249. Paper Prepared by the NSC Staff1

[Facsimile Page 1]


1. What use was made of the 48 hours strategic warning? Why did we not do better than get only 33–1/3% of SAC in the air after getting 48 hours warning?

2. Why was the UK “V” Force destroyed on the ground?

3. What did the Soviet ground forces do? Walk West?

4. Was the new Soviet surface-to-air “Guideline” missile taken into account in developing losses of our attacking forces?

5. Why was less megatonnage dropped on U.S. per this report than in the exercise several years ago?

6. Could the Government relocate upon receipt of strategic warning without attracting wide public attention?

7. Would not the increased weight of the Soviet nuclear warhead mentioned in recent intelligence estimates but not in the intelligence used by NES result in greater megatonnage falling on the U.S.?

8. Why were the 117 Soviet residual ICBM’s left after the 18½ hour exchange not used for further attack on the U.S.?

9. Why did the State governments survive?

10. Was any assessment made of damage to members of the Sino-Soviet Bloc other than the USSR?

11. What activities will the NES Staff be engaged in during the next nine months?

12. Why were only 50% of the weapons striking the U.S. set for ground bursts, while 95% of the U.S. weapons on the USSR were set for ground bursts?

13. Mr. Gray asked General Hickey to consider giving greater emphasis in his introductory remarks to the fact that the attack was war-gamed.

  1. Source: “Planning Board Questions, Net Evaluation Presentation.” Secret. 1 p. Eisenhower Library, NSC Staff Records, Disaster File.