the fact that an overthrow of the Government would be a major set-back for the country. Major developments tending to restore calm have included the conciliatory efforts of the six prestigious cabinet members who sought to mediate the Government-student dispute during the tense week following September 2 (sacrificing their own popularity to do so); the replacement of a [text not declassified] military officer [text not declassified] as the effective top police authority by a respected officer (Lopez Ayare), who has surrounded himself with a higher-type staff; and the efforts at mediation of the other Central American University Rectors, as a result of which several Government Ministers called on the Rector of the University of El Salvador on September 20 to express the Government’s regrets.
As regards the attitudes of various groups, Dr. Rochac indicated that there were no indications of disaffection among the military; that some of the 14 families, however, had “unfortunately” been urging stronger action by the Government (at least prior to September 2); that the non-Communist Labor group did not appear to be in opposition to the Government; and that Osorio appeared to be maintaining a correct position, not intervening in the political disturbances (but that he would be unlikely to allow the situation to degenerate into anarchy without taking action). He thinks the Lemus Government’s chances of survival are fairly good, [Facsimile Page 2] provided he takes steps to (a) effect some changes in his Government (where some of the advice he has been getting has been bad): (b) be conciliatory in finding a solution to the current unrest, and make some restitution; and (c) be impartial in domestic politics. (In this last connection he indicated that two major underlying causes of recent general resentment against the Government have been the changes effected in the electoral law, which lend it to the suppression of not only Communist but all opposition, and the interference in the conduct of this year’s elections.) Rubio Melhado would also have to give up any aspirations he might have for the Presidency, in view of his unacceptability to the Army.
The beating of the Rector was unpardonable, according to Dr. Rochac, and action was taken against people, like Canessa,2 for example, who are clearly not Communists. In Rochac’s opinion Lemus fell into a clever trap laid for him by those having a Communist philosophy and backed by money from Cuba, at a time when some of his sounder advisors (Ortiz Mancia, Carballo3) were out of the country.