Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

544. Memorandum From Lay to the NSC¹

Washington, March 21, 1960

SUBJECT

• The Feasibility and National Security Implications of a Monitored Agreement to Stop or Limit Ballistic Missile Testing and/or Production

REFERENCES

• A. NSC Action No. 1840–c
• B. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject; “Monitoring a Long-Range Rocket Test Agreement”, dated March 28, 1958
• C. NSC Action No. 2161–b

The enclosed report on the subject by the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology is transmitted herewith for discussion by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, March 24, 1960.

Also enclosed for discussion by the Council in connection with the above-mentioned report are two memoranda containing the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject. The request in paragraph 7 of the first of these memoranda (“U.S. Disarmament Policy”, March 2, 1960) that the JCS be afforded an opportunity to comment on the study by the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology prior to its referral to the NSC, has been complied with; and the second memorandum (“Study Entitled ‘The Feasibility and National Security Implications of a Monitored Agreement to Stop or Limit Ballistic Missile Testing and/or Production’”, March 18, 1960) contains the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the report by the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.

The enclosures, one of which contains RESTRICTED DATA, are being given a special limited distribution, and the contents should be subject to special security precautions, with access thereto limited to those individuals having a strict “need to know” in the performance of their official duties.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury (MEMO ONLY)

The Director, Bureau of the Budget (MEMO ONLY)

The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director of Central Intelligence

The Special Assistant to the President for Science & Technology

Enclosure

Report Prepared by Kistiakowsky

March 14, 1960

The Feasibility and National Security Implications of a Monitored Agreement to Stop or Limit Ballistic Missile Testing and/or Production

Scope, Limitations and Assumptions

1. The study is divided as follows: investigation of (a) the feasibility and monitoring requirements for a ballistic missile flight test ban or limitation, (b) the feasibility and monitoring requirements for a ballistic missile production ban or limitation, and (c) the national security implications of any such agreements. The relationships of the above questions to the operations of national space programs has also been considered under the assumption that space programs will be continued subject to inspection and some control.

2. There are a number of other interrelationships which merit serious study, but which it has not been possible to consider in this analysis. The conclusions to this study must be read with these limitations in mind. In particular, the study does not adequately consider:

2.1 The implications of abrogation of any of the possible agreements that might be reached;

2.2 The relationship of the arms control measures discussed here to others, including general disarmament;

2.3 The implications of inhibiting the attainment of nuclear delivery capabilities by nations, other than the U.S., U.K., and USSR;

2.4 The dissymmetries between the U.S. and the USSR in the problems of maintaining production and/or test facilities, and competence when limitations on their utilization are in force.

2.5 The detailed inspection team requirements and cost for monitoring a production ban;

2.6 Specific limitations and controls that might be imposed on space programs and the organization of a possible international authority to carry out space programs;

2.7 The implications of increased emphasis on other delivery systems that might flow from agreements limiting missile tests or production.

2.8 The violation of a production ban or limitation by the importation of long-range ballistic missiles from a non-signatory country.

On the basis of this study, and particularly in view of its limitations, it has not been possible to determine whether or not a test ban in 1963, or at any later date, would be to the net advantage or disadvantage of the U.S.

3. The conclusions that follow are based on the present NIE of Soviet stockpile growth and on U.S. missile program schedules as approved, or proposed for approval, that appear to be reasonably attainable if adequately supported. In the event of any agreement, it would be necessary to be certain that the applicable U.S. schedules were indeed met, if not actually accelerated, prior to the implementation of the agreements.

Summary of Conclusions

Missile Test Monitoring

4. Detection of ballistic missile flights with high confidence can be accomplished by means of radars that are currently in development. The siting of some radars within the Sino-Soviet Bloc and within the U.S. would be required. Such a detection system would probably take about two-and-a-half years to develop and install. About 15 radars would be needed to detect with certainty missiles from within the Bloc whose trajectory rose 75 n.m. or more above the surface of the earth. Of these, at least 4 or 5 would have to be located within the Bloc; the remainder could be located in friendly countries around the periphery. On normal ballistic flights, an apogee of 75 n.m. corresponds to a ground range of 300 n.m. However, it would be possible to fire missiles on non-optimal very flat trajectories out to perhaps 3,000 n.m. without their apogee exceeding the 75 n.m. limit. Radar monitoring could not detect static or tethered firings, nor assure detection of short-range firings of long-range ballistic missiles, or flights by aerodynamic vehicles. Therefore, such tests should not be excluded by any agreement unless there were some other detection means agreed to by which they could be monitored.

5. A world-wide high confidence system for detecting missiles, the apogee of which exceeds 75 n.m. is feasible, but would require a large number (about 100) of radars. It is possible, though by no means certain, that alternative less expensive flight detection systems could be operational by about 1963.

Relationship of a Missile Test Ban to Space Programs

6. For a test ban to be effective in limiting missile development, it would be necessary that space programs, both civilian and military, be abandoned, subjected to rigid inspection and some controls, or internationalized.

7. Short of abandoning space efforts altogether, some feed-through from space programs into possible missile development programs is inevitable. Though more detailed study is required, a cursory look suggests that limitations or controls consistent with valid national space programs could slow, but would not stop, the effects of this feed-through. The inspection teams would, however, be in a position to assess the degree of danger represented by the applicability of space techniques to possible military developments.

8. Inspection would include advance disclosure of all space firings, right to inspect all space vehicles in advance of firing, together with their components and associated equipment, and access on the part of both sides to all results.

9. Internationalization of the space effort could reduce the effects of feed-through to a minimal level, and could also lower the risks associated with the possibility of technological surprise.

Implications of a Missile Flight Test Ban

10. A missile flight test ban would represent a considerable risk for the U.S. if implemented as early as January 1961. A test ban so dated as to preclude the confident operational development of the mobile Minuteman and the 1500 n.m. Polar’s would be disadvantageous to the U.S. On the basis of the programs indicated in Figs. 1 a and 2 a, early 1963 would represent the earliest possible date for such a ban. With respect to other considerations and on the basis of present knowledge and expectations, there do not appear to be decisive reasons for believing that the risk to the U.S. (or the USSR) would be either greater or less if there were a missile test ban in 1963 than if there were no such ban.

11. Any test ban which is dependent on radar coverage for monitoring the Bloc should provide sufficient lead time so that construction of radar sites can begin two years before the effective date of the ban. Alternative monitoring systems may or may not involve comparable lead times.

