Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

7. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, March 7, 1958.

SUBJECT

• Long-Range Solution of MAAG and TERM Problems

Discussion:

1. TERM was established to salvage U.S. military equipment stockpiled in Viet-Nam and, as a by-product, to provide logistical training for the Vietnamese national army. In explaining the purpose of TERM to the British, Canadians, French, and Indians the only emphasis was placed on the salvaging aspect. Meanwhile, however, the training aspect of TERM has become increasingly important. (Tab A and Tab B²). The net result has been that any one of these friendly countries may take the attitude that we were less than frank in presenting TERM to them. Defense, CINCPAC, and MAAG/Saigon have consistently maintained that the voluntarily accepted MAAG ceiling impedes the training of the Vietnamese army and that TERM personnel represent the minimum augmentation of the original MAAG strength needed for training purposes. The Vietnamese-French agreement last year to withdraw the French naval and air training missions required MAAG to absorb the functions of those missions.

2. The Embassy in Saigon reported last month (Tab C³) that the ICC’s interest in TERM had increased and expressed doubt that the ICC would continue to be satisfied that the present strength of TERM is required for the salvage of military equipment. The Embassy recommended that further consideration be given to steps discussed last year for the long-range solution of the TERM problem. At that time the Department approved a short-range course of action (Tabs D, E, F⁴) which conciliated the ICC but postponed consideration of the basic TERM problem. We also took advantage of the withdrawal of the French naval and air missions to authorize the Embassy to carry up to 43 spaces for military personnel performing functions in support of other than MAAG activities … . At the same time we discussed a long-range course of action for solution of the TERM and MAAG problems.

3. The long-range course of action envisaged solution of the TERM and MAAG problems along the lines of one of several alternatives proposed by the Embassy. This proposal called for facing the basic dilemma involved in the discrepancy between the way TERM was presented to the ICC (and to the British and French) and into what it actually developed [sic]. This approach calls for abandoning our past policy of attempting to maintain TERM’s temporary technical facade, which the Embassy advises is increasingly difficult to defend, and aiming at establishing a less tenuous basis for the mission’s presence. The Embassy suggested we might state that TERM’S objective had been accomplished and that we now proposed to increase MAAG or to replace TERM by a mission of comparable magnitude for other purposes more descriptive of TERM’s real mission. In order to placate the ICC we could use the practical argument that the small number of U.S. technicians involved was not comparable to the scores of thousands of French combat troops withdrawn from Viet-Nam after the armistice. This course of action would risk ICC objection and a possible subsequent accusation of a U.S.-Vietnamese violation of the Geneva accords. However, it offers a way in which TERM could be legitimized as a permanent organization with unrestricted functions and relative freedom from ICC interference.

4. In a broader context the question also arises whether or not a continued apparent lack of candor with the Canadians, British, and French might not ultimately have even more embarrassing consequences than being accused by the ICC. It should also be borne in mind that our relations with India might be harmed considerably if we appeared to have acted in bad faith in explaining TERM to them (Tab G; Tab H; Tab I⁵).

5. In informing the Embassy in Saigon of the long-range solution the Department envisaged we pointed out that before considering the details of such a solution we would discuss the matter separately with the Canadians, British, French, and Indians and would examine the implications of the possible withdrawal of the French air and naval training missions.⁶

Recommendation:

That after consulting with Defense we contact the Canadian, British, and French Embassies in Washington and that our Ambassador in New Delhi later contact the Indian Government to obtain informal reactions to the U.S. position set forth below. If the net reaction of these friendly countries should be so unfavorable as to be unacceptable in the light of our general interests we could again postpone consideration of a solution for the MAAG–TERM problem. If the net reaction is not so unfavorable as to be unacceptable we could go ahead with the gradual and simultaneous abolition of TERM and expansion of MAAG. The final total of MAAG personnel would not necessarily equal the sum of present TERM and MAAG personnel, but some smaller figure to be agreed on eventually by State and Defense.

Proposed U.S. Position

A. TERM’s objective will be accomplished within the foreseeable future. We intend to withdraw elements or individual members of that mission as their functions disappear and gradually to abolish the mission.

B. Meanwhile, other considerations have made it necessary that we increase the size of MAAG. The withdrawal of the French air and naval training missions and of certain French instructors in army schools, as well as French line of communication elements whose presence contributed to the effectiveness of the air and naval training missions, is among these considerations.

C. The increased personnel of MAAG will be technicians and not combat instructors. In numbers the total MAAG strength will be insignificant by comparison with the total number of French troops withdrawn since the armistice and it will not by any stretch of the imagination increase the military potential of South Viet-Nam over that of the French expeditionary corps which was a party to the Geneva agreement.

D. We feel quite frankly that it is in the interests of the free world to maintain in the Republic of Viet-Nam armed forces capable of providing some defense for that country against armed aggression or massive Communist subversion. It is obvious that the armed forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam constitute no threat to the Communist region in the north.

E. The proposed increase in MAAG should not cause any concern that the U.S. intends to establish a large military presence in Viet-Nam. In fact there will be a net reduction in the number of U.S. military personnel in Viet-Nam.

Approved: C[hristian] A. H[erter], 3/18/58⁷

1. Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 60 D 90, Vietnam. Secret. Drafted by Corcoran with clearances from SEA, FE, C, G, and L/FE.
2. These tabs were not attached and have not been further identified.
3. Not attached, but apparent reference to Document 1. The seemingly erroneous reference “last month” could be explained by the fact that this memorandum went through a number of drafts, some prepared in February. As footnote 11, Ibid., indicates, there was apparently a draft of this memorandum as early as July 1957.
4. Not attached and not further identified.
5. Not attached and not further identified.
6. Reference is to telegram 2630 to Saigon, April 9, 1957. See footnote 7, Document 1. French air and naval missions in Vietnam terminated in the late spring of 1957.
7. The source text is a copy and Acting Secretary Herter’s initials are lettered in an unknown hand.