Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

1. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State²

Saigon, January 24, 1958—11 a.m.

1537. Ref: Embtel 2772, Mar 9 [12]³ 1164 Dec 2, 1957;⁴ 1394 Jan 7, 1958;⁵ 1538 Jan 24, 1958;⁶ Deptel 2630, Apr 15 [9], 1957;⁷ Embdes 160, Nov 5, 1957;⁸ Embdes 238 Jan 6, 1958.⁹

Continuing problems posed by overt and covert status of TERM in Vietnam presently highlighted by ICC request GVN furnish estimate TERM duration in Vietnam (Embtel 1164). GVN liaison official with ICC asked us supply draft reply which, while relatively simple exercise as interim measure, will neither solve fundamental long-range problems nor deter ICC from pressing GVN in future. We can at least temporarily stall ICC with reply through GVN citing (1) examples magnitude remaining overt outshipment, disposal, scrap, salvage missions, (2) relatively untapped task inventorying large quantities MAP matériel, (3) difficulty predict withdrawal date. But, in view of anticipated continued pressure from ICC, it is perhaps advisable to give further consideration now, in the context following background and factors, to larger problem of TERM future.

After 18 months in Vietnam, TERM still temporary, and, in official view ICC, engaging only in disposal and scrap salvage work. Except for partial cover-up explanation given Indian ICC Commissioner Kaul (Embdes 238), only limited number Americans and Vietnamese here aware classified logistical training mission in which large majority TERM personnel engaged. (See, however, Embtel 1538) Scope of TERM’s overt missions diminishing, however, and we doubt seriously ICC will be satisfied 350 men required for present level TERM overt activity. As Dept aware, GVN Oct 22 letter to ICC on TERM promised monthly activities reports and invited Commission visit ten TERM sites (Embdes 160). ICC has not reacted to first seven reports, which show only limited operations June through Dec, but has requested permission visit four sites late Jan early Feb.

Only seven of original ten sites listed in appendix to GVN Oct 22 letter to ICC now operational (Embdes 160). After careful consideration, MAAG and TERM concluded that it would be useless to try to pretend three sites still active. Some of remaining sites are functioning with as few as two or three TERM personnel on hand. Will be harder to resist claims of Poles and possibly Indians that work TERM must obviously be drawing to a close. We are putting ever-increasing strain on credulity our Allies by presenting picture 350 TERM personnel industriously sorting, cataloging, outshipping, immersing, destroying, scrapping, salvaging, inventorying excess war matériel.

MAAG assures us there is large inventorying job required in connection needs ARVN units being reorganized, but as indicated earlier, other overt TERM activities either drying up or continuing at low plateau of activity. I believe the inventory mission plausible, but it is only relatively short-term palliative and does not diminish urgency I attach to complete new look as best way of providing MAAG adequate personnel to carry out its vital missions of training and equipping VN armed forces.

Difficult predict what courses ICC might follow after consideration GVN reply to its query on TERM duration. If dissatified, as seems likely, Commission would be powerless eject TERM but might eventually refer to co-chairmen TERM’s questionable legitimacy under Geneva Agreements, evidence its decreasing activity, and question as to “temporary” status. As Dept aware, USSR has suggested co-chairmen meetings on ICC financial matters and could be expected use such meetings, if held, to air series of Commie grievances (London 4198 Jan 17¹⁰).

I believe only two courses open to us, re-examination by Dept of 342-man MAAG ceiling, which has made most difficult execution increasingly important US military mission in Vietnam, or continuation present shell game. I discussed first course prior to my assignment here and again when I visited Washington during Diem visit May 1957, i.e. whether, in view changed atmosphere now, we should continue interpret Geneva Agreement as limiting MAAG to 342 ceiling since article 16 fails mention nationality “additional military personnel”.

In view foregoing, it seems advisable give further consideration steps outlined last para Deptel 2630 to carry through course D, by increasing MAAG ceiling or replacing TERM with new organization, recommended Embtel 2772.¹¹

The draft memorandum mentioned has not been found.

Durbrow

2. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5–MSP/1–2458. Secret; Limited Distribution. Passed to CINCPAC PolAd.
3. In telegram 2772, the Embassy reported that the ICC’s attitude to TERM was hardening and proposed four courses of action under lettered headings: A) virtually ignoring ICC complaints; B) gradual withdrawal of TERM; C) compliance with ICC demands; or D) replacing TERM with an expanded MAAG. (Ibid., 751G.5–MSP/3–1257) See Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. I, footnote 2, p. 781.
4. The Embassy transmitted in telegram 1164 an assessment of the ICC reaction to information provided by the Republic of Vietnam on TERM. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5–MSP/12–257)
5. In telegram 1394, Durbrow reported that a GAO, Tokyo-based team had examined U.S. military assistance to Vietnam and had revealed in its report that TERM was engaged in a training function. Durbrow suggested revisions in the language of the report to deemphasize TERM’s logistical training role. (Ibid., 751G.5–MSP/1–758)
6. The Embassy reported in telegram 1538 a breach of security about TERM’s training function in the September 1957 Army Information Digest and requested that the Department confer with the Department of Defense to insure that such a slip did not reoccur. (Ibid., 751G.5–MSP/1–2458)
7. In telegram 2630, the Department of State suggested that the Republic of Vietnam reply to ICC inquiries about TERM by leaving unanswered questions about its duration and avoiding acceptance of a narrow definition of its function. It also stated that a solution of the problem along the lines of incorporating TERM into an expanded MAAG (course D outlined in Embtel 2772 cited in footnote 3 above) was under study. (Ibid., 751G.5–MSP/3–1257).
8. Despatch 160 contains copies of the texts of an ICC letter to the Republic of Vietnam, February 13, 1957, requesting specific information on TERM, subsequent reminder letters by the ICC, and Vietnam’s response of October 22, 1957. (Ibid., 751G.5–MSP/11–557)
9. In despatch 238 the Embassy transmitted a memorandum of conversation of a discussion between Durbrow and ICC Vietnam Chairman Kaul during which TERM was discussed. (Ibid., 751G.00/1–658)
10. Not printed. (Ibid., 751G.00/1–1758)

11. According to a memorandum from Corcoran to Kocher, January 28, telegram 1537 occasioned the following review of the TERM–MAAG question:

    • “1. The situation has not changed substantially since we prepared the draft memorandum to the Secretary last July. The world wide cut in overseas U.S. Military personnel does not seem to have affected Viet-Nam, so we can’t pick up any credit on that score. Ambassador Durbrow’s 1537 merely revives Dan Anderson’s 2772 and Deptel 2630 which formed the basis for our draft memorandum to the Secretary.
    • “2. Our next step would seem to be to get a determination on high levels in the Department that it is now preferable to abandon the MAAG ceiling, liquidate TERM and accept the risk of ICC objection rather than continue the present arrangement which involves the risk of being accused of subterfuge. Ambassador Durbrow seems to think it is preferable to do so.
    • “3. Once we obtain this high level determination we can start sounding out friendly powers as described in the draft memorandum and in paragraph 3 of Deptel 2630.” (Ibid., Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, MAAG–TERM 1958)