Monitoring of a Missile Production Ban or Limitation

12. A missile production ban or limitation can be monitored if, and only if, the following conditions can be met.

12.1 The agreement guarantees a right to unrestricted and self-initiated access by the inspection teams to any point in any area of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

12.2 The inspection directorate has the right to valid aerial photography of the entire Bloc on a periodic basis.

A prior inventory of Bloc missile stockpiles and selected industrial facilities would probably be required for monitoring production, and in any case would be needed to insure that the stockpile is not greatly different than estimated in the NIE.

13. Given the foregoing conditions, if a quota were desired, a sufficiently large quota could probably be set on the permitted number of inspections without seriously degrading the confidence of the monitoring system.² However, in the event of a production limitation or in the event of a continuing national space program, continuous inspection of certain key facilities, such as missile and space production installations, would be required.

14. The inspection teams would be concerned not only with the production of the missiles themselves, but also with the production of the support equipment necessary to give the missiles an operational status. Although it is not within the terms of reference of this study and has not been investigated here, it seems probable that inspection of launchers and launch sites would be of great use; it is possible that further study would reveal it to be as important, or perhaps more important, than inspection of missile production.

15. U.S. intelligence data could provide valuable support to the activities of inspection teams.

16. Despite inspection of the sort envisaged here, there will remain the possibility of a small flow of clandestinely produced missiles. The order of one or two missiles a month might represent a relatively low risk of detection, while five or more a month would probably represent a high-risk situation to the USSR.

Implications of a Missile Production Ban

17. An absolute ban on production would be dangerous to the U.S. if implemented as early as 1961. With delay, the danger would diminish. On the basis of the estimates in the tables, by January 1963 there might still be significant risk, but by January 1964 (or possibly earlier if U.S. production were accelerated), the risk should be small.³

Implications of a Limitation on Missile Production

18. If implemented as early as 1961, a limitation which permitted production of at least several times the estimated clandestine production capability could improve the U.S. position. This conclusion is contingent on the USSR not already having an overwhelming initial attack force which would make it necessary to accelerate presently-planned U.S. missile production. With the passage of time, the advantage of a limitation over an absolute ban would diminish in importance. In the event of an agreement to limit production, a continuation of flight testing would seem advantageous up until early 1963, in that continued testing would contribute to stability by permitting the attainment of hardening and mobility by both sides. After 1963, continued flight testing might be disadvantageous in that such testing would permit further improvements in the guidance accuracies of both sides (particularly that of the USSR).

INTRODUCTION

19. The purpose of the study is to determine the feasibility and the implications to U.S. national security of a monitored multilateral agreement to ban or delimit the flight testing and/or production of long-range ballistic missiles. The precise terms of reference of the study are set forth in Annex A.

20. The definition of long-range involves a certain arbitrariness, particularly since radar detection system requirements are more directly tied to missile apogee than to range, and since for a given apogee the variation in range may be considerable. A limit of about 75 n.m. on apogee would certainly exclude all full-range ICBM firings, and would also exclude firings in the IRBM range except on trajectories so flat as to impose constraints on design substantially more severe than are required for minimum energy trajectories in the same range. A 75 n.m. apogee would seem to be a reasonable limit, though it should be pointed out that a lower limit would be required if it were desired to preclude tests of all ballistic missiles in the ranges that might be important for launch from submarines or aircraft.

21. Questions of national military policy and posture affect the emphasis in the study. With the advent of the Soviet missile force, probably movable, or possibly mobile, and in any event sited in locations unknown to the U.S. (and at least some of which will probably remain unknown for some time), there is a basic dissymmetry in the U.S. and Soviet positions. Thus, even if U.S. policy would permit a first strike by us, it could not be expected to seriously impair Soviet missile strike capability. Consequently, the emphasis of the study has been on the preservation of a U.S. retaliatory capability in the event of a possible Soviet surprise attack.

22. This dissymmetry will, to a significant extent, be weakened by the eventual U.S. possession of a mobile missile force—first Polaris, later the mobile Minuteman, and possibly eventually the ALBM when airborne.

23. The conditions requisite to a satisfactory implementation of a production ban or limitation would presumably reduce this assymmetry, since these conditions involve unlimited inspection and access to valid air reconnaissance data.

24. While emphasis in the study has been on the preservation of a secure U.S. retaliatory capability, it has also seemed important to consider the problem of stability more generally. Even though the U.S. (or the USSR) might have a substantial retaliatory capability, the USSR (or perhaps less likely the U.S.) might make a pre-emptive strike in a situation when war seemed very probable or inevitable in the hope of minimizing damage to itself. To the degree that such a course may seem desirable, the situation may be characterized as unstable. On the other hand, if the U.S. force posture were such that nearly all the U.S. force would survive a Soviet attack, and if nearly all the Soviet force could be expected to survive a U.S. attack, a situation of great stability would ensue, for there would then be little incentive for either side to strike first, even in the event of what it might regard as extreme provocation. Hardening of missiles can help bring about such a situation by increasing the exchange ratio, i.e., the number of missiles required in an attack to achieve some high probability of destroying one of an adversary’s missiles. It is also important, of course, that the force sizes not be so disparate that an attacker may have the capability of overwhelming the opponent’s force even though it is hardened. As the exchange ratio approaches unity with improving accuracy and reliability, or if the U.S. is unable to estimate Soviet force size with any confidence, mobility will be a preferable method of insuring stability.

25. There are certain key considerations which dominate and interpenetrate all discussions of the present problem. It is desirable to isolate these clearly at the very outset so that they can be kept explicitly in mind during the ensuing discussion. For convenience they are tabulated here:

25.1 There is a fundamental difficulty in monitoring a missile test ban in that there need be no residue or evidence at the site of a launching which will persist for a sufficient period of time so that an inspections team could verify a suspected firing by visiting the site. (This is particularly obvious in the case of missiles fired from submarines.) Disturbances in the atmosphere and ionosphere may persist long enough so that evidence of a firing may be adduced minutes or hours after the event; however, the techniques for doing this are still under development. For the present at least, because of the impossibility of verification after the fact, missile detection systems for monitoring a test ban must therefore be such that there is negligible probability that other events will be mistaken for missile tests. It is not necessary that the system be able to detect all missile tests. If it is able to detect a substantial fraction of possible tests, and if the conditions when detection will not be made are unpredictable by the other side, then it would seem reasonable to assume that any agreement would not be violated in the hope or expectation of avoiding detection.

