Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

210. Outline Plan Prepared by the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam¹

Saigon, October 27, 1960.

U.S. PLAN FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY IN SOUTH VIETNAM

[Here follows a table of contents.]

Introduction

1. References:

a. Letter, CINCPAC (JOO) Ser. 00211, dated 27 April 1960, subject: Counterinsurgency Operations in South Vietnam and Laos, with:

(1) Inclosure, CINCPAC Study, dated 26 April 60,² same subject.

b. Message 982994, OASD/ISA to CINCPAC, info CHMAAG and US Ambassador, dated 162156Z September 1960.³

c. Joint State–DOD Message Nr 658, October 19, 1 PM.⁴

d. Draft Study, Hq MAAG, VN, dated 26 Oct 60, subject: Internal Security Problem, SVN (U).⁵

2. Requirement: The continuing communist inspired and directed insurgency in South Vietnam dictates development by the Country Team of policies and overall plans to encourage, and support development by the GVN of an effective national emergency effort to defeat insurgency and restore political and economic stability. However, programming and training lead times preclude GVN dependence on substantial military force increase as the basis for the increased capability required immediately. For this reason, increasing Civil Guard and current regular force effectiveness is vital. But, the threat is economic and political as well as military. The effectiveness of para-military forces and the capabilities of regular armed forces must be enhanced, to be sure, to include the ultimate force increase required for destruction of the Viet Cong and continued maintenance of security. Also, and equally important, the Country Team and GVN must act positively on a fully coordinated basis to improve government, create economic stability, and develop appropriate socio-psychological measures.

3. Purpose: The MAAG outline plan for a US Counterinsurgency Plan, SVN contains the basis for development by the Country Team of a detailed plan describing GVN tasks and US support necessary to accomplish the requirements described in paragraph 2 above. Upon approval by Washington, such a detailed plan would be the basis for US advice and assistance to the GVN.

4. Scope:

a. This plan supports the CINCPAC and OASD/ISA plan for counterinsurgency operations in SVN (reference 1 a and b above), and is, therefore, in accordance with the Joint State–DOD message, reference 1 c above, which suggests the Country Team development of such a plan. The plan also contains and justifies military requirements for personnel, materiel, budgeting support, and organizational and operational concepts. In addition, other MAAG staff papers now in varying stages of coordination with the Country Team, support this plan in detail. In particular the staff study on the internal security situation in South Vietnam, reference 1 d above, is tangential to this plan. The referenced study describes in detail the multi-sided nature of the internal security problem; establishes the requirement for a coordinated and supporting relationship between military and non-military aspects in the current emergency situation; and recommends GVN and US actions in consonance with tasks contained herein. Other significant studies include requirements for increases in the GVN force basis; changes in governmental (military) structure; transfer of the Civil Guard to Department of Defense; and increased tactical effectiveness of RVNAF and para-military units.

b. The plan has been developed to represent fully the objectives and tasks for Country Team and GVN. However, only military and allied non-military aspects are justified in detail, with the idea that complete development and refinement of the requirements can only be accomplished by Country Team action.

[Basic Plan]⁶

Task Organization:

A. GVN

1. SPGDN

2. DOD

a. RVNAF (See Annex A, RVNAF Force Basis)

b. ABA

c. PSYWAR Directorate

3. Other Civil Agencies

B. Country Team

1. US Embassy

2. USOM

3. MAAG

4. USIS

1. Situation:

a. General:

(1) Communist-inspired insurgency in SVN, aimed at the destruction of authority and prestige of established government, is a prelude to further inroads designed ultimately to absorb SVN into the Communist Bloc.

(2) Existing Conditions:

(a) General. Developments in South Vietnam over the past ten months indicate a trend that is adverse to the stability and effectiveness of President Diem’s government. Beginning in December 1959 and continuing to the present, there has been a mounting increase throughout South Vietnam of Viet Cong terrorist activities and guerrilla warfare. This activity has included armed propaganda and leaflet distribution; taxing of the population for food, money, and medicines; kidnapping and murder of village and hamlet officials; road and canal ambushes; and armed attacks against agrovilles, land development centers, Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps posts, as well as small army units. Through the use of these tactics, current Viet Cong military and political objectives are the overthrow of the Diem government by the end of 1960. Failing in this, their objectives are to eliminate any semblance of GVN control of the Mekong Delta and establish a so-called “liberated zone” in this area.

