8. Memorandum of a Conversation, American Embassy, Manila, March 13, 1958, 5:30 p.m.1

US/DEL/MC–5

PARTICIPANTS

  • US
    • Mr. Walter S. Robertson
    • Mr. George M. Abbott
  • Vietnam
    • Mr. Nguyen Dinh Thuan

SUBJECT

  • (1) Vietnamese desire for Support for Civil Guard
  • (2) Vietnamese Relations with Cambodia
[Page 24]

Mr. Thuan said President Diem had asked him to take up one or two matters with Secretary Dulles and Mr. Robertson. The President wished to point out that the current communist emphasis on subversion was creating serious difficulties for Vietnam. The frontier with North Vietnam gave opportunities for infiltration and contact with remnants of insurgent groups and communist agents in the Republic of Vietnam. There was also a problem on the Cambodian border where insurgent groups and bandits were able to flee across the frontier when hard pressed.

In view of this situation President Diem felt strongly that internal security was still his most serious problem and must have priority in use of available funds and resources. Recently the armed forces had been relieved of the mission of assuring internal security in order that they could concentrate on their primary mission of defense against external aggression and carry forward the necessary training.

Internal security thus fell to the Civil Guard and it had become essential that this body of some 40,000 men receive proper equipment and logistic support. President Diem proposed to shift the Civil Guard from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Defense and thus make it eligible for aid under the Military Assistance Program administered by MAAG. At present only very limited assistance is provided through Mutual Security Programs. This proposal had not received a very sympathetic reception in American circles in Saigon where it is viewed by some as an attempt to evade the force goals of 150,000 men in the armed forces.

Mr. Robertson said he would discuss this problem with Ambassador Durbrow, whom he would be seeing in Taipei in a few days, and also with interested parties in Washington on his return. He wished, however, to point out that if President Diem’s proposal involved additional United States aid, as he assumed it did, the prospects were not very good. This year is a particularly difficult one for our aid program. Congress is faced with large demands for funds for the newest types of weapons for the United States armed forces. It is thus doubtful if any additional funds for foreign aid will be appropriated as compared with last year.

The conversation then turned to Vietnamese relations with Cambodia. Mr. Thuan said his government did not have much faith in Prince Sihanouk nor in his recent attacks on communism.2 According to their information, the Prince’s attacks on communism did not represent any ideological conversion to the free world, but merely internal political maneuvers. The Prince had become aware that Soviet and Chinese representatives in Phnom Penh had been exploiting and [Page 25] fanning the ill-will of members of the National Assembly against Prince Sihanouk. This ill-will had arisen in the National Assembly as the result of a Cabinet decision to stop splitting the proceeds of various sorts of illicit traffic or dealings between the members of the Cabinet and of the National Assembly, and to keep the proceeds of such dealings entirely in the hands of members of the Cabinet. The animosity of members of the Assembly towards Sihanouk thus incurred had been consciously and shrewdly exploited by the communists for their purposes. This, more than any concerted view about ideology or policy, had been responsible for Sihanouk’s recent attacks on communism.

At the conclusion of the conversation Mr. Robertson asked Mr. Thuan to convey his respects to President Diem.

Note:

In a subsequent brief follow-up conversation which Mr. Nguyen Dinh Thuan had with Messrs. Abbott and Kattenburg, Mr. Thuan stressed that there was a considerable current of opinion in Vietnam, including also Americans there, which favored more emphasis on the economic side and a de-emphasis of the military aspects of Vietnamese Government policy. Mr. Thuan wished to stress that President Diem considered that such a course of action would bring to Vietnam “not gradual death, but a violent death.” The current situation on the security front did not afford any let-up in the Vietnamese Government’s emphasis on military training and the counter-subversive aspects. The President’s brother, Mr. Ngo Dinh Nhu, had recently informed Thuan that intelligence had been received from Soviet sources indicating that the communists planned a step-up in subversion in Vietnam, to begin particularly this coming May. It was therefore essential that the Civil Guard be properly organized, trained and equipped as soon as possible. President Diem hoped most strongly that the U.S. would agree with him in this view and that the current thinking on emphasizing the economic aspects would not make us lose sight of the very real subversive threat continuing to exist in the country and of the need for continued maximum possible aid on the military side.

  1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 989. Confidential. Drafted by George M. Abbott, Special Assistant for SEATO Affairs in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs. Robertson and Abbott were part of the U.S. Delegation to the Fourth Council meeting of SEATO, held at Manila, March 11–13. Thuan was Vietnam’s Observer. Documentation on the Council meeting is scheduled for publication in a forthcoming volume of Foreign Relations.
  2. Documentation on these attacks is scheduled for publication in the compilation on Cambodia in a forthcoming volume of Foreign Relations.