25.2 By agreeing to stop missile flight tests, particularly if it is done within the next few years, there will be pressures exerted which will tend to prevent, or at least defer, the development of ballistic missiles by countries other than the U.S., USSR and UK. Clearly, this effect may be of very great importance. However, consideration of whether the net effect will be desirable or undesirable is beyond the scope of this study.

25.3 The problems of warning, decision making and reaction time for the U.S. are critical. In the near future it must be assumed that virtually all of the aircraft or missiles would be destroyed on any U.S. base against which a Soviet ICBM was delivered, provided the Soviets were able to achieve a high degree of surprise and simultaneity of attack. The degree to which they can do this remains somewhat uncertain, but what evidence there is suggests that they can probably do reasonably well. Later, hardening will enhance the survival probability of many missiles. However, warning will continue to be very important. As BMEWS becomes operational (the first station late this year), about 15 minutes of warning will be available. Although BMEWS may be very helpful in providing warning for SAC aircraft, there may be serious problems in communications and decision-making that must be solved if use is to be made of such warning for launch of U.S. missiles. There is probably a very real question as to whether a decision to actually launch missiles would ever be made solely on the basis of BMEWS warning. The first BMEWS station will provide warning of ICBM attack against most, but not all, U.S. bases; however, it should be noted that even with all three BMEWS stations operational, there will still be a gap in warning of attack by missiles launched from submarines. Moreover, there are conceivable trajectories for Soviet ICBM’s against which the BMEWS would not be effective. There is no provision for providing IRBM’s and aircraft stationed on overseas bases that are around the periphery of the Bloc with BMEWS type of warning against ballistic missile attack, and even warning against aircraft attack may be questionable. In view of the Soviet 700 and 1100 n.m. ballistic missile and light bomber capabilities, and the softness of the IRBM’s (and aircraft), they must for the most part be discounted completely as retaliatory weapons after surprise attack. They may, however, contribute to the complexity of a possible Soviet attack.

25.4 Considerations not only of production rates but of national missile stockpile levels are fundamental to the study. The analysis from which the conclusion of this study derives is based on the NIEs⁴ of Soviet development, production and deployment, and on U.S. schedules that have been approved or proposed for approval, and which are believed attainable. If, within the next three years, the Soviets should substantially accelerate production, or if there should be major slippages in U.S. programs, the U.S. position could be very adversely affected, and some of the conclusions of this study would require alteration. Figures 1 through 6 show the anticipated performances, characteristics, and operational capabilities on which the analysis is based. Figure 7 shows graphically the growth in effective ICBM’s for both sides and the size Soviet force that would be required in order to have a 90% probability of producing at least a specified overpressure at each aim point in the U.S. Included as aim points are SAC operational air bases, ICBM sites, naval bases, and command and control installations. The assumptions are, for the most part, based on NIE 11–8–59 and are summarized on the figure.

25.5 Questions of attainable guidance accuracy turn out to be central to the discussion. Insofar as the dissymmetry discussed in 21 obtains, Soviet accuracy is far more important than U.S. accuracy, since their missile sites are not currently among our aim points, whereas our fixed missile sites undoubtedly figure prominently in theirs. Thus, the Soviet CEP emerges as probably the most sensitive parameter of the study. This is basically because CEP is more or less directly translatable into missiles, via the notion of the “exchange ratio.” This ratio is the number of Soviet missiles required to destroy (at a certain level of confidence) a U.S. missile installation. Thus, each such installation can in a sense “claim” so many Soviet missiles. The exchange ratio for hardened sites is extremely sensitive to CEP, varying about as the square of this quantity. Consequently, a two to one improvement in Soviet CEP means approximately a four to one effective amplification in that part of the Soviet missile force earmarked for attack on our hard sites. In view of the extreme sensitivity of this parameter, variations from the NIE of Soviet CEP have explicitly been considered. In particular, an alternative set of Soviet CEP’s has been used for exploratory purposes, which corresponds to the accuracies believed, on the basis of U.S. R & D flights, to be attainable with radio-inertial guidance systems.

25.6 It has been necessary to consider carefully the destabilizing effects that a variety of measures might have on the balance that the agreements in question are intended to foster. Some of these measures are quite obvious, e.g., the effects of possible clandestine production under a ban. Others, no less important, are not quite so obvious, namely the effects of ASM measures and of possible active defense measures against ballistic missiles. The relevance of ASM to the efficacy of Polaris as a deterrent is clear. With respect to AICBM or AIRBM measures, the reasoning goes something like this. While cost effectiveness arguments may militate against AICBM defense when there are no constraints on missile production and when heavy decoying and a high degree of simultaneity of arrival are possible, ballistic missile defense may be much more attractive when these conditions cannot be met. Thus, in the event of a production ban or limitation, there would be added incentive for both sides to develop such defenses. Also, if a test ban were negotiated which would lead to heavy emphasis by the U.S. on Polaris (which has little decoy capacity and would not be capable of delivery of weapons with high simultaneity of arrival), then, the possibility that the USSR might develop—via crash and haywire—a modest but worrisome AIRBM capability would accordingly have to be taken into account. (The same applies in part to Minuteman, in that this missile will probably have a minimal decoying capability.)

26. The points discussed above are not the only ones that could be adduced, but they are the most essential ones and will probably suffice to clarify the discussion.

27. The spectrum of time over which the agreements might be implemented runs roughly from the present era into the 1964 period. Two dates have been singled out for detailed analysis: 1 January 1961 and 1 January 1963. It turns out that these dates enjoy a certain adventitious naturalness in that they represent key dates in the structure of the U.S. missile force (1961 operational Polaris capability and Atlas capability; 1963 hard and mobile Minuteman potentially).

28. Finally, the study group recognizes that the problem of the study is only a part of a much larger problem—that of armament control generally. It has not concerned itself directly with questions of the negotiability of any of the agreements considered.