(b) Political. Politically, discontent with the Diem Government has been prevalent for some time among intellectuals and elite circles and, to some extent, labor and urban business groups. Criticism by these elements focuses on Ngo family rule, especially the roles of the President’s brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and Madame Nhu and the influence of the clandestine Can Lao, political apparatus of the regime. An even more important element in the political situation is the growing criticism of the President’s leadership within government circles, including the official bureaucracy and the military. In the past, such discontent and criticism had been centered on Diem’s brothers, Ngo Dinh Nhu and Ngo Dinh Can, as directors of the allegedly corrupt Can Lao Party. Further aggravating many of the government’s problems is the active and partly successful campaign of the Viet Cong to discredit President Diem and weaken the government’s authority through political subversion, as well as through military action. The Viet Cong has had considerable success in sowing disaffection and disrupting effective administration of the government among the population. This is especially true in the Capital, 1st and 5th Military Regions. Viet Cong successes in these regions are due to the large number of sympathizers among the population. ARVN J2 estimates that at least 25%, or 2,000,000, of the people in these three regions are Communist sympathizers, while another 25% (2,000,000) are “sitting on the fence.” Aided by this large number of Viet Cong sympathizers and the equally substantial neutral element, the Viet Cong has established a political apparatus parallel to the GVN. Below province level, in the 5th Military Region, no effective GVN control exists in many areas. The Viet Cong are increasing the void by taxation, terroristic acts, attacks on Self Defense posts, assassination of village and provincial officials, and simultaneously a systematic development of the Viet Cong political apparatus to fill the void. In view of the above conditions the principal task facing the GVN is restoration of individual security.

(c) Military. Militarily, the RVNAF is on the defensive. Approximately 70% of ARVN is committed to pacification, but mostly to static-type guard and security. The military chain of command is usually violated at the expense of unity of effort and command. The Presidency exercises arbitrary control of operations, subverting the JGS and often times Corps and Division staff and command channels. Resources are fragmented to provincial control. The above practices appear to be deliberate and designed to prevent the present government from losing control through a military coup. To top all the above off, the Civil Guard has been ineffective in the internal security role, thereby requiring the large RVNAF commitment, which has further resulted in a serious weakening of the RVNAF capability for defense against overt attack.

(d) Summary. In view of known communist objectives in SVN and of the known general situation and steadily deteriorating political and military situation, if the GVN does not take immediate and extraordinary action to correct the organizational and procedural weaknesses which contribute to the growth of the Viet Cong power and increasing disaffection of that portion of the population loyal to the GVN, the Viet Cong can cause the overthrow of the present GVN government in the months to come.

(3) Requirement. Programming and training lead times preclude dependence on substantial military force increase as the basis for the increased capability required to immediately cope with the Viet Cong. For this reason, increasing Civil Guard and current regular force effectiveness is vital. However, the threat is multi-sided, not only military. The effectiveness of para-military forces and the capabilities of regular armed forces must be enhanced, to be sure. But also, and equally important, as indicated in par 2b above, positive action is mandatory to improve government, create economic stability, and develop appropriate socio-psychological measures. Therefore, in general, the GVN must cope with the current emergency situation with available resources, while at the same time developing the increased force structure required both to insure the eventual destruction of the Viet Cong insurgency threat and thereafter the continued security for the populace and to deter or meet overt communist attack from North Vietnam.

b. Enemy Forces. See Annex B, Intelligence.

c. Friendly Forces. See current US operations plans.

d. Assumptions:

(1) That the greatest immediate threat to the continued existence of the Republic of Vietnam is posed by the eventual solidification of guerilla warfare by the Vietnamese Communists, with the Mekong Delta as a political and military base.

(2) That North Vietnam has the capability of infiltrating covertly into South Vietnam two to three divisions of regular forces to support guerilla forces in this effort (par 3d(l) above).

(3) That the Government of Vietnam has the basic potential to cope with this threat if necessary corrective measures are taken.

(4) That the gravity of this threat will continue until a maximum offensive and coordinated retaliatory effort is made by civil and military authorities.

(5) That the most immediate consideration of US policy in Vietnam is to create governmental stability by the eradication of insurgency in the Republic of Vietnam and to that end the activities of all US agencies will be coordinated.

(6) That the Viet Cong, in coordination with the communist parties of Laos and Cambodia, will build up to a maximum effort against the Republic of Vietnam between now and the April 61 elections as the next immediate goal.

2. Mission: Defeat Communist insurgency efforts in SVN.

3. Execution:

a. Objectives:

(1) GVN:

(a) Establish and maintain political and economic control and stability.

(b) Suppress and defeat disruptive Communist activities in South Vietnam.

(c) Interdict aid flowing to insurgents across Vietnamese borders, to include both police and military action in coordination with the adjacent nations of Laos and Cambodia.

(2) Country Team:

(a) Induce the GVN to adopt and vigorously prosecute Country Team Plans designed to defeat Communist insurgency.

b. Tasks:

(1) GVN:

(a) Establish an Emergency Operations Control System to include (Appendix I, Annex C⁷):

1. A national emergency council (GVN established an Internal Security Council 7 Oct 60).

2. A director of operations (Permanent Secretary for National Defense so designated 7 Oct 60).

3. Commander’s sub-council with responsive Regional, Provincial, and village executive councils.

(b) Implement fully planning aspects of the national planning, programming, and budgeting system (Appendix II, Annex C⁸).

