543. Record of Telephone Conversation Between Herter and Kistiakowsky1
11:20—Telephoned Dr. Kistiakowsky 1) Secy said with regard to suggestions Dr. K had made on organization, Department had also [Typeset Page 1972] prepared organizational set up in connection with disarmament which was a part of our presentation on the Hill on appropriations. Secy suggested Dr. K get in touch with Mr. Farley to see how the two might be dove-tailed, and Dr. K said he would call Mr. Farley. The Secy said he was still bothered as to whether the individual in charge of Dr. K’s setup in the White House would be the fellow who was the top policy man or whether he would be an objective adviser to the President, which the Secy felt should be talked out a little more. Dr. K said he had hoped that by the fact that policy decisions would be made by the committee chaired by the Secretary of State, this would take care of it. Secy said, however, there was another section which stated that the White House man would be the principle policy formulator. Secy and Dr. K agreed that it was important that the various roles and functions be very clear right from the start. 2) Discussed unreliability of information being given Gates and, in turn, those responsible for policy formulation with regard to our missile programs, etc. Discussed Polaris and Navy’s misrepresentation in order to concentrate on their submarine before people were distracted to the Polaris; discussed Air Force over-optimism on Sky Bolt. Dr. K said real trouble with our military planning is that the planners take the idealistic view of what they want and when instead of the realistic view of what they can have by when. 3) Secy referred to new Russian offer in Geneva and the fact that he had talked briefly to the President about it and additional fact that British will be very insistent on this. Secy said he had our legal people looking into what the President can and cannot do. Secy said, for instance, on a moratorium which wouldn’t begin until ratification of the treaty which ratification is undoubtedly out of the question for this year, whether the President can commit himself to a moratorium which goes beyond his term of office?; what can be done by Executive action as opposed to a Treaty? Dr. K said he was worried about calling the principals meeting so quickly because both Gates and McCone will take a negative attitude. Secy said Gates is away and Douglas will be attending; that Douglas is pretty realistic on this. Secy said McCone had told him confidentially—Dr. K said McCone had also told him—that he feels there will be no more testing during this Administration, and Secy said whether McCone will be complete negative on a treaty he just didn’t know. Secy said the British [Facsimile Page 2] are inclined to feel real progress has been made and the Secy said he shared that feeling. Dr. K said he also felt progress had been made and that both he and Dr. Killian feel it would be very unfortunate if we reject this out of hand without countering with constructive suggestions of our own. Dr. K said we just have to accept the fact that there will be no more nuclear tests or else the whole cold war will get hotter. Dr. K said he had a feeling at the root of the difficulty is lack of understanding by our legislators and the electorate on what a monitoring system can do; we can’t have a foolproof inspection [Typeset Page 1973] system. Secy said it was also a question of whether the Soviets will keep their word; whether they will cheat on a ban within the letter of the law or whether, with their current preoccupation with world opinion, they will respect the ban for fear of being caught cheating with its resulting effect on world opinion. Secy said as regards the meeting of principals tomorrow that the Secy felt we have to get this out on the table as soon as possible since we will have to go to the President on the unresolved factors. Dr. K said since this is largely a political rather than a technical decision now, that he will have to take a secondary role in the meeting. Dr. K said there was one item which would undoubtedly be tossed at the Secy tomorrow, which Dr. K thought Secy should be forewarned about. Dr. K said it had been thought with regard to small underground explosions that there was a sharp limit as to size—if the explosion was too big it would collapse and a signal would go out—but Dr. K said it now appears that if you make it too big you don’t get the full effect but you still get a partial effect and, therefore, the risk of doing it clandestinely is very much reduced. Dr. K said he is sure this will be mentioned tomorrow by the people who will argue against going ahead.
2:12—General Goodpaster telephoned (see separate memo)
2:30—The President telephoned (see separate memo)
3:30—Returned Mr. Kendall’s earlier call, but Mr. Kendall had seen Secy at the White House and taken care of whatever the matter was.
4:05—Mr. Kohler telephoned to say the Soviet Ambassador wants to see the President again. The Secretary said the answer was no. Mr. Kohler said we always have to balance this a little against Thompson getting in to see Khrushchev, but agreed the Soviets should tell us the subject matter and then we could decide. Secy said he would call Gen. Goodpaster about this.
- Source: Disarmament organization; military planning; developments in test talks; moratorium on testing. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Phone Calls and Miscellaneous Memos.↩