Figure 1a
U.S. [text not declassified] Ballistic Missiles Anticipated Performance Growth

Figure 1b
U.S. [text not declassified] Ballistic Missiles Anticipated Performance Growth

Figure 2a

Figure 2b

Figure 3a

Figure 3b

Figure 4
Estimated* Soviet Inventory and Deployment
(Figures are cumulative)

Figure 5
Estimated* Soviet Development Testing Program
(Numbers in parentheses are cumulative)

Figure 6
Estimated Soviet Missile Performance

Topical Discussion

I. Items relating to the feasibility of monitoring a long-range missile flight test ban.

30. Ballistic missile flights originating within the Sino-Soviet Bloc could be detected with high confidence utilizing a system of radars, at least some of which must be deployed throughout the Bloc. The numbers (and to some degree the characteristics) of the radars required will depend on the minimum apogee and range against which the system is to be effective. Table I illustrates this.

a) Column a is the minimum apogee against which the system is to be effective.

b) Column b is the range of a missile on a minimum energy trajectory which will have the apogee given in column a.

c) Column c is what is believed to be a reasonable upper limit on range for the apogee given in column a. It should be noted that attainment of such extremely flat trajectories as implied in column c would require heavier nose cones to withstand the great heating and also probably some terminal guidance.

d) Column d is the number of radars required for world coverage against missiles with the apogees given in a and the range given in b.

e) Column e is the number of radars required for world coverage against missiles with the apogees given in a and the range given in c.

Table I

Apogee (nm)	Missile Range (nm)		Radars for World Coverage
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
100	400	10,000	125	70
75	300	3,000	170	115
50	200	1,000	250	240
30	120	200	415	415

From the table it can be seen that an apogee limitation of about 75 n.m. would exclude ICBM test firings. If it were desired to exclude IRBM’s as well, a limit of slightly over 50 n.m. is indicated, though even with the 75 n.m. limit IRBM testing would have to be on far from minimum-energy trajectories. With a 75 n.m. limit, world coverage requirements are seen to be about 115 radars. Actually, of course many areas would not require coverage so that number of radars needed might be more like 100. Because of the great expense of a world wide radar system and in view of other possibilities discussed below, it might be desirable to use radar monitoring only for missile flights originating in the Bloc (and the U.S.). The numbers required are somewhat sensitive to location, i.e. whether it is necessary, and possible, to install radars in countries around the periphery over which Soviet missile might be fired. If it is assumed that this is to be done, then about 15 radars would be required to detect firings of missiles the apogee of which exceeded 75 n.m. As many as 10 or 11 of these could be located in countries along the periphery of the Bloc. The rest would have to be sited within the Bloc. The system would probably take about two and a half years to install, and the initial cost would be of the order of 300 million dollars. A staff of 30 to 50 technicians (plus housekeeping) would be needed at each site. Mobility for the staff would not be a severe requirement.

31. With a radar detection system as described above, a substantial amount of missile development could continue since the radar system described above would not detect static, tethered and very short-range firings of long-range ballistic missiles, firings in which the missile is destroyed shortly after take-off, and any firings of aerodynamic missiles. Therefore, such tests should not be excluded by any agreement unless there were some other detection means agreed to by which they could be monitored. It is assumed that both sides would conduct such tests. If this were to prove not to be the case, there would be a serious dissymmetry which is not considered in this study.

32. Certain current developments—particularly acoustic and radio backscatter systems—offer the possibility, if used cooperatively, of a satisfactory and relatively inexpensive detection system—one that could even be deployed peripherally to the Bloc countries. It is not possible at the present time to specify the confidence level to be attached to such a mutually supporting system, either with respect to certainty of detection or with respect to immunity to false alarms.

33. In the event of a Soviet self-imposed moratorium on missile flight tests, these techniques—in conjunction with others now being used to monitor Soviet missile firings—might suffice at least for a while to keep track of Soviet activities. However, the present techniques are subject to circumvention if the Soviets take certain rather costly and time-consuming measures.

34. The testing of IRBM’s and small ICBM’s at sea is a possible operation. A world-wide radar system to detect such launchings would have an initial cost of the order of 2 billion dollars. Alternatively, cooperative use of acoustic and backscatter techniques might constitute a relatively inexpensive world-wide detection system which might be satisfactory for the detection of the inherently high-risk operation of launch by the Soviets (or others) on the open seas. Another alternative system to monitor tests at sea would involve the use of inspection teams to examine ships, shipyards, ports and coastline. The monitor teams would require rights of access and of aerial photography comparable with those delineated in Item IV, 50. as necessary for a production ban.

35. The MIDAS infra-red satellite system, which may be implemented in any event as a measure of early warning, has the potentialities of a world-wide flight detection system. It is not possible at present to determine whether such a system would by itself satisfy the requirements, nor to determine with certainty the date by which it could be operational.

36. Of the various detection systems discussed above, only the radar system would have any capability of distinguishing between a missile firing and a space flight. None would have any capability at all for determining whether a space flight was being used primarily to further missile development. Consequently, it would be necessary to establish in all the countries involved monitor teams having broad powers of inspection of space vehicles and payloads, both civil and military, including direct access to the firing site, the vehicle and its check-out equipment, to the internals of the payload components, and to the tracking and telemetry data.

II. Items relating to the effect of a space program on the effectiveness of a missile flight test ban.

37. In the event of a test ban, space experimentation could provide a “feed through” to the advantage of missile capability. Certain of this feed-through would be quite difficult to circumvent, for example:

a) Increase missile reliability through continuing experience in the handling and firing of large rocket engines.

b) Improvements in guidance accuracy.

Such improvements are by no means contingent on the existence of a space program, but they would certainly be accelerated by it.

38. A cursory examination suggests that limitations or controls on a national space program, such as would be at all consistent with the vigor and scientific validity of such a program, could slow, but would not stop, the effect of feed-through. The requirements for such controls, and the degree to which they would slow down feed-through, have not been studied in detail. It would be necessary to study in detail the question of whether new configurations (e.g., solid propellant boosters) or new sub-systems (e.g., all-inertial guidance) developed and tested in the course of space operations might find their way into the Soviet missile stockpile. Such developments would enjoy greatly reduced confidence in the presence of a test ban, but the lack of confidence would not necessarily constitute complete unacceptability.

39. The supervision of space effort (including military space programs, if they were to be continued) by an international authority could result in a minimal degree of feed-through into the military missile efforts. It would, in addition, greatly reduce the dangers inherent in the possibility of technological surprise.

III. Items relating to the national security implications of a missile flight test ban.

40. If a test ban were implemented in January 1961, the only ICBM that could be deployed in which the U.S. would have high confidence would be the soft, radio-inertial Atlas. An operational Polaris force, with 1200 n.m. missiles only, would be possible; confidence in it would be less than in the case of the soft Atlas. A hard all-inertial Atlas capability could be developed, but confidence in it would be even less than in Polaris. The operational deployment of the Titan would be precluded; this would probably imply a smaller (as well as qualitatively different) U.S. ICBM force for the period beginning in the latter half of 1961 than would be the case in the absence of a ban.

