Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

ES–23. Airgram from the Ambassador in El Salvador (Kalijarvi) to the Department of State¹

San Salvador, September 27, 1960

G-9. Ref: Deptel 109, September 19, 1960. The chance of the Lemus government survival is directly dependent on the President’s capacity to use the forces now rallying to-his support, not as Lemus (because in few short weeks I believe he has aroused strong animosity against himself in El Salvador) but as the President of the Republic and as the embodiment of law and order. For the moment he is able to count on the Army, the security forces, the cabinet, the business community and the church. The support is based on the concept that the best interest of Lemus supporters lies in their trying to work with him and to maintain him in power despite his idiosyncrasies and their personal piques.

However, there is a strong wave of public indignation and resentment running against him, especially because of the beating of the Rector. The advice of those immediately about him is faulty, and it is not beyond the realm of possibility that it is deliberately poor.

On September 19 a meeting of 50 leaders in response to the call of Ortíz Mancía at the Regalado home resulted, after frank and heated discussion, in a decision to try to work with Lemus and to finance a public relations program building support for the government and educating the public about Communist tactics, aims and threats. The consensus was that Lemus was his own worst enemy and that cabinet changes were overdue, especially in the case of the Sub-Secretary of Justice, Julio Fausto Fernandez, the supposedly reformed Communist and ex-Secretary of the Salvadoran Communist Party. Several subsequent meetings have only strengthened the basic decision and spurred the creation of a new publicity agency backed with substantial funds.

The length of the Lemus government’s new lease on life is directly dependent on Lemus’ ability to curb his egotism, abandon the determination to go-it-alone and to develop at least the appearance of gratitude. To survive he must take counsel of others than those who currently surround him and to be more accessible to many who are anxious and in a position to help.

How long Osorio and his forces will remain withdrawn from the scene will in a large measure depend on President Lemus himself. Signs indicate that Lemus may not be helping his cause to any material degree. The current publicity program emanating from the Casa Presidential at first appeared vengeful and sensational rather than quieting and calculated to restore normal order. Even more disturbing is the reported appointment to the Secretariat of Casa Presidential of Julio Fausto Fernandez. Lemus seems unable to determine correctly where his best interests lie.

The real test of whether Lemus is to continue in office promises to come when the state of siege is lifted (indications are that the thirty-day period will be extended) although the Communist elements are now at work and the government anticipates further trouble. Renewed efforts at disturbances are appearing. A meeting, subsequently cancelled, was called for the 23rd at Parque Libertad. A clandestine radio is operating from across the border in Honduras. It could, of course, be that the above signs are the last actions of a dying cause. However, we do not think so. Rubio Melhado asserts that arms are being shipped to El Salvador from California, New Orleans and Miami. The President has asked our help with a reported military movement against El Salvador allegedly being hatched in Mexico.

My best guess is that at this moment there is a strong chance Lemus will survive the next few months, an even chance that he will last a year, but questionable if he can hold on to his office until the end of his term. This guess could easily be upset by further Lemus blunders. Note that the cabinet still remains firm. If Lemus survives the present crisis, he could not survive a second, should one appear. These views are also shared by some of the cabinet, one or two of whom are completely pessimistic.

Impelled by Castro-communist forces, whose influence on local situation can only be underestimated at country’s peril, the current situation has evolved into one of many complex facets. It must be recognized as well that basic forces at work here are centrifugal in nature tending to pull apart the oligarchy consisting of the Army, Church and wealthy class upon which the present government is based. In this context, it is only possible to generalize re attitudes of the following elements:

1. Military. With few individual exceptions the Army would prefer see this government run its constitutional course. While Lemus is not popular among officer corps, he symbolizes constitutionality and, of all elements here, Army believed to be strongest backer this concept. Army perhaps more realistic and better able to see where its own best interests lie; to date we have had no tangible evidence that top echelon is other than prepared to back Lemus government. Should government begin to disintegrate from within, believe, however, that Army would move decisively to take power into its own hands and that it would succeed.

