6. Despatch From the Consul in Hue (Barbour) to the Department of State1
REF
- Consulate’s Despatch No. 3 of August 30, 19572
SUBJECT
- Meeting with Ngo dinh Can
In the evening of Monday, February 17, 1958, the day before the beginning of the Vietnamese lunar new year celebrations, the reporting officer was received by President Diem’s elusive, political-boss brother, Ngo dinh Can, a mysterious eminence grise on the Central Viet Nam political scene, who shies from contacts with strangers and has heretofore declined to have dealings with American officials. Since previous expressions of hope that a meeting would be possible had been lodged periodically in the past with members of Can’s entourage and had elicited no response, it was with some surprise that the invitation to meet him was received.
The Ngo family homestead, where the meeting took place, seemed unchanged from when first visited six months ago, when it was described in the despatch cited above. Within Hue’s only walled compound, the grounds, as full of birds and animals as ever, were brightly decorated with flowers, lanterns, illuminated slogans, and pictures of the President in anticipation of his arrival the next day. The house was open to the seasonal mist and chill and was full of flowers as well as all the esoterica noticed last August. It is this atmosphere of mystic, exotic isolation that contributes to the position of awe which Can holds in the eyes of the common people of Hue and Central Viet Nam, relatively few of whom have ever seen him. And, it is amidst this setting, in a corner of the “living room” taken up by massive Vietnamese style, mother-of-pearl-encrusted furniture, birdcages occupied and vacant, flowers, and a large stuffed leopard, that visitors are normally received.
Can, himself, proved to be rather handsome individual of moderate stature and with a smooth, healthy, face. Contrary to expectations, he manifested none of his reputed shyness or aloofness, but seemed relaxed and friendly, although considerably less garrulous than the President or Nhu. He was dressed in the traditional Vietnamese fashion with black tunic and turban and wore sandals on his [Page 18] feet. His only jewelry was an occasionally-glimpsed plain gold bracelet, the gold buttons on his tunic, and his plastic and gold-rimmed spectacles.
It is generally believed, and it has yet to be proven otherwise, that Can, the second-youngest of the President’s immediate family, has steadfastly refused to adopt any Western manners or innovations. He clings to the traditional costume, refuses to speak French, although he uses occasional French words, and he prefers the peasant’s small conical, malodorous, home-rolled cigarette to the standard commercial variety. He is said to epitomize all the extreme features of the Hue environment—ultra-traditionalism, xenophobia, conservatism, and a general distrust of things or ideas new or foreign.
In general the conversation on February 17 was limited to pleasantries and platitudes, and, coupling his shyness with a hope for future contacts, no attempt was made to press him with political questions. Can explained that (unlike Nhu) he is not “Counselor to the Government” but only to various groups in this area. (On Vietnamese papers his official title is “Supreme Counselor to Political Groups in Central Viet Nam”.)
In response to various general inquiries, Can said he believed that despite the complaints of merchants and businessmen, the general economic situation in Central Viet Nam was better this year than last. Granted there might not be as much money circulating in the villages as there should be, but the people had plenty to eat, their clothes were adequate, and their physical well-being was generally improved over a year ago. In his opinion, there had been significant economic progress during the past year, and he was satisfied with the rate of this progress.
The important thing was to help the common people, said Can, and for this reason he regretted that so much of American aid was of a budgetary nature designed to support the military establishment. While very grateful for American assistance to Viet Nam and the Vietnamese people, he had occasionally criticized certain aspects of our aid program, he said, citing the inclusion of dried milk and cheese in food shipments to peasants as an example of the sort of thing he thought unwise. These were items the recipients either did not like or did not know how to use. He believed that above all else was the need to increase the material benefits to the people in the countryside, and to this end he had frequently tried to get the Vietnamese Army to assist in building rural roads and digging canals or helping the farmers with the harvests. Unfortunately, the “military region headquarters” had always told him that their “American advisers” would not permit them to do these things. (It is only within the past year that the Army in this area has been able to relinquish its police [Page 19] and security functions and to “reconcentrate” for an extensive and, in MAAG’s opinion, long overdue training program. While there may thus be some truth to Can’s complaint that MAAG objected to projects which would dissipate training time in non-military activities, it does not follow that even without American objections the Vietnamese military would have agreed to Can’s proposals. If what Can says here is true, it would seem primarily a good example of a standard Vietnamese willingness—although not only Vietnamese—to attribute the results of their reluctance to face unpleasant realities to someone else’s shortcomings.)
With regard to subversive activities and Viet Minh agents, Can explained that most of Central Viet Nam had been occupied by or under Viet Minh influence for almost nine years, during which time the people had experienced communism at first hand and found out what it was really like. For this reason, and despite any residual Viet Minh influence in this area, most of the people were “sincere revolutionaries” (supporters of the Government’s “National Revolution”). There were still some communists in this area, he said, and they must be tracked down and ferretted out. He added that in the South the situation was much different, but with the New Year the President planned to unleash an all-out campaign to destroy the subversive forces and bring peace and stability to the South.
Nguyen van Buu, a wealthy Central Viet Nam businessman and agent for Can, was present throughout the half-hour meeting but took no active part in it.
Comment:
What Can had to say is neither new nor startling, but primarily interesting as indicative of his attitude towards various problems. The picayune and now stereotyped complaints about cheese and powdered milk in food shipments seem in his mind to have obscured the fact that food was sent at all. And his satisfaction at the current rate of economic progress in Central Viet Nam is not shared by all.
What is interesting in the present instance is why the meeting took place, that is, why Can, who, according to friendly Vietnamese sources, had resolutely refused to receive the American Consul at Hue, suddenly changed his mind. It is possible that the event is attributable to a burst of good feeling occasioned by the forthcoming New Year celebrations, but it is more likely that he was prevailed upon, deferentially to be sure, by one or more of the younger, more liberal, and less tradition-bound members of his entourage to expose himself in this manner to outside contacts and, perhaps ultimately, to outside influences. Whether this is the case, or whether there is some other reason, it is evident that the sting of an unfavorable Time magazine [Page 20] commentary last year has worn off, and that Can is at least slightly more favorably disposed towards the United States than he is said to have been in times past. It can only be hoped that the February 17 interview will have paved the way for other, more fruitful, exchanges with him.
Note: It is requested that the existence or contents of this despatch not be made known to or discussed with any Vietnamese or foreign government officials.
Action Requested: Department please send one copy of this despatch to the American Embassies at Saigon, Paris, and London.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.11/2–2558. Confidential.↩
- In despatch 3, Barbour had reported that although he had been granted an interview with Mrs. Ngo Dinh Kha, mother of the President and his brothers, he had been unable to arrange a meeting with Ngo Dinh Can. (Ibid., 751G.11/8–3057)↩