41. A January 1961 test ban would reduce but not stop the rate of improvement in accuracy of Soviet missiles. Insofar as the ability of these missiles to strike soft U.S. targets is concerned, Soviet accuracy will almost certainly be good enough by January 1961 so that any further improvements may be quite unimportant.

42. In summary, a test ban dated January 1961 would involve considerable risk for the U.S., since it could lead to a situation a few years hence wherein the U.S. would have an inadequate retaliatory capability. Soft missiles (and any aircraft caught on the ground) could be easily destroyed by a surprise Soviet strike-first. The Polaris force would not have certain desirable characteristics which further testing would provide, and in addition, confidence in the system would be lower than in the case of continued testing. Any aircraft that may be on air alert will find penetration of Soviet air defenses increasingly difficult with the passage of time. Finally, any hard ICBM capability which might be developed would be one in which there could be little confidence.

43. A test ban implemented in January 1963 would permit the operational deployment of the 100 psi all-inertial Atlas, Titan and Minuteman, of the mobile Minuteman and of the 1500 n.m. Polaris, assuming adherence to present schedules. A test ban implemented six months earlier would probably not preclude development of any of these systems, though confidence in the mobile Minuteman and the non-cryogenic all-inertial Titan would probably be significantly lowered.

44. A January 1963 test ban could not be counted on to preclude the development of a second-generation Soviet ICBM, possibly smaller and employing non-cryogenic fuel.

45. By January 1963, Soviet guidance will probably have improved substantially. A 1963 test ban would reduce, but not stop, the rate of improvement subsequently. It is possible that by January 1963 accuracies and reliabilities of Soviet missiles may already be good enough so that the exchange ratio against 100 psi U.S. targets may be approaching dangerous levels.

46. In summary, a January 1963 test ban (would not appear to be particularly dangerous for the U.S., since it)⁵ would permit development of all U.S. missiles for which there are now firm programs, with the probable exception of the ALBM. At this time there do not appear to be any others in prospect that would offer the possibility of greatly improving our retaliatory posture. It would seem important that the test ban not be so early as to preclude development of the mobile Minuteman and the 1500 n.m. Polaris in view of the inevitable improvements in Soviet CEP’s.

47. Technological, military or political developments as yet unforeseen could invalidate or modify these conclusions. There does not appear to be any basis for determining at the present time whether such developments will make a test ban less desirable or more so.

48. Certain possible developments do not alter the conclusions but are distinctly related to the problem. Thus, it seems unlikely that in the next few years, the USSR could develop ASW or ballistic missile defense capabilities which could seriously modify the deterrent effect of the Polaris missiles. However, in the farther future, the possible effects of such countermeasures might be important. In particular, the unilateral deployment of an AICBM defense could seriously alter the balance of force.

49. As a second example, a test ban, particularly an early test ban, could lead to a strong resurgence of interest in aerodynamic missiles, particularly very low altitude varieties. Thus a ban could create strong side effects whose ultimate consequences are difficult to predict, but which might be as serious as those which this ban sought to preclude.

IV. Items relating to the feasibility of a ban or limitation on missile production.

50. A qualifiedly⁶ effective system for delimiting Sino-Soviet production of missiles could be implemented if, and only if, the following conditions could be met:

50.1 The agreement guarantees a right to unrestricted and self-initiated access by the inspection teams to any point in any area of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

50.2 The inspection directorate has the right to valid aerial photography of the entire Bloc on a periodic basis.

A prior inventory of Bloc missile stockpiles and selected industrial facilities would probably be required for monitoring production, and in any case would be needed to insure that the stockpile is not greatly different than estimated in the NIE.

51. Given the conditions outlined above, a limitation on allowed rates of inspection could probably be set. However, existence of a space program or of limited missile production would make necessary continuous inspection of certain key facilities, such as missile and space installations.

52. The activity of the inspection teams would be concerned not only with the production of the missiles themselves, but also with the production of the support equipment necessary to give the missiles an operational status. Although it is not within the terms of reference of this study and has not been investigated here, it seems probable that inspection of launchers and launch sites would be of great use; it is possible that further study would reveal it to be as important, or perhaps more important, than inspection of missile production.

53. U.S. intelligence could support the work of the inspection teams by providing relevant information beyond that derived from the overt inspection.

54. A much more extensive study will be required to determine the proper organization and manpower requirements of the inspection teams and the intensity of level of inspection, including limitations on inspection frequency. A cursory first look indicates that for monitoring the Sino-Soviet Bloc, a minimum of 1000 qualified people, exclusive of logistic support, would have to be engaged in this activity.

55. Despite inspection of the sort envisaged here, there will remain the possibility of a small flow of illicitly produced missiles. A clandestine rate of one or two missiles per month might involve relatively low risk of detection, while five or more per month would probably represent a high-risk situation.

The risk of detection and exposure has to be related to the possible advantage to be gained by incurring the risk. In the event of a total ban on production, for example, the advantage to be gained might be very large compared with the probability of, and the likely consequences of, exposure. In the event of a reasonable limitation on production, the advantages might seem considerably less persuasive.

V. Items relating to the national security implications of a ban or limitation on ballistic missile production.

56. A production ban as early as January 1961 would leave the U.S. with a very few soft fixed missiles, two Polaris submarines, and a bomber force whose capability of penetration (particularly in a retaliatory role) will diminish in time as Soviet defenses continue to be buttressed. The Soviet ICBM force relative to the number of U.S. aim points could be such that only sure warning and great speed of response on the part of the U.S. bomber force could offer any hope of survival of any significant U.S. retaliatory capability in the face of near-simultaneous surprise attack. In addition, the generally low levels of inventory on both sides would lead to a danger from small levels of clandestine production.

57. If implemented as early as 1961, a limitation which permitted production of at least several times the estimated clandestine production capability of the Bloc would lead to a situation a few years hence where the missile inventories of the two sides would be in a proportion such that neither side’s force would be sufficient to destroy the bulk of the adversary’s force. (This conclusion is predicated on the assumption that at the time of the ban the Soviet operational missile stockpile would not be so unexpectedly large as to make it necessary to accelerate presently-planned U.S. missile production). The allowed production rate should be made sufficiently high that an approximate parity would be achieved before the U.S. bomber force could be rendered ineffective by Soviet air defense.

58. The detailed tailoring of the negotiations would have to include consideration of the problems of some continued testing, replacement and disposal of obsolescent missiles, and manufacture of spare parts.

