Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

186. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, August 25, 1960—7 p.m.

466. Paris 723.² We providing material below to enable exchange views with French but believe some reserve should be used in discussions since French motives this area do not seem completely parallel ours. French interests and tactics under Gorce have been different in Cambodia and French approach to current Laos developments shows clear divergence from ours. In Vietnam we believe French views are closer to ours because we doubt French policy sees any alternative to Diem. However, except for Pinay’s personal influence French carry no political weight at all with Diem regime and therefore would not be unnatural for French to desire some greater sharing by Diem of authority with opposition intellectuals whom French may hope influence.

Within above context suggest discussions with French along following lines:

1. We continue firmly support Diem as strong, dedicated Nationalist and anti-Communist leader, who is making a sincere and extensive effort improve lot of Vietnamese people.

2. We glad note Diem’s recent talks to people at Agroville inaugurations and humanizing touch his actions as politician on these occasions. We hope GVN will expand publicity on these talks and actions. We also urging at appropriate opportunities other GVN actions to increase peasantry support of government, such as compensation Agroville labor and increase in price peasant receives for paddy, but believe it desirable French avoid raising such measures with GVN since there is better chance favorable action if GVN does not feel Western powers are ganging up to give it advice.

3. French likely stress opposition and demands Saigon intellectuals, such as petitions submitted by “eighteen”. If raised by French, suggest Paris reply that, while meeting certain of these demands would be desirable in GVN’s own interest, opposition intellectuals pose no real political threat in our view since they are without broad basis of political support, motivated in considerable measure by personal ambition, and cannot work together.

FYI. We believe it desirable avoid discussing with French the opposition within government and Can Lao Party and evidences army discontent, which we consider much more serious than chronic Saigon intellectual complaints. Again we working on these and do not want give idea of western ganging-up. End FYI.

4. French may also raise reports of possible Cabinet changes, since French Ambassador and staff here intrigued by this subject. If raised, suggest reply that changes may well occur, but we do not think they will be of any significance.

FYI: Certain rumored changes might however represent Diem effort eliminate opposition within government. End FYI.

5. French may raise Can–Nhu “rivalry”, another favorite French thesis. If so suggest reply be that we think family will stick together.

FYI. Inadvisable get into discussion of political merits of removal of Mr. and Mrs. Nhu and disbandment or surfacing of Can Lao Party. End FYI.

6. Internal security seriously deteriorated during early months 1960, improved somewhat in May and June as GVN Forces recovered some initiative, but has worsened again since July, especially in provinces north and east of Saigon. Lao Dong Party Congress starting Hanoi September 5 may well decide on measures designed intensify guerrilla pressures on GVN. GVN is however resolutely endeavoring counter enhanced security threat. It has centralized command over security forces in affected areas, is improving and expanding ARVN anti-guerrilla training, and Diem has told us he will not abandon countryside by pulling security forces back into towns. We are supporting GVN efforts by accelerate MAP deliveries, anti-guerrilla training assistance to ARVN, and program for upgrading civil guard.

French could also take action which would be of assistance. They could use their influence to induce French rubber plantation owners not to succumb Viet Cong pressure for possible pay-off payments. Plantation owners should realize such payments are contrary their real interest since Viet Cong take-over South Vietnam, as experience in North Vietnam has shown, would mean that French investments would soon totally disappear. French could also use their influence with Sihanouk to induce him cooperate effectively with GVN in reducing use of Cambodian territory by Viet Cong. Sihanouk should also be brought to realization that pressures on Cambodia would be magnified many fold if Viet Cong took over South Vietnam.

7. GVN gravely concerned about developments in Laos, which may weaken anti-Communist forces there, give Pathet Lao opportunity improve their position and could mean installation neutralist government soft on Communism. (See Embassy telegram 31 to Paris re Diem’s and Nhu’s conviction French behind recent Lao coup.³) No indications received of GVN military intervention in Laos, but GVN is watching situation as well as reactions Western powers closely.

8. Do not understand Roux concern despatch GVN Forces Mekong. This been going on many months to strengthen anti-Viet Cong operations. It may refer to question raised by French Ambassador recently why Vietnam Navy moving to delta area. We have checked and there are no unusual naval movements.

Durbrow

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651.51K/8–2560. Secret. Repeated for information to London, Phnom Penh, CINCPAC PolAd, Bangkok, and Vientiane.

2. In telegram 723, August 23, the Embassy in France reported that an Embassy official met with Jacques Roux, Deputy Director for Political Affairs of the French Foreign Ministry to discuss Laos and Vietnam. According to the telegram, the discussion was as follows:

   • “3. Roux also said Foreign Office disquieted re attitude GVN and said French had indications Saigon might be giving moral and [garble] material support General Phoumi. (He thought Bangkok presently being reasonably discreet.) Roux estimated despatch GVN. forces to lower Mekong probably due difficulties with Vietminh but one could not be sure. French concerned also re internal situation South Vietnam where Diem experiencing increasing difficulty and said French had indications Hanoi might be preparing new moves. He asked US-French exchange information and views re Vietnam. Embassy officer said we would pass this request along with view discussion later this week.
   • “4. Would appreciate resume situation from Embassy Saigon both with respect internal troubles and repercussions from Laos and guidance from Department for proposed exchange with French.” (Ibid., 651.51K/8–2360)

3. In telegram 31, August 25, sent to the Department as 463 and repeated to Paris as 31, Durbrow reported a conversation with Diem and Nhu on August 24. Durbrow described Nhu’s conviction that France was behind the Kong Le coup as follows: “Nhu more than ever convinced French Government not just French colonial elements Laos were behind coup. He also convinced French encouraging opposition elements Viet-Nam in order bring about more neutralist GVN attitude. He attributed French attitude to mistaken belief that by diminishing US influence Laos and Viet-Nam French can regain some of lost prestige in this area. Nhu cited Viet Cong-French agreement re Vietnamese in New Caledonia as example De Gaulle’s mistaken belief must appease Viet Cong in order diminish VC desire take over Laos or SVN and cited strong neutralist position of Kong Le and Souvanna as example same French attitude.” (Ibid., 751J.00/8–2560)