2. 14 families and their supporters. Current attitude this element generally as outlined above. While willing for most part to help Lemus, if indeed he will permit himself to be helped, there is strong undercurrent of dissatisfaction and resentment, and patience with him among this group is beginning to run out. Most of those we have talked to see need for social reforms, etc., but they want them to be instituted in planned context, leadership for which Lemus government has thus far been unable to provide. If it comes to alternatives, majority appears to favor Osorio and we believe this element would throw its weight in his direction.

3. Church. Prodded by Nunciature and clearly more worldly wise to revolutionary type threats, church here is far out in front in pressing for social reform and has evidenced impatience with Lemus government on this score. By its attitude it has widened breach between itself and wealthy class, thereby weakening oligarchy’s foundation. Its basic aim, however, appears to have been to spur Lemus government into action rather than to contribute to its downfall. It has made public its support of Lemus during the recent crisis and can be expected to continue supporting the constitutional government.

4. PRUD Party. As a national party PRUD can be said no longer to exist. It is rent with dissension and is a skeleton without real substance. Much of the blame for this rests with Secretary General Rubio Melhado, who with high-handedness has made many mistakes and continues to make them, and is strongly disliked by all but a few cronies. Historically, parties here have been formed around a man. Lemus, by abdicating in favor of Rubio Melhado as party manager, sacrificed his place as leader and it is doubtful that PRUD as it is now constituted will be vary decisive factor in current crisis.

5. Osorio Clique. Ex-President Osorio still represents strongest non-Communist political force in country. He has loyal adherents in all strata and his reservoir of strength runs deep. Close friends quote him as desirous of seeing Lemus complete term despite deep differences but there is evidence that his lieutenants have been exceedingly active since the present crisis began. We doubt Osorio will step forward until called but believe his ear is cocked to catch weakest summons.
Osorio as a man is better known to several now in ARA than to us here. Our impression, however, is that Osorio would have liked to have been more reformist than he was during his term. He held back mainly by more conservative wealthy elements on whose monetary support he heavily depended. We do not believe the same situation will exist again and that Osario would be inclined to be rather liberal in his outlook and policies. This view reinforced by type people considered close associates such as Jorge SOL Castellanos. We would not expect Osorio to be openly antagonistic to U.S., or West. Neither would we expect him to be as openly pro-U.S. or as amenable to suggestions from us as has been Lemus government. While not favorable to Castroism we believe he would attempt to apply some Castro-type reform measures here.

Labor. Communist-dominated CUTS with 3,000 members is one prime movers current anti-government drive. Non-[illegible in the original]CGS with 20,000 controls large majority organized labor. CGS is considered relatively free from Castro influences. To date it has rejected the oppositionists’ appeal for general strike and we believe it will continue to do so. CGS leadership not close to Lemus, however, and complains of inability to [illegible in the original] him to discuss programs. Perhaps significant that CGS has not during present crisis publicly proclaimed support of government. Moreover current government efforts unseat Secretary-General Saravia will probably result in CGS schism, leaving majority under Saravia even less disposed work in Lemus’ behalf. Despite this conflict, CGS leadership, including Saravia, privately proclaim support for constitutional government. Saravia known to be in close touch with Osorio group, however, and should situation deteriorate further, possibility open swing to Osorio should not be discounted.

7. Congress. Handpicked and representing hard-core what remains PRUD party, Congress can be expected to do Lemus’ bidding. Method of election and mediocrity of membership have, however, left it without much respect throughout country. Its deliberations for most part go unheralded and its power as a political force considered minimal. Assembly President Esquivel is friend both Lemus and Osorio; private conversations lead me to believe he has preference for latter.