59. In the event of an early production limitation, both sides might wish to do limited testing in order to prevent diminution in confidence, to improve accuracy and to prove out modifications of the missile force—particularly improved mobility and hardening. Such modifications would probably, in the near future, increase exchange radios—and hence promote stability of deterrence—faster than improvements in accuracy could diminish them. With a limitation production, continuation of testing would seem, therefore, to be advantageous to both sides. At some later date (possibly in early 1963) when both sides had sufficiently exploited mobility and hardness, the desirability of continued testing might be questionable. Further tests might result in reduced exchange ratios as improvements in guidance became more significant than further improvements in hardening. Moreover, a discontinuance of testing at that time might prevent or delay the attainment of missile capabilities by powers other than the U.S., U.K., and USSR. Whether or not this would be desirable is not considered in this study.

60. If current schedules are met, a January 1963 production ban would leave the U.S. with about 200 ICBM’s and 9 Polaris submarines operational. Actually, additional missiles might be produced prior to 1963 and added to the operational inventory later as more bases and/or submarines were completed. If Soviet CEP’s and force levels were about as estimated in the NIE, a very substantial fraction of the U.S. ICBM’s would survive a Soviet first-strike. The Polaris force, plus even a small residue of the ICBM and bomber force, would pose a very substantial threat to the USSR.

61. Thus, U.S. capabilities would seem sufficient so that the Soviets would not attack in the expectation of delivering a knockout blow with small damage to themselves. However, if they should, for any reason, arrive at the conclusion that war was inevitable or highly probable, there would be great incentive for them to deliver a pre-emptive strike since by doing so they could destroy a very large fraction of the U.S. force and so reduce damage to themselves very materially below what would be expected in the event that war should develop in such a way that the whole of the U.S. force could be used against them. The possible advantage to them of such a pre-emptive strike in the event of crisis or uncertainty would then be contributory to instability. This, coupled with uncertainties regarding Soviet future capabilities, would seem to make a 1963 production ban somewhat risky, though probably not out of the question.

62. With deferral of the ban until about January 1964, the U.S. Minuteman forces, both fixed and mobile, are scheduled to grow so substantially that a situation of more stable mutual deterrence should have been reached, since a pre-emptive Soviet strike could be expected to destroy a much smaller fraction of the total U.S. capability. Thus, on the basis of current estimates and schedules, there would appear to be little danger in a ban at that date.

63. By 1963 the stockpiles of both sides will be large enough so that the advantages of a production limitation over a ban would be far less significant than in 1961. The conclusions with respect to the desirability of a ban in 1963 or 1964 are then, for the most part, appropriate to a limitation in production as well. A limitation would, however, seem slightly preferable, in that it would minimize the desirability of possible clandestine production.

64. The arguments presented earlier with respect to a prohibition on testing when there is also a limitation on production seem applicable for 1963 or later.

65. In the event of a ban or a limitation on production, the development of an AICBM defense would probably receive increased emphasis on both sides. The unilateral development and deployment of such a capability by either nation could seriously modify the stability of an established mutual deterrence.

Annex A

Proposed Terms of Reference, NSC Study (per NSC Action 2161–b)

The purpose of this study is to determine the technical feasibility and national security implications of a monitored ban on flight testing and/or on production of long-range ballistic missiles.

The study shall consider the major problems and implications of a ban on the testing of long-range ballistic missiles with emphasis on the technical feasibility of monitoring an agreement. The study will evaluate the importance of the changes that have taken place since the NSC study of March 28, 1958, with particular reference to the evolving status of missile capabilities in the U.S. and USSR.

A similar study will be made of the technical problems and implications of an agreement to stop missile production.

The relationship between the two types of restriction shall be considered, to determine their interdependence and, where appropriate, the relationship of missile test and production bans to other closely related arms control measures will be considered.

The relationship between any missile test or production ban and outer space programs will be a part of the study.

This study could consider an assumed situation existing on January 1, 1961, and alternatively, January 1, 1963. The study will be completed between February 15 and March 1, 1960.

Attachment

Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Gates

JCSM 74–60

Washington, March 2, 1960

SUBJECT

• U.S. Disarmament Policy (U)

1. Reference is made to the memorandum by the Secretary of Defense, dated 24 February 1960, concerning a possible international agreement to ban or limit the testing, production, and the numbers and/or deployment of long-range missiles.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the proposed disarmament measures and the accompanying question encompassed in your memorandum which stated:

“Cessation of all further flight testing of IRBMs and ICBMs and immediately upon the installation of an agreed control system to verify this measure. All further peaceful uses testing of rockets would be conducted only as part of an internationally agreed program. Upon the installation of appropriate inspection measures, agreed limitations would be imposed upon the numbers and the production and/or deployment of long-range missiles and of other long-range delivery systems such as aircraft and submarines. Subsequently agreed reductions would take place.

“Question. What would be the effect on the relative military posture of the United States and her Allies vis-a-vis the Soviet Bloc including Communist China of the adoption of an international agreement along the lines of the above measure, effective in January 1962; 1963; 1965?”

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that these disarmament proposals entail critical implications for the future security of the United States. This is particularly so if considered for any of the proposed time periods whether with or without regard to other disarmament measures. Current U.S. long-range missile programs are far from complete. For example, the MINUTEMAN program, including research and development on missile components, is actually just well underway. Although hardened MINUTEMAN testing is programmed to be practically complete in 1963, the mobile configuration would still be in the testing stage. (All of this presupposes no slippage or detrimental test results along the way.) The current POLARIS research and development program is less than 40 per cent complete. Although plans indicate completion of development of the 1500 mile missile by 1962, development of the subsequent model (2500 miles) will not be possible if a cut-off date of 1963 is established. TITAN research and development flight test programs are just beginning (of the 98 R&D flights programmed, 7 have been accomplished). The various improvements in this program are dependent upon SUCCESSFUL test completion.

4. There are many serious technical difficulties in our missile program that can be overcome only by extensive R&D testing over the next three or four years, followed by actual military crew firings under field conditions. Examples of more serious problems are: the all inertial ICBM guidance systems have not been flight tested to date; the development of a reliable large grain, solid propellant is in its infancy; and non-cryogenic fueled ICBM’s have not proceeded past the static engine test phase. To commit the United States to a missile flight test ban, as of the proposed dates, based upon anticipated major technical advances and their successful incorporation into our missile programs, could be dangerous to the security of the United States.

5. Failure to successfully complete the flight test phase of any of these systems, or major system components thereof, would not permit the United States to produce a reliable missile weapons system to match the estimated current and anticipated missile technical advances of the USSR. Of equal importance, when viewed in the light of unit operational readiness, training of combat crews would be reduced to “dry runs”. This, of course, would result in questionable confidence in the whole weapons system.

