249. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State1
1129. Embtel 1118.2 Diem received me one hour 26th. I was wrong in believing Diem’s illness was diplomatic since it obvious he still suffering from sore throat. He was, however, quite relaxed and pleasant although still rankled by American and other press stories. Following highlights conversation:
I opened conversation by reiterating gratification my government he able suppress coup speedily and minimize bloodshed, adding USG particularly pleased hear he planning speed up reforms he had already started. I suggested it might be mutually beneficial discuss reforms and assured him we would be as helpful as we could.
Diem replied most essential thing to do is to help peasants at village level by doing all possible to cater their needs, give them protection and obtain their collaboration. He stated too many officials had been making fine speeches about what should do for peasants without taking any effective action and ministries are overstaffed with functionaries who prefer reside big cities instead of going out help masses. Diem ordering ministries send best cadres countryside [Page 689] to help peasants. He urging young medical graduates to make sacrifices by spending two years in country rather than trying to start lucrative city practices. He arranging elections by village youth to pick representative to work with village elders in interests youth. He has for some time been endeavoring pick and train qualified cadre to be G–2 for SDC at village level to obtain first hand intelligence at this level. He stated he had not yet been able find qualified man of integrity to head national intelligence organization but hopes obtain such person from among university professors. He must find man of integrity with solid reputation for full objectivity.
I asked whether he planned to implement his suggestion to hold elections for representatives of various professions and strata of population to form district, province and national level groups as part of national economic council set-up. Diem replied he will do this but it would be wrong to rush into such elections until various lower-level organizations are properly established, such as village-level farmers associations, retail traders, etc. and thus assure that when elections take place they will be fully representative. I urged him do this or allow elections for village elders in order make clear to masses that their desires are being taken into consideration. Diem indicated he planning do something along these lines but except for election youth representative to elder group, he not planning other elections near future.
I asked Diem significance press announcement of new decree stating Civil Guard, while remaining under Interior would be trained and equipped by Defense. (I had not seen text of decree.) He replied while Civil Guard would technically still remain under Interior, decree provided that as many elements as needed would be put under control Defense for training, equipping and operations. He stated since CG pay scale lower than ARVN, would have bad effect morale if entire Civil Guard under Defense and practically integrated into Army. He added decree was worded so as to give flexibility. I reminded Diem that unless it clear that CG elements we assisting are under control Defense we could not furnish MAP equipment for CG nor could MAAG do training. Without going into detail. Diem assured me decree covered these points. I asked him whether Civil Guard would be under operational control military commanders. He stated they would but indicated province chiefs and their military advisers would in certain circumstances have use elements of CG. I stated I hoped decree made it quite clear that military commanders had first priority and operational control all security units since this only way to assure effective use these forces against VC. Without going into details. Diem assured me this correct. I stated that I understood military commanders fifth, capital and first military regions already have such operational control but understood commanders [Page 690] other regions did not. Diem replied this incorrect since, for instance. General Dinh had full operational control CG in fourth region. I then asked Diem significance announced decree putting SDC under Civil Guard. He replied SDC had always been under Interior but administered separately. By placing SDC under administration CG would permit elimination SDC administrative organization, save personnel and make more effective administration both organizations.
In this connection Diem stated, without giving details, that Gen Nguyen Khanh, who directed loyal forces from Palace during coup, would henceforth have top military planning and operational command under directives issued by Internal Security Council.
In not too pointed way Diem complained about unfounded foreign press stories about corruption SVN. He claimed GVN record in eliminating corruption better than all countries SEA. He added it only helped Communists have foreign press talk about corruption when all they were doing was spreading rumors which not backed by facts. He added that if correspondents and others had facts regarding corruption they should make it known to government in order that proper measures could be taken rather than just spread wild rumors.
He ended conversation by outlining results of investigation he had made re reasons Colonels Dong and Hong had revolted. Investigations disclosed they and their wives were quite high livers, gamblers, whose main reasons for disgruntlement was need for more money. During negotiations with Dong he kept pressing to get list of committee members, but it became obvious except for few fellow officers and Dong’s uncle Hoang Co Thuy, no one of consequence on committee which obviously represented no serious elements in country. At one point when Diem on phone with Dong during coup he pressed latter give him names key ministers for new government. Dong said for instance Gen Ty would make good Minister of Defense. Since Gen Ty was rebel captive Diem asked to speak to him. When Diem asked Gen Ty if he would like be Min Defense he categorically refused. Dong then suggested Gen Duong Van Minh (Big). Diem knowing Minh was at Vice President’s house asked him same question. He too refused stating he would gladly lead troops anywhere for Diem but being soldier had no interest in nor capacity for political job. (This confirmed by Gardiner who at Vice President’s house at time Diem called.)
Comment: It somewhat encouraging Diem emphasized need to do more for and win over peasants as well as organized village-level intelligence capability. Whether his efforts will be effective and implemented soon enough is not too sure. His explanation re control of CG needs considerable clarification. It is to be hoped Diem will in fact let Gen Khanh act as overall operations commander instead of [Page 691] Diem moving units around on his own without much rhyme or reason.
I detected nothing which would indicate Diem plans act in vengeful way against rebels and their sympathizers.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.51K/11–2660. Secret. Repeated for information to Bangkok, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, and CINCPAC PolAd.↩
- In telegram 1118, November 22, Durbrow reported that Diem postponed the Ambassador’s request for an interview from November 21 to at least November 24 on grounds that he had an inflamed throat and needed rest. Durbrow thought Diem’s illness might be diplomatic based on his anger with Durbrow for his alleged support of the rebels in the recent coup. (Ibid., 611.51K/11–2260)↩