545. Letter From Eaton to Herter1
We have finished a week here and are now on into the first day of the second week. It is very difficult to tell how the Soviets intend to proceed.
They seem quite relaxed. But, although there has been virtually no difficult language used as yet, they are trying very hard to establish the words “general and complete disarmament” as applicable to their own plan. In other words, the Soviets feel they have a patent on the expression and will permit no infringement.
So far as I am concerned, this is not particularly disturbing except as it is wasteful of time. However, it would be my guess that in these first days it is inevitable that time should be wasted in some way, and this is the least harmful I can think of.
The Soviets speak of the nuclear test talks each day, and I frankly believe that it is in this area that they are concentrating at the moment, permitting our own discussions to go in a rather desultory fashion. But, as I said earlier, it is really too early to guess.
Each day last week I made some comment solely for the purpose of establishing ourselves in the conference. I have now determined, at least for the moment, that I will not enter further into discussions while they remain in the upper atmosphere (where they have been all week) but save my fire until, hopefully, we get down to more mundane measures.
[Facsimile Page 2]In this connection, while shaking hands with Zorin this morning, I told him that I hoped he would get in touch with me directly when he felt there was some specific matter for discussion which would advance the objective of our conference. He seemed quite grateful and uttered “khorosho, khorosho”. After the day’s meeting, at which he had talked for perhaps thirty minutes in not a destructive manner, I sent a private word along to him that I thought his statements had, in general, been helpful. I believe that this may be fruitful of some results later on when he believes the time is ripe to talk specific matters.
By the foregoing, however, I do not intend to indicate that we should sit by and wait for Russian moves as a general rule, but at this particular time I am convinced that this is the best tactic.
[Typeset Page 2008]Also, I am of the impression that the Russians feel that the British are our Achilles heel. Zorin has sent word that he wishes to talk with Ormsby-Gore. It may be that he will wish to play us off against the British or vice-versa. Again, this is but a feeling and is based on no creditable evidence. But, I rather sense that the British are not too unhappy about the nuclear test talk as presented by the Russians on Saturday. Why should they be? If I am correct, the presentation reads very much like a play-back of a record cut in London.
In this connection I spoke to Michael Wright on Friday evening and told him that I had heard the Russians were coming in with the “threshold” accompanied by a moratorium. He said, “Yes, this could be very troublesome.” I replied that it certainly would be troublesome for us. I rather felt that he was a bit embarrassed by my comment. Therefore, I did not elaborate on it further.
In line with your suggestion, I broached the subject of recessing for the Summit in my talk with Dr. Protitch on the second day of the meeting. From the feeling in Washington, I gather there is talk of a Western Summit and some talk of a meeting in Istanbul. In light of all of this, I indicated that Dr. Protitch might want to suggest, on his own, that we recess the last Friday in April and sit down again shortly after the first of June. This would give us ample time to bring you up to date on what has transpired here, as well as time after the Summit to prepare the papers necessary to carry out any instructions which may emanate therefrom.
Dr. Protitch raised the question with the Russians, and they indicated that they thought recessing during the month of May would be consonant with their own plans. This is not agreed as yet since we [Facsimile Page 3] want to be sure that it is agreeable to all of our colleagues and if possible avoid any chance of the onus for an early recess being placed upon us.
The foregoing about covers the report of the week.
I have two specific matters:
a. I think it would be well if I made an occasional report to the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate and the Sub-Committee on Disarmament, i.e., Senator Fulbright and Senator Humphrey. I am enclosing a letter to each of them together with my first report.
The decision on whether to forward these communications rests entirely with you. However, I hope that if you decide that they should go forward that they do so promptly in order that they will be contemporary rather than historical documents. I will not expand on this as I hope the enclosures will be self-evident in this respect.
b. The other matter is the question of instructions from you. On the morning of the opening of our conference (when it was much too late [Typeset Page 2009] to have any discussions with our allies and only the briefest with our own staff), I received very specific instructions together with language to be included in remarks which I was to make on the opening day. These related to our relations with the United Nations. I could not follow these instructions without requesting a change in the Allied Paper which had been cleared in all five capitals and with NATO. Specifically, it was requested that a United Nations study be substituted for the Joint Study referred to in the Plan (which I may say had been in the Plan for weeks and reference to the U.N. included in the last days to cover point).
Further, this matter had been thrashed out and agreed between Mr. Wilcox and Mr. Dillon on the last day of my stay in Washington.
I was therefore, put in the embarrassing position of failing to follow your instructions or of causing a very real explosion among our allies.
I determined that I would endeavor to make the minimum changes in your suggested language (which being in quotation marks and in the context of the telegram I had to assume you had approved, word for word). I hope the result did not do violence too much to either your instructions or the agreement with our allies. I left it in such a way that we are [Facsimile Page 4] free now to go back to our allies and change the earlier arrangement if that seems to be desirable.
I have set this forth at some length, as base on this experience, I hope that you will realize our predicament when matters of this kind arise in the future.
We begin preparations here after lunch with a meeting of our four allies for presentation to the full conference on the following morning at 10:30 A.M. Therefore, any communication which I receive after lunch I will not have time thoughtfully to consider, discuss with our staff and with our allies until the following day.
I recognize that there may well arise a critical or emergency situation which may require more immediate action.
I am enclosing copies of all this material which you may wish to send to Doug and Phil Farley and copies of letters to Senator Fulbright and Senator Humphrey which you may wish to send to Mr. Macomber.
Forgive the length of this letter but I felt that it would be helpful to give you some of the flavor of things here at this early date.
Kindest regards and gratitude for the help which I have received from you.
Sincerely,
- Source: Report on first week of ten-nation conference on disarmament. Secret; Eyes Only. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 396.12–GE/3–2260.↩