6. Consideration of the foregoing, plus an examination of the implications thereof leads to the following conclusions:

a. Any agreement to ban flight testing of IRBM’s, effective prior to 1965, would be disadvantageous to the United States because of the impact upon our weapons systems development programs.

b. The lack of firm data on U.S. programs as well as those of the Soviet Bloc makes the period 1965 one of great uncertainty. The anticipated continuing accelerated advances in weapons technology dictates that judgments as to the relative posture of the Soviet Bloc and the Free World by 1965 cannot be more than questionable at this time.

c. Any consideration of production limitations must include consideration of relative effectiveness of existing inventories of operational missiles as of the cut-off date. Measures which both the Soviet Bloc and the Free World would take to accelerate their ballistic missile programs, PRIOR TO THE CUT-OFF DATE, cannot be determined, but such could materially change current inventory forecasts, to include types of missiles. Furthermore, judgments as to relative advantage accruing there-from would be contingent, to large extent, on the degree to which either or both sides possess an effective active defense against such a missile posture. Therefore, any judgments as to the advantages or disadvantages which would accrue from a national commitment to cease or limit production as of a given future date must be approached with extreme caution. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that a decision relative to the date at which a production ban would be advantageous to the United States cannot be made at this time.

d. An examination of our strategic dependence upon extensive deployment of U.S. and Allied strike forces, as compared to the more monolithic character of the military posture of the Soviet Bloc, indicates that it would be to our national disadvantage to negotiate agreement which would limit deployment of long-range delivery systems.

e. With regard to agreements on reduction of the long-range delivery systems, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that specific measures cannot be considered except as related to other disarmament measures.

7. Recommendation: Inasmuch as it is understood that the study being conducted under direction of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology encompasses, in addition to an investigation of the feasibility of an inspection system, an assessment of the implications of such proposals as are related to our national security, it is recommended that the foregoing be utilized by the Defense representatives in the development of this study. Furthermore, in view of the military implications involved, it is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be afforded an opportunity to review and comment on this study prior to its referral to the National Security Council.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

Arleigh Burke
Chief of Naval Operations

Attachment

Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Gates

Washington, March 18, 1960

SUBJECT

• Study Entitled “The Feasibility and National Security Implications of a Monitored Agreement to Stop or Limit Ballistic Missile Testing and/or Production” (U)

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 14 March 1960, which requested that the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to the subject study be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense by 18 March 1960.

2. It is the understanding of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that when this study was requested by the National Security Council on 10 December 1959, it was contemplated that all major aspects of the problem of control of long range ballistic missiles would be considered and their implications fully assessed in order to establish a sound basis for a policy decision by the President. The terms of reference furnished to the study group were sufficiently comprehensive to permit accomplishment of this objective. However, the study report sets forth, in paragraph 2 thereof, seven interrelated areas of major concern which were not adequately considered.

3. These limitations of the study should be fully recognized in order to preclude a premature decision on this matter. In its over-all effect, the report is unduly optimistic with regard to the prospects for an early U.S. proposal for, or agreement to, a missile test or production limitation.

4. In view of its limitations, the study does not provide an adequate basis for the formulation of a broad policy with regard to the control of missiles. It does afford a sufficient basis, when construed in the light of the comments contained in the Appendix hereto, to conclude that the United States should not at this time propose any limitation on the testing or production of missiles to become effective at any foreseeable date in the future.

5. It is to be expected that proposals of this nature will be advanced by other nations in such a manner as to require their consideration by the United States. For this reason, it is recommended that the United States expeditiously complete a study of all major aspects of the problem in order to provide its negotiators with adequate policy guidance.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(SIGNED)

Thomas D. White
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Appendix

COMMENTS ON STUDY ENTITLED “THE FEASIBILITY AND NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF A MONITORED AGREEMENT TO STOP OR LIMIT BALLISTIC MISSILE TESTING AND/OR PRODUCTION”

1. Paragraphs 2, 10, 18 and 46 (pages 1, 4, 6 and 33). These paragraphs imply that a flight test ban beginning in early 1963 would contain no risk, or only slight risk, to the United States. The date 1963 is considered to be within the period where potential disadvantages of a test ban, with regard to possible slippages, unforeseeable technical/operational difficulties, and the desirability of sophisticating our programmed weapons system, can be identified. Moreover, the possibility that Soviet technical advances could provide them with a significant technical superiority prior to the effective date of a test ban should not be overlooked. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that uncertainty appears in the period 1965 and beyond.

2. Paragraph 3 (page 2). With regard to the last sentence, it should be recognized that such certainty is a practical impossibility.

3. Paragraphs 4 and 31 (pages 2 and 28). A radar monitoring system may not provide enough coverage to ensure detection of short-range missile firings or of ALL flights by aerodynamic missiles. However, it would be incorrect to imply that even a minimal system could not detect some of those flights within its radar envelope.

4. Paragraph 6 (page 4). It should be recognized that consideration of the implications of these measures was beyond the scope of the study, and that, because of the indicated relationship, such implications must be considered before test or production limitations are proposed.

5. Paragraph 8 (page 4). It is considered unnecessary for the limited purpose of the inspection system contemplated here, that ALL information be disclosed. However, it must be recognized that if this proposal were eventually implemented in conjunction with other disarmament proposals (such as measures to preclude surprise attack) there would be inevitable pressure for the complete disclosure of all information obtained through the use of space vehicles. This consideration should be given full weight in any initial decision as to whether the United States should propose or agree to, any restriction on testing or production of missiles.

6. Paragraph 9 (page 4). The second conclusion of this paragraph (following after the comma in the second line) should not be interpreted as implying the internationalization of our space program would be to our advantage.

7. Paragraph 10 (page 4). The indecisiveness of the last sentence (and of the last sentence of paragraph 2, page 1) supports the view that a determination cannot be made at this time that a missile test ban effective at any foreseeable date would be to our advantage.

8. Paragraph 11 (page 4). The lead time indicated, and the emphasis on radar, are relevant only if credence is given to an effective date of 1963.

9. Paragraph 12 (page 4). The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in the conclusions of this paragraph. It should be noted, however, that the study fails to point out, in this paragraph, or elsewhere, the very significant problem involved in the determination of whether the United States would be willing to submit to such extensive inspection.