8. University. This institution has long been one of principal targets of Communist infiltration and results achieved true cause for alarm. All major student organizations are in hands Communist or pro-Communist elements and faculty itself includes several extreme leftist types. Success in part, due practice keeping professional agitators and organizers matriculated as students for up to ten years. While this element represents small minority total student body, its influence greatly disproportionate to size. We are reliably informed that control over students who had no desire take part current political activities gained largely through intimidation and coercion. Only small minority student body took part in disturbances at outset current crisis, with large majority strongly opposed to involvement. Police action and clever handling by student agitators were effective in turning majority against Lemus and our information indicates that majority still considers him public enemy number one. Past week has provided a cooling off period, however, and signs beginning to appear that student body in general tiring of being used and started to think of personal loss ensuing from closed University. Number private groups also forming with aim providing anti-Castro/Communist students with rallying points and with physical protection against coercive efforts if needed. Students here as elsewhere have no positive program—they are only against the existing order and in their search for a cause or philosophy they are prey to highly obtained purposeful and, unfortunately, extremely versatile and able student leaders in international communism’s pay. As a group, they still do not appear to have been completely disabused of their illusions with respect to Castroism and what it stands for. One thing is clear: Lemus is anathema to the large majority and is unlikely ever to re-win students’ confidence or support.

9. Campesino. Thus far this overwhelming majority had taken no part in current disturbances. The campesino has [illegible in the original] some interest as a spectator but no propensity to include his voice of his “machete” in current happenings. Embassy knows that travelling pro-Castro/Communist teams have been proselytizing to the countryside but as yet they do not appear to have succeeded in setting imaginations afire. Lemus, as a President, is thought to be relatively popular among this class, but as a man, Osorio is still reversed by the campesino and the “little” man of Salvador. Thus, while dormant at the moment, the campesino is not happy or content with his lot and a spark in the right place could set this very volatile element afire. Moreover, should the situation in the capital become chaotic at any time, the campesino’s weight can be expected to make itself felt.

While the fall of the Lemus government does not appear imminent, should it occur, it would in all likelihood take the form of a voluntary abdication or ouster. In case of the former, the Vice President constitutionally would succeed to office, i.e., in the following order: Costa, Esquivel, Alvarez, Escapini. None is a military man. While much would depend on attendant circumstances, there is a strong chance that the military would intervene and set up a governing Junta with the results described below.

If Lemus were ousted, the Communists would not be in a position to seize control. The Osorio strategy and tactics to [illegible in the original] have been effectively hidden and would seem to indicate that he would continue to remain in the background and refrain from immediately taking over. However, the possibility should not be entirely discounted.

The most likely development in case of an ouster would be a military Junta. In such case the odds are that the power would shortly thereafter be transferred to Osorio, who would seek to constitutionalize his tenure, possibly through elections.

The advent of Osorio would still keep El Salvador oriented toward the West and favorable towards the Osorio but by no means as friendly as under the present government. I am not completely certain that Osorio would return to his former strong anti-Communist position although there is good reason to believe that in deference to the military he would do so. The winds of nationalism are blowing more strongly here than for some time. Criticism of the U.S. has been stirred from Cuba and has been increasingly evident in student and labor publications and meetings. Castroism has its adherents. Osorio coming to power against this background could not help but be responsive in some measure to its pressures, some of which would be bound to react unfavorably against the United States.

Therefore, as long as the present situation does not deteriorate, we continue to hope that constitutional government can be preserved here and believe that Lemus still has it within his power to save it.

To that end I recommend that we provide Lemus with short-term aid by immediate implementation on a crash basis of the program set forth in Embassy despatches 21 of July 26, 1960² and 62 of September 7, 1960,³ and also by immediate implementation of the program discussed in correspondence between Mr. Charles E. Higdon of ARA and the Embassy including the letter of Mr. Downs to Mr. Higdon dated August 26, 1960. We should also press forward with long-term economic and social assistance and with the Central American Bank. Lemus needs to make new advances with economic and social programs, if he survives. If he does not survive, we need to consolidate our position with a successor government through such programs as are not designed to support any particular administration but to improve the country as a whole. In either case the United States should provide assistance of a longer-term nature in the economic and social fields. We shall submit separate recommendations accordingly.

Kalijarvi

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 716.00/9–2760. Secret. Co-drafted by Downs.
2. See Document ES–17.
3. Under conver of despatch 62, Ambassador Kalijarvi transmitted an ICA survey team report of August 24, which recommended the addition of an investigation advisor to the two-man staff of the ICA Public Safety Program in El Salvador. (716.5-MSP/9–760) A Public Safety Advisor, John C. Hazelett, was added to the ICA Public Safety Program staff on December 31, 1961. [text not declassified]