(c) Develop and employ to optimum RVNAF capabilities to support emergency and related internal security operations on a fully coordinated schedule (Appendix II, Annex C).

(d) Take extraordinary action starting at highest levels of government and extending to the lower political subdivision (the village) to establish and maintain internal security (Appendix IV, Annex C⁹).

(e) Assign high priority to the development of intelligence/counterintelligence staff and operational procedure to provide not only timely and accurate knowledge of Viet Cong activities and organization within Vietnam, but also provide information to enable the GVN to correct sociological and economic problems which the communists are exploiting (Appendix V, Annex C¹⁰).

(f) Develop an adequate border/coastal patrol system (Appendix VI, Annex C¹¹).

(g) Develop an adequate communication capability within GVN agencies to support emergency and related internal security operations (Appendix VIII, Annex C¹²).

(h) Employ full use of psychological and civil affairs programs in support of internal security actions (Appendix VIII and IX,¹³ Annex C).

(i) Establish concurrently means for assuring continued security and a base for political and economic stability and development (Appendix X, Annex C¹⁴).

(j) Place the Civil Guard under the control of the Department of Defense for the duration of the emergency (Appendix XI, Annex C¹⁵).

(2) Country Team:

(a) Develop combined plans and concepts for counterinsurgency operations in SVN.

(b) Influence the GVN to accept and implement US concepts for counterinsurgency operations in SVN.

(c) Coordinate US administrative logistics support to the GVN.

(d) Tailor Country Team organizations and operations to meet the requirements of the above tasks.

c. Concept of Operations:

(1) GVN:

(a) General:

1. Politico/Military Operations. In order to provide protection which the people require, it is necessary to exercise more than an ordinary degree of control over the population. Among the more important operations required are those for exercising control in such manner as to isolate insurgents and sympathizers from the support of the populace. Such techniques as registration and identification, food control and control of movement will be implemented as offering the best prospects for success. Control measures instituted will require support by psychological warfare and information programs to gain and maintain popular confidence and support. Destructive influences in public office will be removed.

2. Military Operations. An effective continuing military system should remain in place, with a capability for reinforcing the permanent local security establishment, since it is not sufficient to defeat or suppress insurgents temporarily or to establish control in one area and then move the counterinsurgency forces to a new area, thus allowing insurgents to reestablish themselves. In addition, the GVN must retain at least two divisions on the high plateau and two divisions in the area of the 17th Parallel as deterrence against and preparation for overt attack and as a deterrent against further Viet Cong expansion in those areas. The regular military establishment of South Vietnam has the capability to fight either guerillas or external aggressors; however, they are not capable of accomplishing these missions simultaneously with indigenous resources. The GVN, with US Country Team assistance as required, will accelerate efforts to train and equip para-military (militia-type home guard and Civil Guard) and police forces. For the duration of the emergency campaign, operational control of all security activities will be under centralized direction. Border and coastal patrol operations, being fundamental to the campaign to prevent insurgents receiving support from areas outside of South Vietnam, will be closely coordinated with other Vietnamese ground, air and naval operations in the Counterinsurgency Campaign. The GVN will also coordinate these operations with Cambodia and Laos, as politically feasible.

(b) Specific Task Concepts. An analysis of each task listed under paragraph 3b(l) above is at Appendix I-XI, Annex C. Included is a statement of purpose, scope and situation; a detailed concept; and an analysis of the implications for implementation.

(2) Country Team. See paragraph 3b(2) above.

4. Administration and Logistics:

a. GVN: See Annex D.

b. Country Team: US administrative and logistic support to the GVN will be coordinated by the Ambassador.

5. Command and Signal:

a. GVN:

(1) Command Relationships. (See Tabs A, B, C,¹⁶ Appendix I, Annex C.)

(2) Communications. See Appendix VII, Annex C.¹⁷

b. Country Team

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Lansdale Papers: FRC 63 A 1803, MAAG–VN Outline Plan. Secret. Only the “Introduction” and the “Basic Plan” are printed here. Omitted are four annexes: A, “Task Organization”; B, “Intelligence”; C, “Concept of Operations”; and D, “Logistics”. The date of October 27 is on the title page and the “Introduction”. The “Basic Plan” is dated November 7; the table of contents is dated November 9.
2. Neither printed, but see footnote 3, Document 170.
3. Document 196.
4. Document 206.
5. Not found.
6. This section is so identified in the table of contents.
7. Entitled “GVN Counterinsurgency Operations Control System.”
8. ”National Planning.”
9. ”Extraordinary Actions.”
10. ”Development of Intelligence/Counterintelligence.’
11. “Border/Coastal Patrol.”
12. ”Psychological Problems.”
13. ”Civil Affairs.”
14. ”Continued Stability and Security.”
15. ”Civil Guard.”
16. Tab A: “Organization of the Ministry of Defense;” Tab B: “Proposed Organization for National Security;” Tab C: “Proposed Organization Department of National Defense and Joint Staff.”
17. ”Communications.”