10. Paragraph 13 (page 5).

a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the United States should not agree to a predetermined, fixed number of annual inspections (quota). Instead, the level of inspections should bear an appropriate relationship to scientific facts and detection capabilities. This principle would seem to require the right to inspect all declared production facilities and any suspected undeclared facilities. The level of inspection should, therefore, have an appropriate relationship to the number of declared facilities and to the numbers of undeclared facilities and suspected activities qualifying for inspection on the basis of agreed criteria.

b. The language of the first sentence indicates that in order not to seriously degrade the confidence of the monitoring system, a large quota would have to be set on the permitted number of inspections. The likelihood of obtaining USSR agreement to a “large quota” is completely negated by past experience.

c. The last sentence implies that continuous inspection of “certain key facilities” would be adequate in the event of a production limitation or a continuing national space program. Such limited inspection would disregard clandestine production.

11. Paragraph 17 (page 6).

a. It is possible that the danger of a production ban would diminish with time, but, recognizing the limitations of this study, there is no justification for concluding that the risk will be small by January 1964. It is equally true that a production ban would become progressively less meaningful with time. The over-all assessment of risk vs gain should include comprehensive assessment of many facets, not considered in this study, before a conclusion as to “small risk” can be justified.

b. This paragraph mentions only acceleration of United States missile production. It would be extremely dangerous to assume that the Soviets would not also immediately accelerate their production in the event that an international proposal for limitation of production at some future date were to be presently taken under consideration.

12. Paragraph 18 (page 6). Recognition should be given to the possibility of development, before 1963, of terminal guidance methods to improve missile accuracy. Tests to refine such terminal methods might be continued, even after establishment of a test ban, by test launchings from aircraft remaining below the floor of the radar detection system.

13. Paragraph 23 (page 8).

a. The meaning of this paragraph is not clear.

b. Paragraphs 13 and 23 appear to be inconsistent in the following respect: The latter contemplates unlimited ground and air inspection of a limited production ban; the former envisages a type of limited inspection both with regard to number of inspections (quota) and situs of inspections (“certain key facilities”).

14. Paragraph 25 (pages 9–14). Current U.S. long-range missile programs are far from complete. For example, the MINUTEMAN program, including research and development on missile components, is actually just well underway. Although hardened MINUTEMAN testing is programmed to be practically complete in 1963, the mobile configuration would still be in the testing stage. (All of this presupposes no slippage or detrimental test results along the way). The current POLARIS research and development program is less than 40 per cent complete. Although plans indicate completion of development of the 1500 mile missile by 1962, development of the subsequent model (2500 miles) will not be possible if a cut-off date of 1963 is established. TITAN research and development flight test programs are just beginning (of the 98 R&D flights programmed, 10 have been accomplished). The various improvements in this program are dependent upon SUCCESSFUL test completion.

There are many serious technical difficulties in our missile program that can be overcome only by extensive R&D testing over the next three or four years, followed by actual military crew firings under field conditions. Examples of more serious problems are: the all inertial ICBM guidance system have not been flight tested to date; the development of a reliable large grain, solid propellant is in its infancy; and non-cryogenic fueled ICBM’s have not proceeded past the static engine test phase. To commit the United States to a missile flight test ban, as of the proposed dates, based upon anticipated major technical advances and their successful incorporation into our missile programs, could be dangerous to the security of the United States.

Failure to successfully complete the flight test phase of any of these systems, or major system components thereof, would not permit the United States to produce a reliable missile weapons system to match the estimated current and anticipated missile technical advances of the USSR. Of equal importance, when viewed in the light of unit operational readiness, training of combat crews would be reduced to “dry runs”. This, of course, would result in questionable confidence in the whole weapons system.

15. Paragraph 25.6 (page 13).

a. The first sentence implies that “the agreements in question”, i.e., proposed agreements on limitation of testing or production of missiles, are intended to foster “balance”. The achievement of a balance of power is not a purpose of, nor could it be achieved by, disarmament agreements except pursuant to proposals whereby the stronger side accepts greater limitations or reductions. This would be an unrealistic expectation.

b. In considering the last six lines of this paragraph (page 14), recognition should be given to current efforts leading toward development of decoy capability for both POLARIS and MINUTEMAN.

16. Figures 1 thru 3 (pages 16–21). These figures relating to U.S.–U.K. missile data do not indicate their source and cannot be reconciled in detail.

17. Figure 5 (page 24). Does not indicate source.

18. Figure 7 (page 25). The data upon which “SOVIET REQUIREMENT” was plotted do not correspond to data for any of the cases discussed in Table A, Annex A, to NIE 11–8–59. It would be undesirable to have before the policy makers two estimates of Soviet missile requirements (this study and NIE 11–8–59) which differ considerably, without a very clear explanation of the reasons for the difference.

19. Paragraph 30 (page 27). The conclusion that about 15 radars would suffice under the assumption stated fails to recognize the possibility of testing on the high seas.

20. Paragraphs 62–63 (page 38). Any consideration of production limitations must include consideration of relative effectiveness of existing inventories of operational missiles as of the cut-off date. Measures which both the Soviet Bloc and the Free World would take to accelerate their ballistic missile programs, PRIOR TO THE CUT-OFF DATE, cannot be determined, but such could materially change current inventory forecasts, to include types of missiles. Furthermore, judgments as to relative advantage accruing therefrom would be contingent, to large extent, on the degree of which either or both sides possess an effective active defense against such a missile posture. Therefore, any judgments as to the advantages or disadvantages which would accrue form a national commitment to cease or limit production as of a given future date must be approached with extreme caution. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that a decision relative to the date at which a production ban would be advantageous to the United States cannot be made at this time.

1. Source: Transmits March 14 report by Kistiakowsky on “The Feasibility and National Security Implications of a Monitored Agreement to Stop or Limit Ballistic Missile Testing and/or Production” and two JCS memoranda (attachments to print Document 249). Top Secret; Restricted Data; Limited Distribution. 50 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S–RD Files: Lot 71 D 171.
2. The Department of Defense is opposed to agreements on quotas, on principle. [Footnote is in the original.]
3. The DOD representatives would prefer that this read “smaller” rather than “small.” [Footnote is in the original.]
4. NIE 11–5–59 Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles, 3 Nov. 1959 (TOP SECRET); NIE 11–8–59 Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack Through Mid-1964, 9 Feb. 1960 (TOP SECRET). [Footnote is in the original.]
5. The DOD representatives would prefer that words in parenthesis be deleted. [Footnote is in the original.]
6. The major qualification is treated in Item 55 below. [Footnote is in the original.]