Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

261. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, December 8, 1960—7 p.m.

1161. Our 466,² G–156,³ D–207.⁴ Expanding Communist guerrilla war in South Vietnam with its increasing threat of achievement of Communist objective of taking over free area of Vietnam poses in more acute form than at any time previously problem of border control between Cambodia and Vietnam. Build-up of Viet Cong Forces to more than 7,000 (our G–156) and Viet Cong progress toward establishment “liberated areas” in SVN (our despatch 207) underline importance considering further action US can take to ameliorate border control situation. Major part infiltration VC into Southern Vietnam believed accomplished via transit from DRV, through Laos and Cambodia.

Chief MAAG is convinced that this guerrilla war cannot be won by free world unless effective steps taken to plug up porous border. In connection counter insurgency plan now under preparation at Washington direction, MAAG is working our recommendations to GVN for expanding and improving its control system on both Cambodia and Lao borders. However, without improved Cambodian cooperation it is very doubtful that substantial improvement in control of border can be achieved.

Believe therefore US should explore all possible alternatives for improving Cambodian cooperation with GVN on this question. We suggest:

1. Consideration of further increase in US military aid beyond that already agreed to in response RKG request. This further increase would be contingent upon Cambodian agreement to effective border control arrangement. In view frequent previous Sihanouk statements RKG does not have wherewithal to patrol borders, increased military aid should relate primarily to types equipment required for more effective border control. Phnom Penh may wish comment on types equipment desirable.

In trying sell this quid pro quo to Sihanouk suggest stress greater threat to RKG posed by Vietnamese Communists than GVN. While RKG may feel that GVN has created problems for it, RKG could be certain that Communist-controlled South Vietnam would pose far greater threat to Cambodia’s security. Since current campaign against internal Communist influence demonstrates RKG aware Communist problem, we believe RKG may also recognize own interest served by improving border control cooperation with GVN.

Believe it would also be useful to remind RKG that free Khmer problem has disappeared during past few months. May therefore be in order for RKG to help GVN deal now with its dissident problem.

2. Urge French in view special influence they have had in Cambodia collaborate with us in attempting persuade RKG introduce more effective border control, as suggested our 466. French have frequently during recent months taken initiative to discuss with us what could be done to improve situation in SVN. French could be told here is concrete way in which they could help.

Chief MAAG concurs in above. Trimble⁵ who consulted during visit also concurs but may have some further comments.

Durbrow

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12–860. Secret. Sent also to Phnom Penh and Paris; repeated for information to Bangkok, London, Vientiane, Ottawa, New Delhi, and CINCPAC PolAd.
2. Document 186.
3. In this airgram, October 8, the Department transmitted the ARVN’s estimate of strength of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam as of September 1, 1960, at 7,252, an 85 percent increase over the previous estimate of April 30, 1960. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10–860)
4. In despatch 207, November 25, the Embassy described and analyzed the Viet Cong campaign of increased guerrilla warfare in the South beginning in September 1960. (Ibid., 751K.00/11–2560)
5. William C. Trimble, Ambassador to Cambodia.